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Preface
Welcome to the second edition of the Workshop on Natural Language Processing for Internet Freedom
(NLP4IF 2019). This year, we focused on censorship, disinformation, and propaganda.
We further featured a shared task on the identification of propaganda in news articles. The task included
two subtasks with different levels of complexity. Given a news article, the FLC subtask (fragment-level
classification) asked for the identification of the propagandistic text fragments and also for the prediction
of the specific propaganda technique used in this fragment (18-way classification task). The SLC subtask
(sentence-level classification) is a binary classification task, which asked to detect the sentences that
contain propaganda. A total of 39 teams submitted runs; 21 teams participated in the FLC subtask and
35 teams took part in the SLC subtask. Fourteen participants submitted a system description paper, which
include models based on a wide range of learning models (e.g., neural networks, logistic regression) and
representations (e.g., manually-engineered features, distributional representations).
We accepted a total of 24 papers: 10 for the regular track and 14 for the shared task. We are excited that
the workshop includes a diverse set of topics: rumor and trolls detection, censorship and controversy,
fake news vs. satire, uncovering propaganda and abusive language identification.
We are also thrilled to be able to bring an invited speaker, Elissa Redmiles from Princeton University
and Microsoft Research, with a talk on measuring human perception to defend democracy, exploring a
specific attack on the freedom of U.S. elections – the IRA Facebook advertisements, which successfully
influenced people and avoided detection – and a defense against propaganda, which uses human
perceptions to defend against the very propaganda that aims to influence those perceptions.
Last but not least, we would like to thank the program committee and the shared task participants for
their help with reviewing the papers, and with advertising the workshop.
The NLP4IF 2019 Organizers:
Anna Feldman
Giovanni Da San Martino
Alberto Barr´on-Cedeño
Chris Brew
Chris Leberknight
Preslav Nakov
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Abstract
Widespread Chinese social media applications
such as Weibo are widely known for monitor-
ing and deleting posts to conform to Chinese
government requirements. In this paper, we
focus on analyzing a dataset of censored and
uncensored posts in Weibo. Despite previous
work that only considers text content of posts,
we take a multi-modal approach that takes into
account both text and image content. We cate-
gorize this dataset into 14 categories that have
the potential to be censored on Weibo, and
seek to quantify censorship by topic. Specif-
ically, we investigate how different factors in-
teract to affect censorship. We also investigate
how consistently and how quickly different
topics are censored. To this end, we have as-
sembled an image dataset with 18,966 images,
as well as a text dataset with 994 posts from
14 categories. We then utilized deep learning,
CNN localization, and NLP techniques to an-
alyze the target dataset and extract categories,
for further analysis to better understand cen-
sorship mechanisms in Weibo.
We found that sentiment is the only indica-
tor of censorship that is consistent across the
variety of topics we identified. Our finding
matches with recently leaked logs from Sina
Weibo. We also discovered that most cate-
gories like those related to anti-government
actions (e.g. protest) or categories related to
politicians (e.g. Xi Jinping) are often cen-
sored, whereas some categories such as crisis-
related categories (e.g. rainstorm) are less fre-
quently censored. We also found that censored
posts across all categories are deleted in three
hours on average.
1 Introduction
Human monitoring of social media posts and the
subsequent deletion of posts that are considered
sensitive is an important aspect of Internet cen-
sorship for academic study. Seeing a post get re-
moved by the censors gives valuable information
to researchers, including the content that was cen-
sored and the amount of time it was visible before
being deleted. This information can provide in-
sights into the censors’ policies and priorities. A
better understanding of censors’ motivations can
lead to more effective ways of addressing Internet
censorship, be they technical, political, legal, eco-
nomic, or otherwise.
Censorship of Chinese social media is a com-
plex process that involves many factors. There are
multiple stakeholders and many different interests:
economic, political, legal, personal, etc., which
means that there is not a single strategy dictated
by a single government authority (Miller, 2017).
Moreover, sometimes Chinese social media do not
follow the directives of government, out of con-
cern that they are more strictly censoring than their
competitors (Miller, 2017).
Past literature in censorship of Chinese social
media has attempted to make general statements
about what kinds of features lead to a given post
being likely to be censored. Researchers have
posited the topic of a post (e.g., what keywords it
contains) (Bamman et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 2013),
how viral or popular the post is (e.g., how much it
is reposted and commented on) (Zhu et al., 2013),
the collective action potential (how likely it is to
lead to, e.g., protests) (King et al., 2013), and the
individual posting the content (Miller and Gal-
lagher, 2019), as major features that determine
how high of a priority deleting the post is for
the censors. However, no study to date with re-
spect to censorship in China has considered the
multimodal nature of social media, and past stud-
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ies have relied on relatively narrow datasets (e.g.,
spanning months rather than years or only follow-
ing a small set of users).
In this paper, we focus on Sina Weibo and
use Weiboscope dataset (Fu et al., 2013), which
tracks 120,000 users over 4 years (2015–2018) in
Sina Weibo and includes 128,044 posts, of which
64,022 were censored. The WeiboScope dataset
has only two categories, censored and uncensored,
and does not include the reason for censorship. In
particular, this dataset is not labeled by topics and
it is very time-consuming to manually categorize
them. We identify fourteen topics that both (1) saw
a significant amount of censorship in the Weibo-
Scope dataset; and, (2) could be identified through
both images and text. To analyze the dataset we
take a multi-modal approach that takes into ac-
count both text and images that appear in posts.
We then test the effect of various factors that may
affect censorship that were identified by past liter-
ature on the lifetime of posts.
Sina Weibo is one of the most popular social
media platforms in China (“Weibo” means “mi-
croblog” in Chinese). After the Urumqi riots, Chi-
nese authorities shut down all social media plat-
forms including Twitter, Facebook, and local so-
cial media platforms. Sina Weibo provides mi-
croblogging services similar to Twitter but was de-
signed to block posts with content that does not
comply with the Chinese government’s require-
ments. Weibo users can re-post and follow other
users, mention other people with @UserName, and
add hashtags using #HashName#. More impor-
tantly for this study, Weibo also allows embed-
ded photos. As of July 2018, Weibo has over
441 million active users, which surpasses Twitter’s
339 million active users (wei, 2017).
To analyze the WeiboScope dataset, we take a
semi-automated multi-modal approach and utilize
deep learning, CNN localization, and NLP tech-
niques. To train our image and text classifiers, we
first assembled our own image and text datasets
from 14 interesting categories that are potential
topics for censorship on Weibo and any other so-
cial media platforms in China. We refer to the im-
age dataset as CCTI14 (Chinese Censored Topics
Images), and to the text dataset as CCTT14 (Chi-
nese Censored Topics Text). After training classi-
fiers with CCTI14 and CCTT14, we categorize the
WeiboScope dataset into our 14 categories.
These categories are selected based on previ-
ous research, domain knowledge, and known cen-
sorship events in China. CCTI14 has 18,966 la-
beled images and CCTT14 has 994 labeled texts
from 14 categories as well as an “Other” category.
These categories are as follows (in alphabetical or-
der): 1) Bo Xilai, 2) Deng Xiaoping, 3) Fire, 4) In-
jury/Dead, 5) Liu Xiaobo, 6) Mao Zedong, 7) Peo-
ple’s congress, 8) Policeman/Military forces, 9)
Protest, 10) Prurient/Nudity, 11) Rainstorm, 12)
Winnie the Pooh, 13) Xi Jinping, 14) Zhou Kehua.
We trained an image classifier over the CCTI14
dataset using the VGG network (Simonyan and
Zisserman, 2014) and it achieved a 97% F1-score.
We also trained a text classifier over the CCTT14
dataset that achieved a 95% F1-score. We used
our classifiers to classify both censored and uncen-
sored posts from the target dataset under study into
the above-mentioned 14 categories. Because of a
flag in the Weibo API, we can distinguish between
deletions by a post’s author and by the Weibo sys-
tem itself, providing ground truth for which posts
have been censored.
We found that sentiment is the only indicator
of censorship that is consistent across the variety
of topics we identified. We also found that most
of the categories (e.g., protest) are often censored,
whereas some categories (e.g., rainstorm) are less
frequently censored. This suggests that different
topics can be censored with different levels of con-
sistency. We also found that the median lifetime of
the posts that were censored in a category is less
than three hours on average, which confirms that
censors can quickly delete sensitive posts.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the
first to look at both text and image content of posts
being censored and not just at the text content.
We hope that our datasets, CCTI14 and CCTT14,
which are the first datasets labeled by topics as-
sembled for studying China’s censorship, can help
other researchers to uncover image and text cen-
sorship mechanisms in other social media plat-
forms in China, and that our techniques can be ap-
plied in other contexts.
In summary, this paper presents the following
contributions:
• We introduce CCTI14 and CCTT14, the first
image and text datasets labeled by topics as-
sembled specifically for studying image and
text censorship in Chinese social media.
• We train a CNN model over CCTI14 that
achieves 97% F1-score, and a text classifier
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over CCTT14 that achieves 95% F1-score, to
automatically classify the target dataset under
study of this paper, based on both image and
text content.
• We use a CNN localization technique to dou-
ble check that our categories and our trained
image model produce an intuitive model.
• For each category, we analyze how quickly
and how often it is censored. We also per-
form survival analysis per category to inves-
tigate how different factors interact to affect
the lifetime of a post.
• We make CCTI14, CCTT14, our code, and
our trained models publicly available to help
important efforts such as those to understand
image and text censorship or to identify top-
ics that are likely to be censored.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the dataset under study of this paper.
Section 3 explains our methods. Section 4 presents
our analysis and results, and Section 5 presents re-
lated work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 WeiboScope Dataset
WeiboScope tracks about 120,000 users from
three samples:
1. User accounts with high going-viral poten-
tial, measured by the number of followers.
2. A group of accounts whose posts are known
to have a high likelihood to be censored,
such as individual media, NGOs, human right
lawyers, grassroots leaders, or key opinion
leaders, etc.
3. A random sample of accounts generated by
randomly selecting users’ unique identity
codes.
By following the tracked users as “friends”, the
user’s recently modified timeline is compared to
the previous version, every 20 minutes, to discover
if any posts had been deleted. When a post is miss-
ing, Weibo returns two possible messages: “weibo
does not exist” or “permission denied”. The latter
is returned when the censors make the post inac-
cessible to others, and the former message is re-
turned when the user voluntarily deletes the post
or the censors remove it entirely. Since there is
no feasible way to determine who deleted a post,
we only consider posts deleted by a “permission
denied” message to be censored.
From January 2015 through April 2018, Weibo-
Scope collected 64,022 censored and more than 40
million uncensored posts by tracking the above-
mentioned users. In this paper, to be able to com-
pare censored and uncensored posts, we randomly
selected 64,022 uncensored posts from the 40 mil-
lion uncensored posts. We know that these posts
are uncensored since they were not deleted by the
censor or the user. Thus the reduced WeiboScope
dataset that we study in this paper has 64,022
censored posts and 64,022 uncensored posts from
2015 through 2018.
3 Methods
During the analysis of the target dataset, we en-
countered a number of challenges that we present
here. We also describe CCTI14 and CCTT14
datasets and our image and text classifiers to ad-
dress these challenges.
3.1 Challenges
Here, we describe the challenges that we en-
countered over the course of analyzing the target
dataset.
The possibility of interactions between mul-
tiple factors: To decide whether to censor a post,
the censors may use any of the factors recorded
in our datasets: images, text, number of reposts,
number of comments, or the user account making
the post. Furthermore, censors may also use fac-
tors not recorded in our datasets, such as number
of views or information about the political situa-
tion at the time. The last possibility highlights that
censorship may change over time. Furthermore,
censorship might even depend upon ideally irrev-
erent factors, such as the motivation of a human
monitor on a particular day.
Lack of experimental data: Additionally, hav-
ing access to observational data but not experi-
mental data means that any found patterns may be
correlated with censorship but not actually caus-
ing it. This issue limits our abilities to draw con-
clusions about the causes of censorship. While can
find patterns predictive of censorship, between this
limitation and the multiple possible factors dis-
cussed above, we cannot draw firm conclusions
about why a post is censored.
Clustering methods do not work here: Lack-
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ing pre-defined categories, it may be tempting to
automatically categorize the images in the target
dataset with clustering algorithms. However, since
the target dataset has very diverse images, cluster-
ing algorithms do not work well. We tried sev-
eral clustering algorithms (e.g., hierarchical and
K-means), but none of them was able to cluster
the images in a way that we could learn some-
thing from the categories. The clustering algo-
rithms would either come up with: i) too many
categories (where many of them have only a few
images), which render the clustering useless, or
ii) with a reasonable number of categories each of
which contains many diverse images from which,
again, nothing could be learned.
There is no image or text dataset available for
studying image and text censorship: Further-
more, in order to be able to use ML classification
methods to categorize images and texts, annotated
image and text datasets are needed that is partic-
ularly designed for studying censorship in China,
but there is no such datasets publicly available.
To overcome these challenges, we take the very
first step in collecting image and text datasets par-
ticularly for studying image and text censorship in
Chinese social media. We refer to these datasets as
CCTI14 (Chinese Censorsed Topics Images) and
CCTT14 (Chinese Censorsed Topics Text). Then
we train classifiers over CCTI14 and CCTT14 to
help us in categorizing image and text content of
posts in the WeiboScope dataset.
3.2 Image Classifier
In this section, we first describe how we assem-
bled the CCTI14 dataset. Then we present the
performance evaluation of our CNN model over
CCTI14.
3.2.1 CCTI14 Dataset
To find a list of potentially censored categories in
Weibo, we relied on previous research and censor-
ship events in different domains of censorship in
China (Zhu et al., 2013; King et al., 2013; Bam-
man et al., 2012). We ended up with 14 categories
spanning diverse domains including collective ac-
tion (e.g., Protest), Chinese politicians (e.g., Xi
Jinping, Deng Xiaoping, and Mao Zedong), cri-
sis and disaster (e.g., rainstorm and fire), politi-
cal activists (e.g., Liu Xiaobo), and mockery (e.g.
Winnie the Pooh). We did not include categories
that we were not able to find at least 100 unique
images (e.g., Xi Jinping bun) or were too vague
to have them as a separate category (e.g., China
anti-corruption). Our categories are not compre-
hensive, since there is no such comprehensive list
of topics that China censors. However, we have
tried to pick general categories so that they can be
applied for analyzing any other Chinese platforms
that practice censorship.
Training Dataset: To assemble a training dataset,
we utilized Google Image Search to find images
of 200 × 200 pixels or bigger per category. As
has been done by other studies (Bainbridge et al.,
2013, 2012), we scraped Google Images and au-
tomatically collected images per category. In ad-
dition to the 14 categories, we carefully crafted
an “Other” class including random images and
images that we found could be confused with
other categories (e.g., street banner confused with
protest and ocean confused with a rainstorm).
As is common practice (Xiao et al., 2010; Bain-
bridge et al., 2013, 2012), we then manually re-
moved problematic images including those that
were too blurry or would fall into more than one
category (e.g., an image of both Deng Xiaoping
and Mao Zedong). We also manually removed all
duplicate images in a category or among several
categories. To do so, two trained human annota-
tors verified that images are in the right category,
with each annotator spending 5 hours on average
on this. In case of a disagreement between anno-
tators about an image, an expert made a decision
on the image.
We also used the label preserving image aug-
mentation techniques to add more images to our
dataset. Image augmentation is the procedure of
taking images and manipulating them in different
ways to create many variations of the same im-
age. In this way, not only can we train our classi-
fier on a larger dataset, but also we can make our
classifier more robust to image coloring and noise.
It has been proven that data augmentation could
be very effective in improving the performance of
CNNs (Wong et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2016).
We picked six label-preserving data augmen-
tation techniques: i) contrast normalization, ii)
affine transformation, iii) perspective transforma-
tion, iv) sharpen, v) Gaussian blur, vi) padding.
We then applied them to each image in our dataset
and added the result images to our dataset.
Testing Dataset: The classifier should be tested
against real-world censored images from Weibo
so that it can be trusted in categorizing the Wei-
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boScope dataset which consists of real censored
images. To this end, we assembled a test image
dataset from real-world censored images. We used
two human annotators to manually label a small
subset of images from WeiboScope dataset into
the 15 categories. Here are the steps that we fol-
lowed for assembling the testing dataset:
1. We trained two human raters by providing
them the definition for each category as well
as image samples per category.
2. We randomly selected 1000 censored images
from WeiboScope dataset.
3. We asked the raters to categorize these im-
ages into the 15 categories.
4. If each category has at least 30 images, go to
#5. Otherwise go to #2.
5. In case of a disagreement between raters
about an image we asked an expert to cate-
gorize the image.
At the end of this process, we measured the
inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s Kappa coef-
ficient (Cohen, 1960). The inter-rater reliability
was 91%, which is satisfactory. Each rater spent 6
hours on average to annotate the dataset.
The final test dataset has 1014 images (which is
equal to about 5% of the size of the train dataset),
and each category has 30-70 images. Note that
since the “Other” category had many more images
than other categories, we only kept 70 (randomly
selected) images from that category to balance the
dataset.
CCTI14’s training dataset has 5,038 images be-
fore augmentation, and 18,966 images after aug-
mentation from 14 categories and one “Other”
class in which each category has 700–1400 im-
ages. Also CCTI14’s testing dataset has 1014 im-
ages from real-world censored images from the 15
categories.
3.2.2 CNN Model
In this section, we present our CNN model and
evaluate its performance using several metrics. We
also explain how we use CNN localization for er-
ror analysis.
Classification: We train a CNN classifier using
the VGG-16 network (Simonyan and Zisserman,
2014) over the CCTI14’s training dataset and then
(a) Protest (b) Policeman (c) Rainstorm (d) Fire
Figure 1: Examples of highlighted images.
test it with CCTI14’s testing dataset. For the train-
ing phase, we split the CCTI14’s training dataset,
stratified by topic, into primary training set (95%
of the data) and development/validation set (5% of
the data). The trained classifier achieves 97% F1-
score on the testing dataset.
To reduce the incidence of classifying images
that belong to none of our categories as belong-
ing to the most similar category, we used two ap-
proaches at the same time: i) Using an “Other”
class: as described in the previous section, ii)
Using a confidence level threshold: a confidence
level threshold of 80% is used to decide whether
to accept the classifier’s decision or not, meaning
that if the classifier is 80% or more confident about
its decision on an image we accept it, otherwise
we categorize it as belonging to the “Other” class.
We empirically tuned the confidence level thresh-
old on the training data set and achieved the best
results with 80%.
We have evaluated the performance of the clas-
sifier using several metrics: precision, recall and
F1-score.
The F1-score takes into account both precision
and recall, making it a more reliable metric for
evaluating a classifier. The classifier achieves a
precision of 97%, recall of 96% and F1-score of
97% overall.
3.2.3 Performing CNN Localization
To double check our model, we utilized a CNN
localization technique introduced by Zhou et
al. (Zhou et al., 2016). Using the CNN localiza-
tion technique, we were able to highlight parts of
the images that are considered the most important
parts by the CNN to decide to classify an image as
a specific category.
We repeatedly used this technique for error
analysis and to adjust our model as well as the
CCTI14 categories. Figure 1 shows some in-
stances of highlighted images for a few categories.
All highlighted parts matched our intuition for
each category.
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Highlighted examples in Figure 1 confirm that
our model is trained to look for the right objects in
each category. However, some similar objects still
can confuse the classifier. Figure 2 shows some
examples of the false positives in our model. Im-
ages containing something similar to the main fea-
tures of each category have been incorrectly cate-
gorized as that category.
However, before we do any analysis on the cat-
egorized images we manually remove false posi-
tives from the 14 categories. Since removing false
positives from image categories is fairly easy and
it’s not very time-consuming, we opt to do so to
make our categorized data even cleaner.
3.3 Text Classifier
To be able to categorize text content of posts into
our 14 categories, we built a text classifier. To train
our classifier we assembled our own text dataset
from real-world Weibo posts that we refer to as
CCTT14. In below we explain how we assembled
CCTT14 and then we describe the performance of
our text classifier.
3.3.1 CCTT14 Dataset
We assembled a text dataset from real-world
Weibo posts from the same 14 categories as
CCTT14 as well as an “Other” category, that we
refer to as CCTT14. Here are the steps we took to
assemble this dataset:
1. We first trained two human annotators that
were native Chinese speakers by providing
them the definition of each category as well
as examples of each category.
2. We then partitioned all posts in the Weibo-
Scope dataset using keywords related to each
category. We used the keywords extracted by
Knockel et al. (Knockel et al., 2015) from
four Chinese applications as well as the key-
words provided by other online resources.
The goal of this step was to make the man-
ual annotation process more efficient and less
time consuming.
3. We randomly selected 1000 posts from the
output of the previous step.
4. We asked the two trained annotators to anno-
tate the selected 1000 posts.
5. We only kept posts that both annotators
agreed on their category and if each category
(a) Protest (b) Policeman (c) Rainstorm (d) Fire
Figure 2: Examples of false positives.
had at least 50 posts, we stopped. Otherwise,
go to (3).
The final dataset has 994 labelled posts in which
each category has 50-90 posts. Each annotator
spent about 12 hours on the whole process, and
the inter-reliability of raters was 76%, which was
satisfactory.
3.3.2 Classifier performance
We tried different text classifiers (e.g., naive bayes,
random forest, neural networks) over CCTT14 and
achieved the highest F1-score with multinomial
logistic regression. We leveraged unigrams, bi-
grams, and trigrams as the feature vectors. We
also used CoreNLP (Manning et al., 2014) tool for
word segmentation and tokenization. The classi-
fier achieves a precision of 96%, recall of 94%,
and F1-score of 95% overall when we tested our
classifier using 10-fold cross validation.
4 Analysis and Results
In this section, we present our results on the Wei-
boScope dataset. We used our classifiers to cate-
gorize censored and uncensored posts into our 14
categories and then performed our analysis on the
result.
4.1 Censorship Rate
To discover how often a category is censored and
what percent of posts in each category is censored,
we compared the number of posts found in that
category within the censored posts with that of
those within the uncensored posts. Table 1 shows
the number of posts found in each category as well
as the percentage of posts in each category that
was censored. A post ends up in a category if it
has either an image or text in the category. As one
can see in this table, most categories (e.g., protest)
are often censored, whereas some categories (e.g.,
rainstorm) are less frequently censored. This con-
firms that the consistency of censorship varies by
topic/category. For example, more sensitive cate-
gories may experience a higher deletion rate.
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Category #Cens.
posts
#Uncens.
posts
Cens.
Rate
Bo Xilai 665 336 64%
Deng Xiaoping 281 125 70%
Fire 431 530 45%
Injury/Dead Body 1799 1029 51%
Liu Xiaobo 184 123 60%
Mao Zedong 1093 486 70%
People’s Congress 145 113 56%
Policeman 1311 927 59%
Protest 536 220 71%
Prurient/Nudity 2664 2551 51%
Rainstorm 153 207 43%
Winnie the Pooh 160 177 48%
Xi Jinping 1745 1029 63%
Zhou Kehua 102 134 43%
Table 1: Percentage of censored posts per category.
4.2 Life Time
To reveal how quickly posts in a category are cen-
sored, we plotted the lifetime distribution of cen-
sored posts in that category in minutes. Lifetime
is measured as the difference between the time a
post is created and the time it is deleted. Figure 3
presents the lifetime distribution per category. As
one can see, the median lifetime for all categories
is less than 180 minutes, meaning that most of the
posts are censored in less than three hours.
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Figure 3: Categories vs. life time
4.3 Survival Analysis
Survival analysis is used for analyzing data where
the outcome variable is the time until an event of
interest happens. For example, if the event of in-
terest is death, then the survival time is the time in
years, weeks or minutes, etc. until a person dies.
In our case, the event of interest is being censored,
then the survival time for a post is the time un-
til it is censored. In addition, in survival analysis
there are two types of observations: i) those that
the event of interest happens during the time of
observation (censored posts in our case), ii) those
that the event of interest does not happen during
the time of observation (uncensored posts in our
case). That enables us to take into account both
censored and uncensored posts into consideration,
despite other researchers that have only considered
the censored posts (Zhu et al., 2013).
To analyze how different factors interact to af-
fect censorship, we performed a survival analy-
sis per category over the following measured fac-
tors: i) whether the image matches this category,
ii) whether the text matches this category, iii) num-
ber of reposts, iv) number of comments, and v)
text sentiment. To compute the sentiment score
we utilized CoreNLP (Manning et al., 2014) tool
that supports Chinese.
Table 2 shows the results of survival analy-
sis per category. Coefficients in survival analy-
sis relate to hazard (risk of dying or risk of be-
ing censored in our case). A positive coefficient
for Image, Text, #Repost, and #Comment vari-
ables means more risk of getting censored and thus
shorter lifetime. For example, almost all of the
“Image” variables have positive coefficient which
means having an image that matches that category
increases the risk of being censored and therefore
shorter lifetime. On the other hand, sentiment is a
score between 0-4 (0 being very negative and 4 be-
ing very positive). A negative coefficient for sen-
timent means as we increase the sentiment score
(i.e. being more positive), it decreases the risk of
being censored and therefore longer lifetime.
As shown in Table 2, sentiment always has a
negative sign and it is always statistically signif-
icant at 5%. That suggests that sentiment is the
strongest indicator of censorship across all cat-
egories. Our finding matches with recently leaked
logs from Weibo that they were asked by the gov-
ernment to remove all posts about an specific inci-
dent, but Weibo advised its censorship department
to only deal with the negative content (Miller and
Gallagher, 2019).
It is also interesting that image category almost al-
ways has a positive sign which suggests that hav-
ing an image that matches that category increases
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Category
Image Text #Repost #Comment Sentiment
Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P Coef. P
Bo Xilai 0.19 <0.005 0.14 0.41 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.28 -0.20 0.04
Deng Xiaoping 0.62 0.01 0.04 0.87 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.52 -0.23 <0.005
Fire 0.73 <0.005 0.13 0.59 0.00 0.01 0.00 <0.005 -0.11 0.02
Injury/Dead Body 0.63 0.02 -0.02 0.94 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.54 -0.24 <0.005
Liu Xiaobo 0.25 0.19 -0.07 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.24 -0.27 0.04
Mao Zedong 0.31 0.09 0.05 0.85 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.04 -0.28 0.01
People’s Congress 0.16 0.07 -0.21 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.34 -0.47 <0.005
Policeman 0.19 0.24 0.09 0.62 0.00 <0.005 0.00 0.36 -0.15 0.05
Protest 0.78 <0.005 -0.25 0.28 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.29 -0.06 0.05
Prurient 0.74 <0.005 0.09 0.68 0.00 <0.005 0.00 0.19 -0.20 <0.005
Rainstorm -0.50 0.48 -0.87 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.01 -0.31 0.02
Winnie the Pooh 0.44 0.09 -0.16 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.16 -0.35 <0.005
Xi Jinping 0.49 <0.005 -0.51 <0.005 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.07 -0.09 0.01
Zhou Kehua 0.22 <0.005 -0.08 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.23 -0.17 <0.005
Table 2: Survival regression per category.
the risk of censorship, but sometimes it is not sta-
tistically significant and thus we can not draw firm
conclusions about the image category.
5 Related Work
The Weibo platform is popular and previous re-
searchers have attempted to study its censorship
mechanism. King et al. (King et al., 2013) col-
lected a dataset of censored posts, by checking for
the deleted posts every 24 hours, over six months
in 2011. Using that dataset, they identified the
collective action potential of posts as a major in-
dicator of censorship. Bamman et al. (Bamman
et al., 2012) used a dataset collected over three
months in 2011, and performed a statistical anal-
ysis of deleted posts and showed that posts with
some sensitive words are more likely to be deleted.
Zhu et al. (Zhu et al., 2013) collected a dataset of
censored posts by tracking 3,567 users over three
months in 2012. They investigated how quickly,
on a scale of minutes, posts in Weibo are removed.
They also performed a logistic regression over
censored data only to analyze the interaction of
different factors, by ignoring sentiment and topics,
and showed that whether a post contains an image
has the highest impact on censorship.
Ng et al. (Ng et al., 2018a) built a Naive Bayes
classifier over 344 censored and uncensored posts
related to Bo Xilai scandal to predict censorship.
They indicated that posts with subjective content,
e.g. expressions of mood and feeling, are likely to
be censored. Ng et al. (Ng et al., 2018b) collected
2,171 censored and uncensored posts from 7 cate-
gories and built a text classifier based on linguis-
tic features (e.g., sentiment) to predict censorship.
They indicated that the strongest linguistic feature
in censored posts is readability.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed a dataset of censored
and uncensored posts from Weibo using deep
learning, NLP techniques, and manual effort. We
first introduced the CCTI14 and CCTT14 datasets
with 14 categories designed particularly for study-
ing image and text censorship in China. Then we
trained classifiers on CCTI14 and CCTT14 and
used the classifiers to classify the target dataset
so that we can analyze censorship mechanisms in
Weibo.
Using our classifiers, we found that sentiment is
the only indicator of censorship that is consistent
across the variety of topics we identified. Our find-
ing matches with recently leaked logs from Weibo.
We also found that some categories (e.g., protest)
are often censored, while some categories (e.g.,
rainstorm) are less frequently censored. Our anal-
ysis suggests that all the posts from our 14 cate-
gories are deleted in less than three hours on av-
erage, which confirms that censors can delete sen-
sitive content very quickly. Taken as a whole and
within the body of other related research, our re-
sults call into question the idea that censorship are
binary decisions devoid of timing or context. The
“there are a set of sensitive topics and any content
within that set are censored” view of censorship
needs to be reevaluated.
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Abstract
Abusive text is a serious problem in social me-
dia and causes many issues among users as
the number of users and the content volume
increase. There are several attempts for de-
tecting or preventing abusive text effectively.
One simple yet effective approach is to use an
abusive lexicon and determine the existence of
an abusive word in text. This approach works
well even when an abusive word is obfuscated.
On the other hand, it is still a challenging prob-
lem to determine abusiveness in a text hav-
ing no explicit abusive words. Especially, it
is hard to identify sarcasm or offensiveness in
context without any abusive words. We tackle
this problem using an ensemble deep learning
model. Our model consists of two parts of
extracting local features and global features,
which are crucial for identifying implicit abu-
siveness in context level. We evaluate our
model using three benchmark data. Our model
outperforms all the previous models for detect-
ing abusiveness in a text data without abusive
words. Furthermore, we combine our model
and an abusive lexicon method. The experi-
mental results show that our model has at least
4% better performance compared with the pre-
vious approaches for identifying text abusive-
ness in case of with/without abusive words.
1 Introduction
As the number of social media data increases,
abusive text such as online harassment, stalking,
trolling and cyber-bullying becomes an important
social issue. According to a Pew Research Center
study1 published in 2017, 66% of Internet users
1https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/10
have observed someone being harassed and 41%
have personally experienced harassment by them-
selves in online. There have been various attempts
to detect or prevent abusive text and, in practice,
the abusive word dictionary is the most efficient
tool to identify abusive text even if an abusive
word is obfuscated. However, if a text does not
contain any abusive words explictly yet the abu-
siveness is clear in context, then it becomes a
very challenging problem. For instance, E1) is
an abusive comment that explicitly contains abu-
sive words, and E2) is an abusive comment with-
out abusive words.
• E1: Go you cocker cockuser motherfuck un-
cle suckefing you go fuck your mom you
dirty little ass fuck bitch i will kill you i
know where you live i will rape you yoru
fucking ass.
• E2: I know how having the templates on
their talk page helps you assert dominance
over them. I know I would bow down to the
almighty administrators. But then again, I’m
going to go play outside. . . with your mon. . .
There are several approaches for detecting abu-
siveness using an abusive lexicon (Chen et al.,
2012; Lee et al., 2018; Wiegand et al., 2018).
These approaches work well when there is an abu-
sive word in text. However, there is no explicit
abusive words in text yet the text is abusive in con-
text, the problem of identifying its abusiveness is
challenging. We tackle this problem using an en-
semble deep learning model.
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Our model consists of two detection models.
One is a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
with bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory
model (LSTM), and the other is the hierarchical C-
LSTM model to understand the hierarchical struc-
tures in text. Each model specializes in under-
standing of long and short sentences. We evaluate
our model using three popular benchmark social
media datasets, Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter.
The experimental results show that our model out-
performs the other baselines as well as the state of
the art. We also run an additional experiment and
evaluate the performance with respect to a sen-
tence length for understanding context. The exper-
imental results show that the hierarchical model is
effective to solve the long dependency problem.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We design a hierarchical deep learning model
that understands the hierarchical structure in
long sentences with implicit abusiveness.
• We propose an ensemble model that com-
bines two classifiers for understanding both
of short and long sentences.
• We present an efficient abusive detection sys-
tem using both our model and an abusive
word dictionary.
We discuss the related work on abusiveness de-
tection in Section 2 and propose our model in Sec-
tion 3. We explain our datasets in Section 4. Then
we evaluate our model by running several experi-
ments in Section 5, and analyze the experimental
results in Section 6. We suggest a few future di-
rections and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Related Work
2.1 Text classification
Over the years, neural network models showed
a great improvement in text classification.
The emergence of Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN) (Liu et al., 2016), which preserves
the information continuity over time, and
CNN (Kim, 2014), which preserves the local
information of data, opened up a new indicator
of text classification. Schwenk et al. (2017)
presented Very-Deep CNN (VD-CNN) that uses
only small convolutions and pooling operations
for text processing. Zhou et al. (2015) proposed a
C-LSTM model that combines CNN and LSTM
to reflect the local information and the time
continuity. Zhou et al. (2015) also introduced
Attention-Based Bidirectional Long Short-Term
Memory Networks (Attn-BLSTM) that can
capture the semantic information among sen-
tences using the attention mechanism (Bahdanau
et al.). Researchers also added the structural
characteristics of data into the learning model
design. For example, Yang et al. (2016) proposed
a hierarchical attention mechanism that mirrors
the hierarchical structure of documents and solves
the long-term dependency problem.
2.2 Lexicon-based abusive detection
As abusive text increases, there are several at-
tempts to detect or prevent abusive text effectively.
The most classical method is to determine the
presence of abusive words. Chen et al. (2012)
proposed the Lexical Syntactic Feature (LSF) ar-
chitecture to detect offensive content and identify
potential offensive users in social media together
with user’s writing style and cyberbullying con-
tent. Wiegand et al. (2018) proposed lexicons of
abusive words that take advantage of a base lex-
icon by taking negative polar expressions. Lee
et al. (2018) proposed a detection method by en-
hancing the abusive lexicon from the existing abu-
sive words using Word2vec and deciding abusive-
ness together with n-grams and edit-distance for
obfuscated abusive words.
2.3 Learning-based abusive detection
Djuric et al. (2015) proposed to learn the dis-
tributed low dimensional representation of com-
ments using neural language models. Their model
solves the high dimensionality and sparsity is-
sues. Xiang et al. (2012) proposed a novel semi-
supervised approach for detecting profanity con-
tent. It exploits linguistic regularities in profane
language via statistical topic modeling. Zhang
et al. (2016) noticed that lots of noise and er-
rors in social media data made the abusive detec-
tion challenging. They proposed a Pronunciation-
based Convolutional Neural Network (PCNN) and
solved the error problem of data via phoneme
codes of text as the features for a CNN. Zhang
and Luo (2018) combined the convolutional and
gated recurrent unit networks to detect hate speech
on Twitter. They show that their method is able
to capture both word sequence and order infor-
mation in short texts compared to all the previous
deep learning models. Srivastava et al. (2019) pre-
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sented an approach that automatically classifies a
toxic comment using a Multi Dimension Capsule
Network. They also provide an analysis of their
model’s interpretation.
2.4 Ensemble model
Malmasi and Zampieri (2018) tackled the prob-
lem of identifying hate speech in social media us-
ing ensemble classifiers that consist of linear Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM). Fauzi and Yuniarti
(2018) suggested another ensemble method for an
effective hate speech detection in Indonesian lan-
guage and improved the detection performance.
Cheng et al. (2019) utilized the time interval char-
acteristic in social media for designing a detec-
tion model. In particular, they proposed a Hierar-
chical Attention Networks for Cyber-bullying De-
tection (ANCD) together with an ensemble tech-
nique applied to the deep learning model by sepa-
rating users and messages from social media. It
predicts the interval of time between two adja-
cent comments and shows that these tasks can
improve the performance of cyber-bullying detec-
tion. van Aken et al. (2018) proposed an ensemble
method that consists of Bidirectional LSTM (Bi-
LSTM) and attention-based networks. They also
conducted an in-depth error analysis of the toxic
comment classification.
3 Methods and Ensemble
The proposed system consists of two parts as de-
picted in Figure 1. First, an abusive lexicon detects
explicit abusiveness when there exists an (obfus-
cated) abusive word in text. Second, the ensemble
deep learning model detects implicit abusiveness
that does not contain any abusive words.
3.1 Lexicon of abusive words
We use an abusive lexicon (Wiegand et al., 2018)
that takes advantage of the corpora and lexical
resources. We also apply several efficient gad-
gets (Lee et al., 2018) based on blacklist, n-grams,
punctuation and words with special characters to
detect intentionally obfuscated words.
3.2 C-LSTM
Zhou et al. (2015) proposed C-LSTM that com-
bines CNN and LSTM for text classification, and
has advantages of both architectures. The CNN
extracts a sequence of local information of sen-
tences and LSTM obtains the representation of a
sentence.
CNN: The CNN (Kim, 2014) extracts local in-
formation by preserving the word order and con-
textual information. We use the word embed-
ding matrix We with 300 dimensions and convo-
lution, which involves the 3 window vectors and
100 filters to obtain multiple features. We apply a
non-linear function using a Rectified Linear Unit
(ReLU) and the 1D max-pooling operation with
pool size of 4 over the feature map to take the
down-sampled maximum value. Let αi denote d-
dimensional word vectors through an embedding
matrix We for the ith word xi in a sentence. We
have a window vector wi with k consecutive word
vectors. A filter m convolves with the window
vectors at each position in a valid way to generate
a feature map ci. For n filters with the same length,
the generated n feature maps can be rearranged as
feature representation for each window wi as fol-
low:
αi =Wexi,
wi = [αi, αi+1, . . . , αi+k−1],
ci = f(wi ◦m+ b),
ci = ReLU(ci),
cˆi = max4(ci),
W = [c1, c2, . . . , cn].
Bidirectional LSTM: The LSTM extracts or-
derly information (Zhang and Luo, 2018) by pre-
serving a sequence of words or character n-grams.
We use bidirectional LSTM, which has two LSTM
layers instead of the standard LSTM to have in-
formation from backward and forward simultane-
ously. We use 100 features in the hidden state, fol-
lowed by a dropout layer with a rate of 0.5. After-
ward, we apply the 1D max-pooling operation to
reduce the dimensionality of the LSTM output fea-
tures
−→
O j and
←−
O j . Finally, a linear-layer with the
sigmoid function predicts the binary label classifi-
cation and the softmax function predicts the multi-
label classification.
−→
O j =
−−−−→
LSTM(cj),
←−
O j =
←−−−−
LSTM(cj),
v = max{O},
p = {sigmoid, softmax}(Wcv + bc).
3.3 Hierarchical C-LSTM Networks
Yang et al. (2016) introduced hierarchical atten-
tion network for document classification that has
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Is the MySpace page
that is linked actu-
ally maintained by
the group, or is it a
fansite? If it is a fan-
site, it should not be
linked to.
non-abusive text
Go you cocker cock-
sure mohterfuck.
unlce suckefing you
go fuck your mom
you dirty little ass
fuck bitch. i will
kill you..
abusive text with
abusive words
I should bow down
to the almighty
administrators. But
then again, I’m
going to go play
outside....with your
mom...
abusive text without
abusive words
social media data
abusive lexicon
fuck sadist
psychopath
nerd
nutcase
wretch
stupid
scum
horrible
idiot
loutbitch
ensemble deep learning model
..
...
...
C-LSTM
hierarchical C-LSTM
Go you cocker cocksure
mohterfuck. unlce suck-
efing you go fuck your
mom you dirty little ass
fuck bitch. i will kill
you..
I should bow down to the
almighty administrators.
But then again, I’m going
to go play outside....with
your mom...
explicit abusive with
abusive words in cotext
implicit abusive in context
abusive text
without abusive words
non-abusive text
Is the MySpace page
that is linked actu-
ally maintained by the
group, or is it a fan-
site? If it is a fansite,
it should not be linked
to.
Figure 1: A proposed abusiveness detection mechanism by combining deep learning and an abusive lexicon
word attention and sentence attention. They sug-
gested two distinctive characteristics: 1) it has a
hierarchical structure that mirrors document has
a hierarchical structure, and 2) it has two atten-
tion mechanism to prevent the loss of information
in case of a long sentence. Since the abusiveness
in context is preserved in a hierarchical structure,
we propose a hierarchical C-LSTM network that
is able to understand the hierarchical structure and
uses a C-LSTM model instead of RNN attention
model to extract the local information of a sen-
tence. Let xit be the tth word vector in the ith
sentence s, and We be an embedding matrix.
Xit =Wexit,
Si = CLSTM (Xit),
v = CLSTM (S),
v = ReLU(v),
p = {sigmoid, softmax}(Wcv + bc).
Hierarchical structure: A text often consists
of several sentences and the structure of these
multi-sentences is crucial to understand its con-
text. We obtain the multi-sentence structure fea-
tures using C-LSTM. Because online sentences of-
ten have punctuation errors including repeated oc-
currences, we split each sentence into fixed length
in the data preprocessing described in Section 4.
3.4 Word Embedding
Word embedding provides a dense representation
of words and their relative meanings. We use
a pre-trained language model because there are
many out of vocabulary words due to misspelling
or newly created word. We use a fastText em-
bedding (Bojanowski et al., 2017) of 300 dimen-
sions trained with sub-word information on com-
mon crawl. For out-of-vocabulary words, we ini-
tialize the embedding with random weights.
3.5 Ensemble Learning
Each detection model has its own predictive power
and scope. In the case of C-LSTM network, when
a sentence is short, it can capture both word se-
quence and order information well. However,
when a sentence is long, it cannot avoid the long-
term dependency problem, which causes informa-
tion loss. Hierarchical C-LSTM network can solve
this problem to some extent by obtaining the local
feature in each sentence. Therefore, we design an
abusive detection model that is an ensemble of C-
LSTM and hierarchical C-LSTM network as de-
picted in Figure 2. The proposed system also in-
corporates additional features associated with im-
plicit abusiveness of text in local and global con-
text level. For the ensemble, we concatenate the
output of v1 and v2 through a C-LSTM and the
output of u through a hierarchical C-LSTM. Then,
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Sentence Encoder
1. im sorry i screwed around someones talk page .
2. it very bad do i know templates talk page helps assert dominance .
3. i know i bow almighty administrators . but , i m going go play outside with mom .
im sorry i screwed around someones talk page it very bad do i know templates talk page helps assert
dominance i know i bow almighty administrators . but , i m going go play outside with mom .
Word Encoder
...
...
...
...
...
s1
s2
sN
i
know
page
wi1
wi2
wiM
...
i
know
page
wi2
wiM
wi1
...
...
A
N
a: abusive text
n: non-abusive text
filter size = 100
window size = 3, 4
word hidden size = 100
sent hidden size = 200
filter size = 100
window size = 3
hidden size = 100
Input Data
Input Data
Figure 2: Ensemble of C-LSTM and hierarchical C-LSTM network
we apply a non-linear function using ReLU and
feed this vector p to a fully-connected layer in or-
der to predict the output.
v1, v2 = CLSTM(input),
u = HierarchicalCLSTM(input) ,
p = concatenate(v1, v2, u),
p = ReLU(p),
p = linearlayer(p).
4 Datasets
class # of occurrences
Clean (Train) 80977 (96%)
Implicit Toxic (Train) 2948 (4%)
Clean (dev) 9019 (96%)
Implicit Toxic (dev) 307 (4%)
Clean (Test) 33541 (83%)
Explicit Toxic (Test) 5085 (13%)
Implicit Toxic (Test) 1158 (4%)
Table 1: Class distribution of Wikipedia dataset.
4.1 Kaggle Toxic Comment
Kaggle dataset is published by Google’s Jig-
saw for the toxic comment classification chal-
lenge. This dataset consists of comments from
class # of occurrences
NAG (Train) 4159 (46%)
Implicit CAG (Train) 3223 (36%)
Implicit OAG (Train) 1651 (18%)
NAG (Dev) 1029 (46%)
Implicit CAG (Dev) 806 (36%)
Implicit OAG (Dev) 420 (18%)
NAG (F) 491 (65%)
Explicit CAG (F) 35 (5%)
Explicit OAG (F) 56 (7%)
Implicit CAG (F) 95 (13%)
Implicit OAG (F) 73 (10%)
NAG (T) 431 (38%)
Explicit CAG (T) 85 (7%)
Explicit OAG (T) 103 (9%)
Implicit CAG (T) 328 (29%)
Implicit OAG (T) 188 (17%)
Table 2: Class distribution of Facebook (F) and Twitter
(T) datasets.
Wikipedia’s talk page edits. Each comment cate-
gorized as one of the following six classes toxic,
severe toxic, obscene, threat, insult and identity
hate. We turn multi-class into binary-class to eval-
uate the performance of the abusive lexicon with
ensemble deep learning model. We consider a
toxic dataset if any of the six classes are applica-
ble. Then, we split the dataset of 93,251 sentences
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into 90% training and 10% validation. We also use
39,784 test sentences provided by Kaggle as sum-
marized in Table 1.
4.2 TRAC-1
TRAC-1 is a dataset shared by cyberbullying
workshop. This dataset consists of 15,000 aggres-
sion annotated Facebook posts and comments. It
makes a 3-way classification among Overtly Ag-
gressive (OVG), Covertly Aggressive (CAG), and
Non-Aggressive (NAG). We split the dataset into
80% training and 20% validation. Then, we use
two test datasets from Facebook and Twitter pro-
vided by TRAC-1 to evaluate the performance as
summarized in Table 2.
4.3 Data preprocessing
before preprocessing
I salute . . Neel Patel,, U r just amazing. Each
& every comment of urs is true & correct...India
n world need people like U...Love u my brother.
God bless U...& pls don’t stop here. Keep ur
comments on every required post...
after preprocessing
i salute . ( )(.) neel patel (,,) u r just amazing.
Each (&) every comment of urs is true (&)
correct.(..)india n world need people like u.(..)
love u my brother.god bless u. (..)(&) pls don(’)t
stop here. keep ur comments on every required
post.(..)
Table 3: Data preprocessing example.
In the data preprocessing, we convert all char-
acters to be lowercase, and remove whitespace,
punctuations, non-English characters, URLs and
Twitter and Facebook mentions. Table 3 is an ex-
ample of this data preprocessing. We use a Natural
Language Toolkit (NLTK) and regular expressions
for data preprocessing.
5 Experiments
We run the following two experiments to verify the
effectiveness of the deep learning module for im-
plicit abusiveness and the abusive lexicon for ex-
plicit abusiveness:
1. Both training and testing datasets consist of
implicit abusive text only.
2. The training dataset consists of implicit abu-
sive text only, and the testing dataset consists
of both explicit and implicit abusive text.
We use several baseline models and a few vari-
ants of our proposed ensemble model to evaluate
the detection performance. We train all the models
using cross-entropy as the loss function and Adam
Optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2015). For the evalua-
tion metric, we choose the micro-average F1 mea-
sure because of the class strong imbalance in the
dataset. In addition, we use Area under the Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC AUC)
to evaluate whether it can distinguish the differ-
ence between classes. All results are an average
score of 5 evaluations.
5.1 Results
Deep learning performance: Table 4 compares
our hierarchical model against the baselines as
well as state-of-the-arts. Our model shows the best
performance for the on Wikipedia dataset, how-
ever, there are no improvements from its baseline
model C-LSTM and CNN for the Facebook and
Twitter datasets. This is because the three datasets
have different sentence lengths and sizes. The
Wikipedia dataset has relatively large long sen-
tences whereas the Facebook and Twitter datasets
have rather short sentences. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 3, since hierarchical C-LSTM applies hier-
archical structure and often longer sentences pre-
serve much more structural information, we have
better performance on Wikipedia.
Ensemble performance: We use an ensem-
ble of C-LSTM as a scalable approach to extract
for small and short sentence features. Table 4
shows our ensemble with only one C-LSTM out-
performs. Ensemble with two C-LSTM shows
the better performance than individual models on
three datasets. However, it has poor performance
on Wikipedia compared to ensemble with only one
C-LSTM. These show that the ensemble of addi-
tional models does not improve the performance.
Lexicon with deep learning performance:
Our method combining an abusive lexicon and
a deep learning model has the best performance.
HAN improves performance of F1 measure 5.28%
and AUC 7.06% on Wikipedia and our hierar-
chical model (HCL) improves performance of F1
measure 9.79% and ensemble model improves
12.74% on Facebook and Twitter. The result
shows that the combined approach is more effec-
tive than any individual approach.
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Comparison of F1 measure and AUC on three datasets consisting of implicit abusive sentences
model
Wikipedia Facebook Twitter
F1 AUC F1 F1
LSTM (Wang et al., 2015) 94.24 91.95 50.08 50.17
Bi-LSTM (Zhou et al., 2016) 95.55 91.91 50.93 50.50
CNN (Kim, 2014) 95.46 90.95 53.83 60.50
C-LSTM (Zhang et al., 2018) 95.70 91.66 52.88 59.60
HAN (Yang et al., 2016) 96.32 89.21 50.25 54.09
HCL 96.36 92.91 53.15 58.43
HCL+C-LSTM 96.08 93.03 54.77 60.55
HCL+C-LSTM+C-LSTM 95.61 93.00 54.12 62.51
Comparison of F1 measure and AUC on three datasets consisting of
explicit and implicit abusive sentences
model
Wikipedia Facebook Twitter
F1 AUC F1 F1
LSTM 90.35 92.02 53.88 53.71
Bi-LSTM 91.65 91.94 54.74 52.80
CNN 91.45 92.06 53.54 56.33
C-LSTM 91.67 92.13 53.74 57.23
HAN 91.53 90.93 51.97 55.99
HCL 91.89 92.31 51.13 53.22
HCL+C-LSTM 91.54 92.55 53.91 52.62
HCL+C-LSTM+C-LSTM 91.97 92.71 55.11 57.50
Comparison of F1 measure and AUC on three datasets consisting of
explicit and implicit abusive using both an abusive lexicon and a deep learning model
model
Wikipedia Facebook Twitter
F1 AUC F1 F1
LSTM 94.97 98.50 58.36 56.26
Bi-LSTM 96.12 98.32 59.07 56.54
CNN 96.04 98.31 61.48 65.53
C-LSTM 96.25 98.45 60.69 64.54
HAN 96.81 97.99 58.37 59.57
HCL 96.82 98.68 60.92 63.51
HCL+C-LSTM 96.58 98.73 60.74 65.36
HCL+C-LSTM+C-LSTM 96.17 98.70 62.51 67.09
Table 4: Results of different models on Wikipedia, Facebook and Twitter datasets, HAN: Hierarchical Attention
Neural Net, HCL: Hierarchical C-LSTM. Explicit abusive is when there is an (obfuscated) abusive word, and
implicit abusive is no abusive word yet abusive in context.
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model data length (|T|) F1 AUC
C-LSTM
0 <|T|< 100
87.61 94.36
HCL 84.57 93.88
HCL+C-LSTM+C-LSTM 87.41 94.62
C-LSTM
100 <|T|< 200
87.45 94.22
HCL 86.35 93.90
HCL+C-LSTM+C-LSTM 87.87 94.61
C-LSTM
200 <|T|
87.33 95.34
HCL 90.52 96.56
HCL+C-LSTM+C-LSTM 90.69 96.55
Table 5: Comparisons of F1 measure and AUC using Wikipedia dataset which has under 100 words, over 100 and
under 200 words and over 200 words.
type data example predictedlabel
true
label
type-1
W 52% black people deserve to die 0 1
F 37% shutdownjnu do it NAG CAG
T 39% families as well lol NAG CAG
type-2
W 13%
actually help us u dont help at all so help dick heads
from ur unexpected guest
0 1
F 3% what to say about shutdownjnu just shut up NAG OAG
T 2% sensex in maternity ward .good morning cnbc tv NAG CAG
type-3
W 35%
poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo
poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo poo
1 0
F 60%
send umar khalid to afzal before its too late . do n t let
him become another afzal guru in real ! shutdownjnu
madarsajnu
NAG OAG
T 59%
kinner to vo h jo bar bar pakistan dwara hamare uper
hamle hone par bhi apna much chhipa k baitha h kinner
vo h jo bar bar bina bulaye pakistan ja raha h
CAG NAG
Table 6: Example of error caused by the proposed model for the Wikipedia (W), Facebook (F) and Twitter (T)
dataset. 0: abusive, 1: non-abusive.
5.2 Experiment with short/long sentences
Previously, we have claimed that C-LSTM is spe-
cialized in short sentences and Hierarchical C-
LSTM is specialized in long sentences. We verify
this claim using different sentence lengths. Be-
cause the Wikipedia dataset contains a lot of punc-
tuation errors, we use the number of words in-
stead of sentences for this experiment. We catego-
rize the dataset into three parts (<100, 100∼200,
200<) by counting the number of words in sen-
tences. Note that Founta et al. (2019) suggests a
sentence of under 100 words to be a short sen-
tence. We use the micro-average F1 measure and
AUC for evaluation metric. As presented in Ta-
ble 5, C-LSTM has better performance of F1 mea-
sure 3.04%, 1.1% and AUC 0.48%, 0.32% com-
pared to HCL in sentences with under 100 words,
and over 100 and under 200 words. HCL has bet-
ter performance of F1 measure 3.19% and AUC
1.22% compared to C-LSTM in sentences which
have over 200 words. This experiment verifies that
each model is specialized in relation to the size of
sentences. Finally, our ensemble model shows the
best performance except for a slight difference of
0.2% compared to C-LSTM.
6 Error analysis
We manually categorize the resulting errors into
three types: short sentences of less than five
words (type-1), sentences with new explicit
words (type-2), and sentences having misspelled
words, which cause wrong decisions (type-3). Ta-
ble 6 shows examples of these types of errors.
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From the type-1, we can see that our model is
confused in understanding the meaning of short
sentences of less than five words. It is hard for
our model to understand the context of short sen-
tences, since these are few words that does not
contain abusive words. The type-2 is an error
caused by obfuscated and new abusive words that
are not in the current abusive lexicon, such as
“esss”, “a**hole”, “betches”, and “b1tch”. In or-
der to solve these issues, we need to improve and
modify the abusive lexicon furthermore. The type-
3 is an error caused by the presence of repetitive
and misspelled words. Because online comments
often do not basically follow formal language con-
ventions, there are many unstructured, informal
and often misspelled and abbreviations. These
make the abusive detection very difficult. One can
handle these problems in two ways: preprocessing
the data with grammar checker or improving the
performance with pre-trained embedding model.
7 Conclusion and Future work
We have tackled the problem of detecting abusive-
ness when there are no abusive words in text us-
ing deep learning. We have designed a hierarchi-
cal deep learning model that extracts global fea-
tures for long sentences. We have also proposed
an ensemble models that combine two classifiers
extracting local and global features. Finally, we
have combined our model for context abusiveness
and an abusive lexicon method. We have evaluated
the proposed system on Wikipedia, Facebook and
Twitter datasets. The experimental results confirm
that our hierarchical model outperforms in implicit
abusive sentences of more than 100 words. En-
semble model outperforms baselines as well as the
state of the art in most cases. The combination
of an abusive lexicon and a deep learning model
shows the best performance in comparison to the
individual method.
We plan to develop methods to detect implicit
abusiveness in short sentences. Furthermore, we
aim to build a new abusive detection method using
additional language models.
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Abstract
Social media has reportedly been (ab)used
by Russian troll farms to promote political
agendas. Specifically, state-affiliated actors
disguise themselves as native citizens of the
United States to promote discord and pro-
mote their political motives. Therefore, de-
veloping methods to automatically detect Rus-
sian trolls can ensure fair elections and pos-
sibly reduce political extremism by stopping
trolls that produce discord. While data ex-
ists for some troll organizations (e.g., Internet
Research Agency), it is challenging to collect
ground-truth accounts for new troll farms in a
timely fashion. In this paper, we study the im-
pact the number of labeled troll accounts has
on detection performance. We analyze the use
of self-supervision with less than 100 troll ac-
counts as training data. We improve classifica-
tion performance by nearly 4% F1. Further-
more, in combination with self-supervision,
we also explore novel features for troll detec-
tion grounded in stylometry. Intuitively, we as-
sume that the writing style is consistent across
troll accounts because a single troll organiza-
tion employee may control multiple user ac-
counts. Overall, we improve on models based
on words features by ∼9% F1.
1 Introduction
Social media platforms, such as Twitter, can be
helpful in monitoring events, particular for on-
going emergency events (i.e. time-critical situa-
tions) (Yin et al., 2015). For example, Twitter has
been used to create earthquake monitoring sys-
tems by monitoring tweets in real-time (Sakaki
et al., 2010). However, Twitter has also be-
come the subject of public scrutiny regarding un-
wanted actors who are exploiting the social me-
dia platform to steer public opinion for their po-
litical gain.1 Twitter, like many other social net-
1https://nyti.ms/2Uwr36y
working services, has both positive and negative
sides of its rendered services. However, when
it is used unfairly, malicious actors can manipu-
late Twitter to influence a potentially large audi-
ence by using fake accounts, or worse, by hiring
troll farms (Zhang et al., 2016), organizations that
employ people to provoke conflict via the use of
inflammatory or provocative comments. In gen-
eral, for this paper, we study models for classify-
ing users as being part of a troll farm.
There has been many inquiries concerning the
interference into the 2016 presidential election by
the Russian government (Badawy et al., 2018).
The Internet Research Agency (IRA)—a troll farm
that positioned fraudulent accounts on major so-
cial accounts such as Facebook, YouTube and
Twitter (Mueller, 2019)—engaged in an online
campaign for Russian business and political inter-
ests. The IRA’s accounts have been created in such
a way that they are portrayed as real American ac-
counts. Masking the sponsor of a message such
that it appears to originate, and be supported by,
grassroots participants is also known as astroturf-
ing (Peng et al., 2017). Based on a 2018 Pew Re-
port, 53% of the Americans participate in some
form of civic or political activities on social media
during the year (Anderson et al., 2018). There-
fore, the magnitude of exploitation by troll farms
in influencing opinion on social media is signifi-
cant. With this growing concern, it is critical that
the troll accounts are detected.
Given ground-truth troll farm accounts, re-
searchers have studied if they can develop classi-
fiers to find other members of the troll farm orga-
nizations (Im et al., 2019). Even though all the ac-
counts in their dataset are no longer active on Twit-
ter (i.e., they have been banned), based on their
classifier, they find that accounts with similar char-
acteristics are still active. However, while social
media is swarming with troll accounts (Metaxas
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and Mustafaraj, 2012), building large datasets of
real troll accounts is challenging, especially as
new troll farms are formed with different politi-
cal agendas. It is hard to annotate new troll ac-
counts because they masquerade as citizens, news
media outlets, or individual journalists on social
media (Paul and Matthews, 2016). Without exten-
sive domain expertise, and external knowledge re-
garding specific troll organizations, it is challeng-
ing for the research community to gather newly
annotated users to train more predictive models.
In this paper, we study two specific issues re-
lated to troll farm classification. First, we analyze
how three different sets of features impacts our
classifier’s performance. Specifically, we look at
content, behavioral, and stylistic features. Based
on the political agenda a troll farm is pushing, it is
intuitive that there will be common tokens associ-
ated with the organization (e.g., #fakenews). How-
ever, it is possible that writing style can improve
predictive performance. Intuitively, if we assume
that certain employees at a troll organization con-
trol multiple accounts, then even if the topical
information (i.e., content) varies across the ac-
counts, the writing style should be similar. Thus,
we hypothesize that features that are predictive for
authorship attribution (Sari et al., 2018), can be
applied to the troll farm domain.
Second, we study how the number of annotated
trolls impacts the classifier’s performance. While
more data is generally better, there are still many
interesting questions that need to be addressed.
For example, how many annotated trolls do we
need to build a classifier? Would adding more data
significantly improve the performance? Can we
achieve similar performance using few annotated
accounts? What types of errors does the classifier
make if we have limited ground-truth troll data?
Manually verifying an account as a Russian troll
at scale is not feasible. As a result, this leads to
an open challenge in text classification i.e., how
can we effectively leverage unannotated tweets to
improve the classifier’s performance. This ne-
cessitates the design of a novel/effective machine
learning method to detect anonymous fake ac-
counts. Moreover, detecting the bad actors on
Twitter/social media that are trying to influence
opinion of unaware users will be critical in the fu-
ture to ensure unbiased elections, and to minimize
the impact of information warfare.
Overall, our work is the most similar to Im et al.
(2019). In contrast to Im et al. (2019), our work
differs in two substantial ways. First, while they
explored one set of stylistic features (e.g., stop-
words), we ground our work by exploring state-of-
the-art stylometric features originally developed
for authorship attribution (Sari et al., 2018). Sec-
ond, their work was focused on showing that troll
accounts are likely still out there. Yet, in this
manuscript, we are more interested in understand-
ing classifier performance and behavior, not an-
alyzing possible unseen troll accounts still active
on Twitter. Moreover, via a detailed error anal-
ysis, we study possible biases the classifier has
with regards to both false positives and false neg-
atives. For example, the classifier trained using
recent IRA data is biased against politically active
conservatives, resulting in more false positives.
The contributions of the paper are listed below:
• Based on the hypothesis that a single troll
organization employee can control multiple
social media accounts, we introduce state-
of-the-art stylometric and behavioral fea-
tures, in combination with standard ngrams,
to develop a novel troll detection method.
Moreover, we compare content-based fea-
tures against stylometric/behavioral features,
analyzing which group has the biggest impact
on classifier accuracy.
• We study how the number of annotated troll
accounts affects classifier performance. We
also show that simple methods that only
use content-based features do not effectively
make use of large quantities of training data
as well as methods with stylistic and behav-
ioral features. Furthermore, we use a simple,
yet effective, semi-supervised method to im-
prove performance in the presence of severe
data scarcity.
• Finally, we perform a detailed error analy-
sis across different training set sizes. From
the error analysis, we investigate how to im-
prove the model further, as well as analyz-
ing the types of biases the models make, and
whether the biases are reduced, or enhanced,
by adding more training data.
2 Related Work
Overall, our work is related to three major research
areas: Russian troll analysis, text classification,
and semi-supervised learning.
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Russian Trolls. Researchers have studied Rus-
sian propaganda on social media across various
domains, including, but not limited to, politics and
healthcare. The spread of propaganda is a form
of information warfare (Denning, 1999). Bronia-
towski et al. (2018), for example, explained how
Russian trolls discussed vaccine-relevant mes-
sages to promote discord. Specifically, they cre-
ated divisive messages that legitimized the debate
by polarization. Their work sought to understand
the role played by trolls in the promotion of con-
tent related to vaccination. Stewart et al. (2018)
studied how Russian trolls polarized topics using
retweet network and community detection algo-
rithms. Specifically, they showed that trolls aggra-
vated the context of a domestic conversation sur-
rounding gun violence and race relations. Badawy
et al. (2018) explored the manipulation effects
by analyzing users that re-shared tweets gener-
ated from Russian trolls during 2016 U.S. elec-
tion campaign. Using bot detection techniques
and text-analysis, they identified the percentages
of liberal and conservative, showing that most of
the tweets were conservative-leaning tweets in an
attempt to help the presidential campaign.
Surprisingly, IRA linked accounts, which have
been identified by Twitter as evidence and later
on submitted to United States Senate Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism,
have also been found to be associated with
Brexit (Llewellyn et al., 2018). These accounts at-
tempted to promote discord for various topics re-
garding the European Union and migration. Simi-
larly, the IRA had also participated in the #Black-
LivesMatter in accounts identified by Arif et al.
(2018). Their work elaborated on how these bad
actors impersonated real users to manipulate audi-
ences in accordance to their political agenda.
Text Classification. There are several types of
machine learning-based text classification meth-
ods available such as generative, discriminative,
linear, kernel-based, and deep learning methods.
In machine learning, generally text classification
is a task of automatically assigning set of prede-
fined categories to unstructured texts. Kim (2014)
introduced convolutional neural network for text
classification. Yang et al. (2016) introduced a hier-
archical attention mechanism that simultaneously
weights sentences and words based on their pre-
dictive importance. While neural networks have
produced state-of-the-art results for a wide variety
of tasks, the focus of this paper is on interpretable
models with features grounded in stylometry com-
bined with easy-to-understand behavior informa-
tion.
With regards to interpretable models, Joulin
et al. (2016) showed that in many cases linear clas-
sifiers still create strong baselines, and are faster
than neural networks. Generally, linear classi-
fiers are often faster and more efficient than neu-
ral network on large datasets. As we will dis-
cuss in Section 3, we use a dataset consisting of
700,000 Twitter users, with more than 17 million
tweets. Therefore, for our task, efficiency is im-
portant. Moreover, given the recent concern of the
carbon footprint of natural language processing
models, linear models should continue to be stud-
ied (Strubell et al., 2019; Schwartz et al., 2019).
Recently, stylometry-grounded features have
been used for authorship attribution, including in
malware code authorship attribution (Kalgutkar
et al., 2019). For example, Sari et al. (2018) ex-
plored the connection between topical (content)
features combined with various stylistic features,
including, but not limited to, capitalization and
punctuation usage. Similarly, Abbasi and Chen
(2008) introduced “writeprints”, method of iden-
tifying authorship across the internet. They com-
bined traditional features such as lexical, syntac-
tic, structural, content-specific, with idiosyncratic
attributes (e.g., spelling mistakes). They utilized a
transform-based technique that uses a pattern dis-
ruption algorithm to capture feature variations.
Semi-Supervised Text Classification. Finding
training data to train a troll classifier is challenging
in practice, and results in a needle-in-a-haystack
situation. One of the aims of this paper is to
study whether large quantities of unlabeled data
can be automatically annotated to augment small
amounts of training data to more accurately detect
Russian trolls.
There has been a lot of work regarding semi-
supervision, for both image, video, and text clas-
sification (Li et al., 2019; Mallinar et al., 2019).
Wang et al. (2009), for example, applied semi-
supervised learning algorithms for video annota-
tion. They presented a technique that was de-
veloped based on the classical kernel density es-
timation approach using both labeled and unla-
beled data to estimate class conditional probabil-
ity densities. Habernal and Gurevych (2015) cre-
ated a clustering-based semi-supervised method to
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annotate unlabeled text. The aim was to make
the model better at identifying scene text with
the semi-supervised learning from the unanno-
tated dataset. Rajendran et al. (2016) proposed
a semi-supervised algorithm for argument detec-
tion. In this work, we primary focus on meth-
ods previously developed for other tasks Rajen-
dran et al. (2016, 2018). Specifically, we focus
on self-supervision, a model agnostic method of
automatically annotating unlabeled data.
3 Data
To be consistent with prior work, our data collec-
tion is similar to Im et al. (2019). We provide the
basic statistics for our dataset in Table 1. In 2018,
federal agents released 3,841 accounts found to be
associated with the IRA. We focus on the 2,284
accounts that have selected English as the main
language in their profile. Intuitively, we are in-
terested in classifying bad actors that masquerade
themselves as a normal user from the United States
(US). Note that while most of the tweets are in
English, there are occasional tweets in other lan-
guages. Furthermore, we collect each user’s last
200 tweets, assuming that each user has that many
available tweets. We limit to the last 200 tweets
because this is the number of tweets we can collect
for an active user with a single Twitter API call.
While we have ground-truth troll accounts,
we do not have a standardized non-troll dataset.
Therefore, we gathered a 701,614 random Twit-
ter accounts constrained to the continental US.
Tweets were collected from August 2018 to Jan-
uary 2019. Furthermore, for each account, we re-
trieved their last 200 tweets, as available. It is
important to note that some users posted fewer
than 200 times. The collected user’s tweets rep-
resent our control, or not-troll accounts. Overall,
the data is unbalanced, where the control makes
up 99.676% of the total accounts, and the Rus-
sian troll accounts represent only 0.324% of the
entire dataset. The imbalance matches the real-
world assumption that troll accounts are rare (Im
et al., 2019).
We split the dataset into four groups: Train, Val-
idation, Test, and Unlabeled. Each group contains
both troll and control accounts. The unlabeled
set is used for training our model using a semi-
supervised technique.
Train Val Test Unlab. Total
Troll 924 206 229 925 2,284
Control 284,153 63,146 70,162 284,153 701,614
Table 1: Dataset statistics.
4 Method
Based on previous studies (Sari et al., 2018; Ab-
basi and Chen, 2008; Stamatatos, 2009; Im et al.,
2019), in Section 4.1, we discuss the three groups
of features we used in our model: stylistic, con-
tent and behavioral. Intuitively, we identify trolls
by what they say (content) and how they say it
(stylistic and behavioral). Furthermore, in Sec-
tion 4.2 we explain the semi-supervised method
(self-supervision) we used to analyze whether un-
labeled data can be automatically annotated to im-
prove our model performance.
4.1 Features
We use three groups of features: Content, Stylis-
tic, and Behavioral. In this section, we describe
each feature group in details.
Content Features (C). The content features repre-
sent the topics that people discuss on Twitter (Sari
et al., 2018). To represent content, we use bag-
of-words (BoW). This group of features was also
used for troll detection in Im et al. (2019). Specifi-
cally, we use unigram word counts. Moreover, we
limit the vocabulary to the 5000 most common un-
igrams. The reason we limit the vocabulary is to
avoid overfitting. For instance, slight shifts in con-
tent may occur over time. However, the broad po-
litical agenda that trolls are perpetuating may stay
relatively stable. For example, in the IRA dataset,
there are many tweets regarding the #BlackLives-
Matter movement to promote discord because it
was a popular topic on the news at the time (Arif
et al., 2018). Ideally, we want to detect when trolls
promote discord, not simply remember a few spe-
cific topics discussed during a certain time period.
Stylistic Features (S). We adopt the following
stylistic features from Sari et al. (2018): aver-
age word length, number of short words, percent-
age of digits, percentage of upper-case letters, fre-
quency of alphabetic characters, frequency of each
unique digit, richness of vocabulary, frequency of
stop words and frequency of punctuation. These
features are both of lexical and syntactic in na-
ture. The number of short words is determined
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by counting tokens that contain no more than four
characters. Richness of vocabulary was calculated
by counting the number of hapax and dis legom-
ena, i.e., the number of words that appear only
once or twice in the corpus. We also count the fre-
quency of stop words. We use the 179 stop words
provided in the Natural Language Toolkit (BIRD
and LOPER, 2004). The rest of the features are
explained in Sari et al. (2018).
Behavioral Features (B). In a study on political
communication on Twitter, it was shown that emo-
tionally charged tweets are retweeted repeatedly
and quicker than average neutral tweets (Stieglitz
and Dang-Xuan, 2013). Earlier work has shown
that hashtags, shared links, and user mention pat-
terns are predictive of Russian trolls (Bronia-
towski et al., 2018; Im et al., 2019; Zannettou
et al., 2019). For our model, we use three behav-
ioral features. Specifically, we calculate the num-
ber of times a user adds hashtags, mentions, and
links/URLs to their tweets. Intuitively, tweets that
repeatedly share links, or use a large number of
hashtags, could indicate bot activity, or someone
promoting a specific agenda.
4.2 Self-Supervision (Self)
To address the question “How can we automati-
cally annotate unlabeled data?”, we use a tech-
nique called self-supervision. Intuitively, self-
supervision is an iterative method that slowly adds
unlabeled instances to the training data. First, the
model is trained on the original annotated train-
ing dataset. Next, it is applied to the unlabeled
dataset. The most confident Russian trolls, based
on the classifier score, are added to the training
dataset as new troll instances. The process is re-
peated for a fixed number of iterations. Further-
more, only a fixed number of unlabeled instances
k are only added to the training dataset at each
iteration. Only unlabeled examples with a score
greater than t are added to the training dataset.
4.3 Implementation Details
As our base classifier, we use a linear support
vector machine with L2 regularization. We grid-
search over the C values 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1,
1, and 10. The best C value is chosen using the
validation dataset. We repeat the self-supervision
process for 25 iterations. Moreover, k is set to
10. Therefore, no more than 10 examples are
added during each iteration with a threshold t of 0.
Precision Recall F1
C 0.635 0.738 0.683
CBS 0.745 0.764 0.754
CBS+Self 0.815 0.729 0.770
Table 2: Overall results on the test dataset. The
results are generated from models trained on all of
the Russian troll users in the training dataset.
Precision Recall F1
Best Model (CBS) 0.761 0.772 0.766
- CB (without S) 0.668 0.723 0.695
- CS (without B) 0.785 0.602 0.681
- BS (without C) 0.595 0.578 0.586
Table 3: Ablation results using the validation
dataset for the three major feature groups: Stylistic
(S), Behavioral (B), and Content (C). The results
are generated from the model trained on all of the
Russian troll users in the training dataset.
The self-supervision hyperparameters were cho-
sen based on the validation dataset.
5 Results
In this section, we evaluate two of the major con-
tributions of this paper: the stylometric features
and self-supervision.
Stylometric Features. In Table 2, we compare
our model (CBS+Self) trained using the entire troll
dataset. We compare it to (CBS), our model with-
out self-supervision, and to simply using content
(C), without stylometric features. Overall, we find
that the model CBS+Self outperforms the other
two baselines, with an improvement of nearly 2%
over CBS and 9% over C. While not directly com-
parable, we find that C performs comparably to the
bag-of-words model presented in Im et al. (2019).
Thus, implying that the control dataset may have
similar data distributions. Moreover, compared to
Im et al. (2019), we do not use any profile fea-
tures nor do we extract information about the lan-
guage, unless a language specific token was one
of the 5,000 most common words when combined
with the control group. Overall, we only rely on
linguistic style, simple behavior information, and
general topical content to make predictions.
Feature Ablation. We perform an ablation study
across the three feature groups on the validation
dataset in Table 3. Specifically, we analyze the
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Figure 2: Precision, recall, and F1 test results are plotted using different percentages of troll data during
training.
loss in precision, recall, and F1 scores by exclud-
ing a feature set from the CBS model and record-
ing its performance. Excluded features are in-
dicated by the minus (-) symbol. Overall, we
find that removing content features results in the
largest drop in performance, with a 20% drop.
This is expected given content features were also
the most predictive in Im et al. (2019). The next
largest drop is from removing behavioral features,
followed by stylistic. However, removing stylistic
features results in the second largest drop in pre-
cision, while behavioral features have the second
largest drop in recall.
Self-Supervision. In Figure 2, we plot the pre-
cision, recall, and F1 for the three major mod-
els using different percentages of the troll train-
ing dataset. We observe that CBS outperforms C
across all percentages of troll data with regards
to F1. Similarly, CBS+Self consistently results in
around a 2% F1 improvement over CBS. Interest-
ingly, precision has a near linear improvement as
more trolls are used for training. Yet, recall stays
relatively consistent, or for C, slightly decreases.
From the plots, we can make two important con-
clusions. First, adding more troll data improves
overall prediction, at least based on F1. It seems
that because of the diversity of topics discussed
across troll accounts, it is not easy to detect a sig-
nificant amount of trolls. Moreover, we find that
adding more troll data results in a nearly linear in-
crease in recall. Yet, precision is erratic, result-
ing in neither large improvements nor decreases.
Second, while CBS results in consistent improve-
ments over C, showing the positive impact of be-
havioral and stylistic features, more data does not
necessarily help precision. This suggests that new
information must be incorporated for further im-
provement. We examine the false positive and
false negative errors in more detail in Section 6.1.
6 Discussion and Limitations
To address two questions, “What type of errors
are reduced by adding behavioral and stylistic fea-
tures?” and “What errors are reduced as more data
is collected?”. Specifically, we perform a manual
error analysis and discuss our study’s limitations.
6.1 Error Analysis
In order to assess the quality of our classifier, we
analyze the false positive and false negative er-
rors made by the models. Particularly, we study
error differences between C and CBS. Moreover,
we analyze the different errors made by classifiers
trained on different percentages of troll accounts.
For error analysis, one of the authors manually an-
alyzed the errors and grouped them into semantic
categories. Specifically, we selected a total of 100
false positives and negatives if available. Other-
wise, if there were fewer than 100 errors, we an-
notated all of them. The aim of the analysis is two-
fold. First, we want to provide insights into what
the models are unable to learn (i.e., weaknesses).
Second, we want to provide insight for future av-
enues of work.
6.1.1 False Positives
The false semantic groups and counts of false pos-
itive errors are displayed in Table 4a. Overall, we
grouped errors into four semantic classes: Bots,
Political, Unknown Character, and Misc. None of
the models had more than 100 false positives in
the validation dataset.
Bots. A common source of false positives ap-
pear to fall into the “bot” category. We find that
the number of bot-related false positives increases
from 5 to 9. Intuitively, the C model fails to dis-
tinguish the repetitive nature of the troll accounts
from Bots. Example of bot accounts includes
users that repeatedly share links in every tweet.
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C CBS
10% 100% 10% 100%
Bot 5 9 5 5
Political 10 20 10 13
Unknown Character 4 7 3 3
Misc. 11 27 11 29
Total Error 30 63 29 50
False Positives
C CBS
10% 100% 10% 100%
Support 14 6 14 6
Discord 14 10 13 7
Political Concealment 12 10 12 9
Unknown Character 19 13 19 5
Misc. 41 23 42 20
Total Error 100 62 100 47
False Negatives
Table 5: Manual analysis of false positives and false negatives for the Content (C) and Con-
tent+Behavioral+Style (CBS) models. We also analyze errors made by models trained on different
percentages of the troll dataset (10% and 100%). The error analysis is based on the validation dataset.
One “bot” user repeatedly tweets the time of day.
Example: “It’s 5 o’clock in Auckland. It’s
5 o’clock in Apia. It’s 5 o’clock in Juneau.
It’s 5 o’clock in Seattle. It’s 5 o’clock in San
Rafael. It’s 5 o’clock in Yanacancha...”
For the CBS model, the number of Bot-related
false positives did not increase after adding more
troll-related data (i.e., from 10% to 100%). Sug-
gesting that the stylistic and behavior feature are
able to distinguish a bot from troll. Yet, a substan-
tial group of errors are still bot-related. Therefore,
we believe future work should jointly learn to clas-
sify bots and trolls.
Political. The second category of errors are la-
beled as “political”. These tweets are not essen-
tially leaning towards democratic or republican
ideologies. Rather they are politically active users,
that are criticizing various issues or posting polit-
ical updates on current events. The topic of the
tweets included, but were not limited to, health-
care, Medicaid, Obamacare, and war. Tweets
mentioned several political figures such as Donald
Trump, Barrack Obama, Ivanka Trump, Ted Cruz,
and Jeb Bush. Likewise, politically active users
that were misclassified as trolls also used terms
such as debate, campaign, and president.
Example: “...The GOP asked her to endorse
Rubio NBC/WSJ knows that their recent poll
is a fraud. It would have been better to say
JEB polls Rubio was leading the nation wide
poll The Gop pundits keep saying...”
We did find a few false positives were also related
to sexual abuse. Overall, with the C model, the
number of false positives increased after adding
more troll data. For CBS, there was a slight in-
crease in errors (10 to 13), but the increase was not
as dramatic. This suggests that stylistic and behav-
ior information can distinguish between politically
active users and trolls with a political agenda.
Unknown Characters. The third category only
resulted in a few errors. We labeled this group
as “unknown character” which groups users that
have tweets with repetitive non-English charac-
ters along with repetitive mentions, in combina-
tion with shared links. Overall, because the con-
tent does not appear in or ngrams, the false posi-
tive is called because of the user’s behavior (i.e.,
sharing many links).
Example: “ rbA, Fntd ¡nA   fO
932  AA ¤  yH. Ftd C¤ X
 tmy ¤ mKA¡d­ A±Ff mr 
}d¤C  fO ¤Ftd wd  fO ¨
¡@   mqA.
https://t.co/XXXXXX”
The CBS model only had 3 unknown character-
related errors. Likewise, the number of errors did
not increase, or decrease, by adding more trolls to
the training dataset. Overall, many of the unknown
characters are not in the top 5000 unigrams. Thus,
we find that many of the false postives are caused
by the behavior aspects of the tweets (e.g., sharing
many hyperlinks).
Misc. The final category we developed for false
positives are “misc.” errors. These tweets did not
contain political-related topics. The focus of the
tweets ranged from religion to pop culture. Like-
wise, sometimes, users in this group shared links
for marketing purposes. We find that this is the
largest group of errors, and the number of misc-
related errors increases dramatically as more troll
data is added (e.g,. 11 to 29 for CBS). We ob-
served a pattern in the ground-truth troll data in
which they talk about Veterans Day, then heroes,
Christmas, someone’s birthday, and music. They
then generally post a politically-related tweet.
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Example: “Specials 3/28/19 Sandwich:
turkey, bacon, avocado aioli and greens ...
Sad note, today is chef Laurette’s last day
... Specials 3/29/19 Sandwich: Parmigiana
chicken breast ... Also contains 20+ urls”
Many of the errors are caused by the behavior of
the user (e.g., sharing a large number of links). To
fix these errors in future work, adding topic pattern
over time could help. Intuitively, if a user never
discusses any political topics, and is not likely to
tweet one, based on temporal patterns that differ
from known troll farms, then we may be able to
reduce this group of false positives.
6.1.2 False Negatives
In Table 4b we display the counts of false nega-
tives that fall into one of five groups: Support, Dis-
cord, Political Concealment, Unknown Character,
and Misc. Overall, for both C and CBS, and unlike
false positives, we find that the number of false
negatives decreases as more data is added. This
pattern is also evident in Figure 2 by the nearly
linear increase recall as more data is added.
Discord. The model failed to detect Russian troll
tweets gave an impression of “discord”—in our
work we labeled accounts that were attempting
discord about certain topics, e.g. black lives mat-
ter, immigration ban on Muslims, and racial degra-
dation/issues.
Example: “@EdwardNiam Namaste Cops
getting away with murder. Once again
#TamirRice #Justice4Tamir #BlackLives-
Matters #policebrutality https://t.co/XXXXX
Love my city! #Cleveland #Blackycleveland
#streetart #graffiti https://t.co/XXXXXX ...
Also contains 10+ urls ”
For C, the number of errors dropped from 14 to
10 by adding more data. Likewise, for CBS, the
errors dropped from 13 to 7. We find that behav-
ioral and stylistic information takes better advan-
tage of more data, with a nearly 50% drop in dis-
cord errors. Intuitively, CBS improves by a lot be-
cause many of the discord text contain many hy-
perlinks which the model correlates with troll be-
havior. Moreover, common topics are captured by
the top 5000 ngrams as more troll data is added.
Political with Concealment. We refer to next
group of errors as “political with concealment”.
The models failed to identify trolls that posted a
large number of tweets that were not related to
politics, compared to the political-related tweets.
Examples of non-political topics include tweets
about the Kardashians and Pamela Anderson.
Generally, we found the transition into a politi-
cal post are quite sudden. Political concealment is
a major tactic used by troll organizations to mas-
querade themselves as US citizens. While CBS
performed slightly better with more data (12 to 9)
than C (12 to 10), political concealment errors still
make up a large proportion of the false negatives.
Example: “... I was supposed to be flying
from NY to San Antonio on business, but
my wife got hurt the day before and I can-
celed my trip. #My911Story ...Poland bans
Russian “journalist” from entering Schen-
gen zone until 2020 https://t.co/XXXXX via
.... RT @EjHirschberger: This is my daugh-
ter, Elizabeth Thomas, missing since Mon-
day, March 13th. Please help me find...”
Support. The “support” category is similar to po-
litical false negatives. Except, most of the tweets
for a user consisted of messages which that heav-
ily support Donald Trump, but they do not directly
refer to him. The tweets mentioned anti-Muslim
and anti-Hillary posts.
Example: “We don’t allow “refugees” into
this country until we help our homeless first
#IslamKills”
Generally, adding more data solves this issue.
This suggests that the training data is not large
enough to capture all the topics discussed by Rus-
sian trolls.
Misc. The largest portion false negatives are
caused by users that either did not not tweet any
political issues or tweeted political issues that are
not common, thus not captured by the 5000 most
frequent unigrams. We labeled this category as
“misc”. Most of these tweets did not have any spe-
cific focus which seemed to repeat. The length of
the tweets was not long. Two uncommon politi-
cal subjects kept recurring are about nuclear ex-
plosions and chemicals. For example, many of
these users tweeted about #FukushimaAgain or
#Fukushima2015, a nuclear disaster that occurred
in Japan.
Example: “... #FukushimaAgain Ukraini-
ans say it was the new Chernobyl! They
are afraid! I wanna drown my sorrow
http://t.co/XXXXX ... Bitterness is like drink-
ing poison Chernobyl’s reactor is going to
explode again!...”
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Compared to the misc group for false positives,
we found that the misc examples for false nega-
tives did not always contain many distinguishing
behavior or stylistic characteristics. Therefore, a
large number of false negatives are produced by
both the C (23 false negatives) and CBS (20 false
negatives) models.
Unknown Character. Finally, we also have a cat-
egory called “unknown character” for false neg-
atives. Often those were related to non-English
characters that are not commonly occurring within
the continental US. Examples include Unicode
characters from the Russian alphabet.
Example: “Ковер на стене и бесконеч-
ные тосты. Что удивляет испанку в рус-
ских: https://t.co/XXXXX”
We find that most of these errors are handled by
adding more troll data. For instance, CBS errors
were reduced from 19 to 5 by increasing the troll
data from 10% to 100%. We find that the behavior
and stylistic features are important to handle the
unknown character error type.
6.1.3 Error Analysis Discussion
Overall, we believe temporal patterns of topics
could further reduce false negatives. For exam-
ple, if we analyze a user’s tweets over time, we
may find that they repeatedly discuss the follow-
ing topics in temporally: 1. pop culture 2. birthday
wish 3. political 4. pop culture. Thus, temporal-
topic patterns can be used as auxiliary features. If
we use neural networks, the patterns can be used
by a recurrent neural network. The topics can be
learned automatically using topic modeling.
6.2 Limitations
There are two limitations to this study. First, the
control dataset is not guaranteed to be troll-free.
While we did not find any obvious trolls in our er-
ror analysis of false positives, this does not stop
them from being part of the training, test, or un-
labeled datasets. This can result in sub-optimal
performance, either by incorrectly reported test re-
sults, or because of noisy training data. Second,
the training dataset consisted of Twitter accounts
that have selected English as their primary lan-
guage. Thus, given the limitations, future work
should provide more varied datasets. Specifically,
data should be collected carefully to avoid contam-
ination. Also, larger collections of bots and polit-
ically active users should be added to the dataset
to increase the difficulty of the task. Furthermore,
normal users that discuss non-political topics sim-
ilar to the topics discussed by the trolls should
be targeted to include in a new dataset. Finally,
while we found that stylistic and behavior infor-
mation can improve classification performance,
sometimes this information resulted in more false
positives (e.g., Misc false positives).
7 Conclusion
Social media platforms are likely to play a more
important role in political discourse for both
democratic and authoritative nations, as evidenced
by recent world events. Hence, it is important
that we develop approaches to identify malicious
actors seeking to influence the outcomes or deci-
sion making of various stakeholders by manipulat-
ing social media platforms. Therefore, in this pa-
per we presented a novel troll detection method,
based on state-of-the-art stylometric and behav-
ioral information. Moreover, because it is chal-
lenging to collect real troll accounts, we analyzed
the use of self-supervision to automatically anno-
tate unlabeled collections of data. Specifically,
we showed that self-supervision improves detec-
tion performance with as few as 100 training users
and with nearly 1,000 annotated trolls. Finally, we
performed a detailed error analysis that provides
insight for future model development. Future re-
search includes, but is not limited to, new dataset
development, detecting both bots and trolls, ex-
panding the stylistic/behavioral features, and in-
troducing temporal topic patterns as features.
Also, it is important to study the ethical im-
plications of this technology, such as asking the
question, “How could false positives, or false neg-
atives, adversely impact real people?” Moreover,
should black box models be used by government
agencies, or social media companies, to monitor
Russian troll activity? It is important to under-
stand each of these questions before putting this
work into production.
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Abstract
The blurry line between nefarious fake news
and protected-speech satire has been a notori-
ous struggle for social media platforms. Fur-
ther to the efforts of reducing exposure to mis-
information on social media, purveyors of fake
news have begun to masquerade as satire sites
to avoid being demoted. In this work, we ad-
dress the challenge of automatically classify-
ing fake news versus satire. Previous work
have studied whether fake news and satire
can be distinguished based on language dif-
ferences. Contrary to fake news, satire stories
are usually humorous and carry some political
or social message. We hypothesize that these
nuances could be identified using semantic
and linguistic cues. Consequently, we train a
machine learning method using semantic rep-
resentation, with a state-of-the-art contextual
language model, and with linguistic features
based on textual coherence metrics. Empirical
evaluation attests to the merits of our approach
compared to the language-based baseline and
sheds light on the nuances between fake news
and satire. As avenues for future work, we
consider studying additional linguistic features
related to the humor aspect, and enriching the
data with current news events, to help identify
a political or social message.
1 Introduction
The efforts by social media platforms to reduce the
exposure of users to misinformation have resulted,
on several occasions, in flagging legitimate satire
stories. To avoid penalizing publishers of satire,
which is a protected form of speech, the platforms
have begun to add more nuance to their flagging
systems. Facebook, for instance, added an option
to mark content items as “Satire”, if “the content is
posted by a page or domain that is a known satire
∗Authors contributed equally
publication, or a reasonable person would under-
stand the content to be irony or humor with a social
message” (Facebook). This notion of humor and
social message is also echoed in the definition of
satire by Oxford dictionary as “the use of humour,
irony, exaggeration, or ridicule to expose and crit-
icize people’s stupidity or vices, particularly in the
context of contemporary politics and other topical
issues”.
The distinction between fake news and satire
carries implications with regard to the exposure
of content on social media platforms. While fake
news stories are algorithmically suppressed in the
news feed, the satire label does not decrease the
reach of such posts. This also has an effect on
the experience of users and publishers. For users,
incorrectly classifying satire as fake news may de-
prive them from desirable entertainment content,
while identifying a fake news story as legitimate
satire may expose them to misinformation. For
publishers, the distribution of a story has an im-
pact on their ability to monetize content.
Moreover, in response to these efforts to de-
mote misinformation, fake news purveyors have
begun to masquerade as legitimate satire sites,
for instance, carrying small badges at the footer
of each page denoting the content as satire (Jen-
nifer Golbeck, 2018). The disclaimers are usually
small such that the stories are still being spread as
though they were real news (Funke, 2019).
This gives rise to the challenge of classifying
fake news versus satire based on the content of
a story. While previous work (Jennifer Golbeck,
2018) have shown that satire and fake news can be
distinguished with a word-based classification ap-
proach, our work is focused on the semantic and
linguistic properties of the content. Inspired by the
distinctive aspects of satire with regard to humor
and social message, our hypothesis is that using
semantic and linguistic cues can help to capture
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these nuances.
Our main research questions are therefore,
RQ1) are there semantic and linguistic differences
between fake news and satire stories that can help
to tell them apart?; and RQ2) can these semantic
and linguistic differences contribute to the under-
standing of nuances between fake news and satire
beyond differences in the language being used?
The rest of paper is organized as follows: in sec-
tion 2, we briefly review studies on fake news and
satire articles which are the most relevant to our
work. In section 3, we present the methods we use
to investigate semantic and linguistic differences
between fake and satire articles. Next, we evalu-
ate these methods and share insights on nuances
between fake news and satire in section 4. Finally,
we conclude the paper in section 5 and outline next
steps and future work.
2 Related Work
Previous work addressed the challenge of identi-
fying fake news (Niall J. Conroy, 2015; Kai Shu
and Liu, 2017), or identifying satire (Clint Bur-
foot, 2009; Aishwarya N. Reganti, 2016; Victo-
ria Rubin, 2016), in isolation, compared to real
news stories.
The most relevant work to ours is that of Gol-
beck et al. (Jennifer Golbeck, 2018). They intro-
duced a dataset of fake news and satirical articles,
which we also employ in this work. The dataset
includes the full text of 283 fake news stories and
203 satirical stories, that were verified manually,
and such that each fake news article is paired with
a rebutting article from a reliable source. Al-
beit relatively small, this data carries two desir-
able properties. First, the labeling is based on the
content and not the source, and the stories spread
across a diverse set of sources. Second, both fake
news and satire articles focus on American politics
and were posted between January 2016 and Octo-
ber 2017, minimizing the possibility that the topic
of the article will influence the classification.
In their work, Golbeck et al. studied whether
there are differences in the language of fake news
and satirical articles on the same topic that could
be utilized with a word-based classification ap-
proach. A model using the Naive Bayes Multi-
nomial algorithm is proposed in their paper which
serves as the baseline in our experiments.
3 Method
In the following subsections, we investigate the se-
mantic and linguistic differences of satire and fake
news articles.1
3.1 Semantic Representation with BERT
To study the semantic nuances between fake news
and satire, we use BERT (Devlin et al., 2018),
which stands for Bidirectional Encoder Represen-
tations from Transformers, and represents a state-
of-the-art contextual language model. BERT is a
method for pre-training language representations,
meaning that it is pre-trained on a large text cor-
pus and then used for downstream NLP tasks.
Word2Vec (Tomas Mikolov, 2013) showed that
we can use vectors to properly represent words in
a way that captures semantic or meaning-related
relationships. While Word2Vec is a context-free
model that generates a single word-embedding
for each word in the vocabulary, BERT gener-
ates a representation of each word that is based
on the other words in the sentence. It was built
upon recent work in pre-training contextual rep-
resentations, such as ELMo (Matthew E. Peters,
2018) and ULMFit (Jeremy Howard, 2018), and is
deeply bidirectional, representing each word using
both its left and right context. We use the pre-
trained models of BERT and fine-tune it on the
dataset of fake news and satire articles using Adam
optimizer with 3 types of decay and 0.01 decay
rate. Our BERT-based binary classifier is created
by adding a single new layer in BERT’s neural
network architecture that will be trained to fine-
tune BERT to our task of classifying fake news
and satire articles.
3.2 Linguistic Analysis with Coh-Metrix
Inspired by previous work on satire detection, and
specifically Rubin et al. (Victoria Rubin, 2016)
who studied the humor and absurdity aspects of
satire by comparing the final sentence of a story
to the first one, and to the rest of the story - we
hypothesize that metrics of text coherence will be
useful to capture similar aspects of semantic relat-
edness between different sentences of a story.
Consequently, we use the set of text coherence
metrics as implemented by Coh-Metrix (McNa-
mara et al., 2010). Coh-Metrix is a tool for pro-
ducing linguistic and discourse representations of
1Reproducibility report, including codes and results, is
available at: https://github.com/adverifai/Satire vs Fake
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PCA Component Description estimate std.error statistic
Sa
tir
e
as
so
ci
at
ed
RC19 First person singular pronoun incidence 1.80 0.41 4.38 ***
RC5 Sentence length, number of words 0.66 0.18 3.68 ***
RC15 Estimates of hypernymy for nouns 0.61 0.19 3.18 **
RC49 Word Concreteness 0.54 0.17 3.18 **
RC35 Ratio of casual particles to causal verbs 0.56 0.18 3.10 **
RC91 Text Easability PC Referential cohesion 0.45 0.16 2.89 **
RC20 Incidence score of gerunds 0.43 0.16 2.77 **
RC32 Expanded temporal connectives incidence 0.44 0.16 2.75 **
RC9 Third person singular pronoun incidence 0.44 0.16 2.67 **
RC43 Word length, number of letters 0.45 0.20 2.27 *
RC46 Verb phrase density 0.37 0.16 2.25 *
RC97 Coh-Metrix L2 Readability 0.34 0.16 2.16 *
RC61 Average word frequency for all words 0.50 0.24 2.13 *
RC84 The average givenness of each sentence 0.37 0.18 2.11 *
RC65 Text Easability PC Syntactic simplicity 0.38 0.18 2.08 *
RC50 Lexical diversity 0.37 0.18 2.05 *
Fa
ke
ne
w
s
as
so
ci
at
ed
RC30 Agentless passive voice density -1.05 0.21 -4.96 ***
RC73 Average word frequency for content words -0.72 0.20 -3.68 ***
RC59 Adverb incidence -0.62 0.18 -3.43 ***
RC55 Number of sentences -0.79 0.26 -3.09 **
RC62 Causal and intentional connectives -0.42 0.15 -2.72 **
RC34 LSA overlap between verbs -0.35 0.16 -2.22 *
RC44 LSA overlap, adjacent sentences -0.36 0.16 -2.16 *
RC47 Sentence length, number of words -0.36 0.18 -2.03 *
RC89 LSA overlap, all sentences in paragraph -0.34 0.17 -1.97 *
(Intercept) -0.54 0.19 -2.91
Table 1: Significant components of our logistic regression model using the Coh-Metrix features. Variables are also
separated by their association with either satire or fake news. Bold: the remaining features following the step-wise
backward elimination. Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.
a text. As a result of applying the Coh-Metrix
to the input documents, we have 108 indices re-
lated to text statistics, such as the number of words
and sentences; referential cohesion, which refers
to overlap in content words between sentences;
various text readability formulas; different types
of connective words and more. To account for
multicollinearity among the different features, we
first run a Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
on the set of Coh-Metrix indices. Note that we
do not apply dimensionality reduction, such that
the features still correspond to the Coh-Metrix in-
dices and are thus explainable. Then, we use the
PCA scores as independent variables in a logistic
regression model with the fake and satire labels
as our dependent variable. Significant features of
the logistic regression model are shown in Table
1 with the respective significance levels. We also
run a step-wise backward elimination regression.
Those components that are also significant in the
step-wise model appear in bold.
4 Evaluation
In the following sub sections, we evaluate our clas-
sification model and share insights on the nuances
between fake news and satire, while addressing
our two research questions.
4.1 Classification Between Fake News and
Satire
We evaluate the performance of our method based
on the dataset of fake news and satire articles and
using the F1 score with a ten-fold cross-validation
as in the baseline work (Jennifer Golbeck, 2018).
First, we consider the semantic representation
with BERT. Our experiments included multiple
pre-trained models of BERT with different sizes
and cases sensitivity, among which the large un-
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Model P R F1
Headline only 0.46 0.89 0.61
Text body only 0.78 0.52 0.62
Headline + text body 0.81 0.75 0.78
Table 2: Results of classification between fake news
and satire articles using BERT pre-trained models,
based on the headline, body and full text. Bold: best
performing model. P: Precision, and R: Recall
cased model, bert uncased L-24 H-1024 A-16,
gave the best results. We use the recommended
settings of hyper-parameters in BERT’s Github
repository and use the fake news and satire data
to fine-tune the model. Furthermore, we tested
separate models based on the headline and body
text of a story, and in combination. Results are
shown in Table 2. The models based on the head-
line and text body give a similar F1 score. How-
ever, while the headline model performs poorly on
precision, perhaps due to the short text, the model
based on the text body performs poorly on recall.
The model based on the full text of headline and
body gives the best performance.
To investigate the predictive power of the lin-
guistic cues, we use those Coh-Metrix indices that
were significant in both the logistic and step-wise
backward elimination regression models, and train
a classifier on fake news and satire articles. We
tested a few classification models, including Naive
Bayes, Support Vector Machine (SVM), logistic
regression, and gradient boosting - among which
the SVM classifier gave the best results.
Table 3 provides a summary of the results.
We compare the results of our methods of the
pre-trained BERT, using both the headline and
text body, and the Coh-Mertix approach, to the
language-based baseline with Multinomial Naive
Bayes from (Jennifer Golbeck, 2018). Both
the semantic cues with BERT and the linguistic
cues with Coh-Metrix significantly outperform the
baseline on the F1 score. The two-tailed paired
t-test with a 0.05 significance level was used for
testing statistical significance of performance dif-
ferences. The best result is given by the BERT
model. Overall, these results provide an answer
to research question RQ1 regarding the existence
of semantic and linguistic difference between fake
news and satire.
Method P R F1
Baseline 0.70 0.64 0.67
Coh-Metrix 0.72 0.66 0.74*
Pre-trained BERT 0.81 0.75 0.78*
Table 3: Summary of results of classification between
fake news and satire articles using the baseline Multi-
nomial Naive Bayes method, the linguistic cues of
text coherence and semantic representation with a pre-
trained BERT model. Statistically significant differ-
ences with the baseline are marked with ’*’. Bold: best
performing model. P: Precision, and R: Recall
4.2 Insights on Linguistic Nuances
With regard to research question RQ2 on the un-
derstanding of semantic and linguistic nuances be-
tween fake news and satire - a key advantage of
studying the coherence metrics is explainability.
While the pre-trained model of BERT gives the
best result, it is not easily interpretable. The co-
herence metrics allow us to study the differences
between fake news and satire in a straightforward
manner.
Observing the significant features, in bold in Ta-
ble 1, we see a combination of surface level related
features, such as sentence length and average word
frequency, as well as semantic features including
LSA (Latent Semantic Analysis) overlaps between
verbs and between adjacent sentences. Semantic
features which are associated with the gist repre-
sentation of content are particularly interesting to
see among the predictors since based on Fuzzy-
trace theory (Reyna, 2012), a well-known theory
of decision making under risk, gist representation
of content drives individual’s decision to spread
misinformation online. Also among the signifi-
cant features, we observe the causal connectives,
that are proven to be important in text comprehen-
sion, and two indices related to the text easability
and readability, both suggesting that satire articles
are more sophisticated, or less easy to read, than
fake news articles.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We addressed the challenge of identifying nuances
between fake news and satire. Inspired by the hu-
mor and social message aspects of satire articles,
we tested two classification approaches based on
a state-of-the-art contextual language model, and
linguistic features of textual coherence. Evalua-
tion of our methods pointed to the existence of
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semantic and linguistic differences between fake
news and satire. In particular, both methods
achieved a significantly better performance than
the baseline language-based method. Lastly, we
studied the feature importance of our linguistic-
based method to help shed light on the nuances
between fake news and satire. For instance, we ob-
served that satire articles are more sophisticated,
or less easy to read, than fake news articles.
Overall, our contributions, with the improved
classification accuracy and towards the under-
standing of nuances between fake news and satire,
carry great implications with regard to the delicate
balance of fighting misinformation while protect-
ing free speech.
For future work, we plan to study additional lin-
guistic cues, and specifically humor related fea-
tures, such as absurdity and incongruity, which
were shown to be good indicators of satire in pre-
vious work. Another interesting line of research
would be to investigate techniques of identifying
whether a story carries a political or social mes-
sage, for example, by comparing it with timely
news information.
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Abstract
Calls to action on social media are known to
be effective means of mobilization in social
movements, and a frequent target of censor-
ship. We investigate the possibility of their au-
tomatic detection and their potential for pre-
dicting real-world protest events, on histori-
cal data of Bolotnaya protests in Russia (2011-
2013). We find that political calls to action can
be annotated and detected with relatively high
accuracy, and that in our sample their volume
has a moderate positive correlation with rally
attendance.
1 Introduction
Calls to action (CTAs) are known to be effec-
tive means of mobilization in social networks
(P.D. Guidry et al., 2014; Savage et al., 2016), and
they are also known to be a target for censorship
by authoritarian states (King et al., 2013, 2014).
However, to the best of our knowledge, they have
not been systematically evaluated for their poten-
tial for automatic detection and predicting offline
protest events.
We contribute a case study on political CTAs
in historical data on Bolotnaya protests in Rus-
sia (2011-2013). We identify 14 core and bor-
derline types of political CTAs, and we show that
they are relatively easy both to annotate (with IAA
0.78) and to classify (F1 of 0.77, even with a small
amount of annotated data). All of that puts them at
high risk for censorship, but also opens the possi-
bilities to track such censorship. We also find that
in Bolotnaya data, the volume of CTAs on social
media has a moderate positive correlation with ac-
tual rally attendance.
2 Related Work
2.1 Prediction of social unrest with social
media data
Social movements differ in their goals (reforms or
preservation of status quo), size of the group they
are targeting, methods, and other factors (Snow
et al., 2004), but their success always ultimately
depends on successful mobilization of new partic-
ipants. The role of social media in that has been
clear since the Arab Spring (Dewey et al., 2012).
Social media fundamentally changed the social
movements, enabling new formats of protest, a
new model of power, and greater activity outside
of formal social organizations (Earl et al., 2015).
Expert judgement is famously unreliable for
predicting political events (Tetlock, 2017). So, if
social media play such an important role in social
movements, can they also be used to track and per-
haps predict the real-world events? By now hun-
dreds of studies explored various kinds of forecast-
ing based on social media (Phillips et al., 2017;
Agarwal and Sureka, 2015), from economic fac-
tors to civil unrest. Most of them show that their
techniques do have predictive merits, although
some skepticism is warranted (Gayo-Avello et al.,
2013).
Most of the civil unrest prediction work is
done on Twitter and news, sometimes in combina-
tion with other sources such as blogs and various
economic indicators (Ramakrishnan et al., 2014;
Manrique et al., 2013). The basic instrument of
analysis in most of these studies is time series of
social media activity on a given topic (Hua et al.,
2013). Data filtering is typically performed via
protest-related keywords, hashtags, geolocation or
known activist accounts. Many studies also rely on
some combination of spatiotemporal features (e.g.
Ertugrul et al. (2019); Zhao et al. (2015)). The
texts of posts could be mined for extracting struc-
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tured event-related information, or dense meaning
representations could be used without identifying
specific features, such as doc2vec representations
of news articles and social media streams (Ning
et al., 2016). Additionally, social network struc-
ture (Renaud et al., 2019) and activity cascades
(Cadena et al., 2015) were also found useful, as
well as mining and incorporating demographic in-
formation (Compton et al., 2014).
The typically-used features that are extracted
from social media text include time, date, and
place mentions, sentiment polarity of the post, and
presence of violent words (Benkhelifa et al., 2014;
Bahrami et al., 2018). Another popular approach
relies on manually created lexicons of protest-
related vocabulary (such as “police”, “molotov”,
“corruption”, etc.) combined with event-specific
names of politicians, activists etc. (Spangler and
Smith, 2019; Mishler et al., 2017). Korolov et al.
(2016) identifies possible stages of mobilization in
a social movement (sympathy, awareness, motiva-
tion, ability to take part). To the best of our knowl-
edge, CTAs have not been systematically investi-
gated for their predictive potential.
2.2 Censorship in social media
Similarly to the systems used to predict offline
events, many current censorship systems seem to
rely on keywords (MacKinnon, 2009; Verkamp
and Gupta, 2012; Chaabane et al., 2014; Zhu et al.,
2013). However, it is highly likely that states
engaging in suppression of collective action are
researching more sophisticated options, and it is
therefore imperative that censorship monitors also
have better tools to monitor what gets deleted.
Much of research on Internet censorship fo-
cuses on China, where there does not seem to be
a single policy enforced everywhere: local organi-
zations and companies show significant variation
in their implementations (Knockel et al., 2017;
Miller, 2018; Knockel, 2018). This depends on
only on the goals of the platform, its ties or de-
pendence on the government, but also the market
forces: a competing platform that would find a
way to censor less would be more attractive for
the users (Ling, 2010). The actual process also
varies based on the available resources: it is likely
that larger companies have significant censor staff
(Li and Rajagopalan, 2013), while others might
rely only rely on simple keyword filtering. Finally,
even at government level not all criticism is disal-
lowed: a significant degree of freedom seems to
be allowed with respect to local social movements
that are unlikely to become a threat to the regime
(Qin et al., 2017).
Calls to action seem to be an obvious candidate
for types of verbal messages strongly associated
with social movements, and they are known to be
effective means of mobilization in social networks
(P.D. Guidry et al., 2014; Savage et al., 2016).
In particular, King et al. (2013, 2014) report that
sometimes the censors let through materials that
are simply critical of government, but flag mate-
rials with collective action potential (such as calls
to attend a rally or support opposition). The ef-
fort to shut down the collective action is clear, for
example, from the fact that Instagram was simply
shut down for 4 days while photos of Hong Kong
protests were trending (Ma, 2016).
To the best of our knowledge, the censorship
potential of CTAs has also not been specifically
addressed in the context of political protests.
3 Case study: Bolotnaya protests, Russia
Our case study is the 2011–2013 Russian protests,
of which the best known is the “March of the Mil-
lions” on May 6, 2012 in the Bolotnaya square
in Moscow. The movement was widespread, with
protests in many smaller Russian cities and towns.
The protesters were opposing fraudulent elections
and government corruption. This was the largest
protest movement in Russia since 1990s.
The experiments discussed below rely on the
“Bolotnaya” dataset that contains posts, likes and
groups of users from VKontakte, the largest Rus-
sian social network. The main statistics for the
dataset are shown in Table 1. It was created by the
New Media Center (Moscow, Russia) in 2014 on
the basis of a list of 476 protest groups, which was
compiled by Yandex (the largest Russian search
engine). The data is used by an agreement with
New Media Center.
Enikolopov et al. (2018) report that the number
of users of VK social network in different loca-
tions was in itself associated with higher protest
activity, and locations where the user base was
fractured between VKontakte and Facebook had
fewer protests, which overall suggests that the
main role of social media was the ease of coor-
dination (rather than actual spreading of informa-
tion critical of the government). This is consis-
tent with the reported role of Facebook in Egypt’s
37
Protest groups 476
Posts in the protest groups 196017
Protest groups’ members 221813
Posts posted by the group 77604
Posts shared from other groups 81403
Time frame covered 08.2010 - 10.2014
Users liking the posts by the protest
groups
57754
Table 1: Basic statistics on the Bolotnaya dataset
Tahrir Square protests (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012).
If these conclusions are correct, then higher vol-
ume of CTA should in itself also be a factor in
higher protest attendance.
4 Defining Calls to Action
Prototypical CTAs are imperatives prompting the
addressee to perform some action, such as “Don’t
let the government tell you what to think!”. This
seems like a straightforward category to annotate,
but in reality CTAs may be expressed in various
ways, including both direct and indirect speech
acts. There are many borderline cases that would
in the absence of clear guidelines decrease inter-
annotator agreement (IAA). There is relevant work
on the task of identification of requests in emails
(Lampert et al., 2010) and intention classification
for dialogue agents (Quinn and Zaiane, 2014), but,
to the best of our knowledge, this work is the first
to create a detailed schema for CTA annotation in
the context of a political protest.
The current work on censorship is concerned
not so much with CTAs in particular, but with a
broader category of “material with collective ac-
tion potential”. King et al. (2013) defines such
materials as those that ’(a) involve protest or or-
ganized crowd formation outside the Internet; (b)
related to individuals who have organized or in-
cited collective action on the ground in the past; or
(c) relate to nationalism or nationalist sentiment
that have incited protest or collective action in the
past.’ In other words, this definition only concerns
offline events, and does not include various forms
of “crowd protesting” such as calls to share infor-
mation critical of the government.
Based on extensive manual analysis of samples
from Bolotnaya dataset, we identified 5 core and
9 borderline cases for political CTAs, shown in
Figure 2. Since we were interested in CTAs for
social movements, we excluded any other CTAs
that would formally fit the criteria, such as invi-
tations, marketing CTAs etc. We also excluded
any other protest-related posts, such as reports of
protest events. Of the core and borderline CTA
cases, we chose to consider 8 as CTAs.
This choice does not have a firm theoretical un-
derpinning and would vary depending on the re-
searcher’s perspective and the case study. For
example, in our Bolotnaya data we opted to not
include broad rhetorical questions like “For how
much longer shall we put up with this?”, but in a
different context (especially in a different culture)
they could be key. Inter-annotator agreement de-
pends on how the guidelines’ describing the cho-
sen policy explicitly.
5 Annotation study
Pilot data analysis made it clear that the CTA and
non-CTA classes were not balanced. Since CTAs
overall constitute a small portion of all posts, we
pre-selected the data for annotation using a man-
ually created seed list of 155 protest-related key-
words and phrases, such as “participate”, “share”,
“join”, “fair elections”, etc.
We used our schema to develop detailed anno-
tation guidelines for an annotation study on 1000
VKontakte posts from Russian Bolotnaya data.
The annotation was performed on the level of full
post, not individual sentences. We considered a
post as CTA if it included even one instance of
a political CTA as defined above. Ambiguous
cases were treated as political CTA, as long as they
could function as such: for example, Join us to-
morrow! could refer to both a protest or a birthday
party.
Each post was annotated by 3 native Rus-
sian speakers, using the classification interface
of Prodigy1 annotation tool. The inter-annotator
agreement as estimated by Krippendorf’s alpha
was .78. In the end, we obtained 871 posts on
which at least 2 annotators agreed. 300 of them
were identified as CTAs, and 571 - as non-CTAs.
This was used as the training dataset for the work
to be described in subsequent sections.
6 Classification
In our experiments, we randomly split the col-
lected CTA dataset into the train and test parts in
the 80/20% ratio. We selected Logistic Regres-
sion (LR) and Support Vector Machine classifier
with a linear kernel (SVC) as our baseline mod-
els. Both models were used as implemented in the
1https://prodi.gy/
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2. Calls to broad
changes/impact on
society
7. Suggestions of
collective actions
3. Instructions for
speciﬁc protest
events
5. Calls to activism
and organizing
protest groups
4. Calls to
disseminating
information
8. Indicating the
necessity or
desirability of some
action
6. Declarations of
future actions with
the intention to
mobilize
1. Calls to
participating in
protests
14. Declarations of
future achievements
by the activists
12. Imperatives
addressed to the
opponents
10. Sharing
organizational
information for the
protest group 13. Questions (rhetorical or not)
9. Indication of
possibility of an
action
11. Opinions on the
suggested actions
Calls to action in protest
movements
15. Calls to other
kinds of actions
Figure 1: The core and peripheral cases of political CTAs. This study focuses on types 1-8.
Examples for each type:
1. Everybody, join us tomorrow in Sakharov square!
2. If you love Russia, if you love your home city of Smolensk, start the fight with the crooks and thieves!
3. Do not form a line or arrange to meet in a specific place.
4. Invite foreign press and TV – let them see what is going on in our capital!
5. Observers in Kaluga, please respond!
6. That’s ok, we will tell them what we think of them even in the square in front of the Central market!
7. I suggest we put on white stripes on our arms as a symbol of honest elections. That’s easy to do!
8. On the 10th of March we should come in large numbers!
9. You can download the leaflet with the invitation here.
10. This is the beginning! We will start activities when we will have 50 members. We repeat, participation in this group can
only be active.
11. I do like the idea of the government’s resignation, but I think your slogans are too emotional. Furthermore, I’m against
calling an early election.
12. Out with you, McFaul! And take Putin and Medvedev with you, together with Nemtsov and Chirikova!
13. Is THAT really our choice? (rhetorical)
Today at 10 pm Vlad and I are going to post the leaflets around the city. Who wants to help us? (factual)
14. Together we will get rid of Putin’s lies and dictatorship!
15. Everybody, come to my birthday party on Saturday!
Figure 2: Types of calls to actions in Russian social networks, with examples
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scikit-learn2 library. In both cases we used
TF-IDF representations of both original posts and
posts lemmatized with pymorphy3 library (Ko-
robov, 2015). We picked the best regularization
hyperparameters for each model through cross-
validation based on the average F1 score over 5
folds.
The current state-of-the-art deep learning ap-
proaches rely on large Transformer-based models
pre-trained on large text corpora and then fine-
tuned for a given task. In particular, we tried two
versions of BERT (Devlin et al., 2019): the mul-
tilingual model released in the PyTorch repository
of BERT 4, and the Russian version (RuBERT) re-
leased by DeepPavlov5. The latter model is initial-
ized as multilingual BERT and further fine-tuned
on Russian Wikipedia and news corpora (Kuratov
and Arkhipov, 2019). Both models have 12 layers
and 180M parameters. We trained both models for
40 epochs with the batch size of 32 and the learn-
ing rate of 5e−5.
Additionally to BERT representations, we ex-
perimented with the contextual embedder of the
ELMo model (Peters et al., 2018) pre-trained
for Russian and released by DeepPavlov6. The
posts were split into sentences using the NLTK li-
brary7 and each sentence token was encoded by
the ELMo embedder into a 1024-dimensional vec-
tor. The classification was performed by a stan-
dard LSTM network (Hochreiter and Schmidhu-
ber, 1997) with a hidden size of 256 units followed
by a linear layer. We trained the network for 25
epochs and with the learning rate of 0.001.
The results of all the classification experiments
are shown in Table 2. The best performance was
achieved by RuBERT, with LSTM on ELMo close
second. The effect of lemmatization with linear
classifiers is inconsistent. It is interesting that sim-
ple logistic regression with lemmatizatized TF-
IDF representation of the posts is only 4 F1 points
below ELMo, which suggests that the overall clas-
sification task is not very difficult.
2https://scikit-learn.org
3https://github.com/kmike/pymorphy2/
4https://github.com/huggingface/
pytorch-transformers
5http://docs.deeppavlov.ai/en/master/
components/bert.html
6https://github.com/deepmipt/
DeepPavlov/tree/master/deeppavlov
7https://www.nltk.org/
Classifier Acc. F1
LR (no lemmatization) 0.78 0.67
LR (lemmatization) 0.82 0.71
SVC (no lemmatization) 0.80 0.68
SVC (lemmatization) 0.78 0.65
BERT multilingual 0.8 0.73
RuBERT 0.86 0.78
LSTM on ELMo 0.83 0.75
Table 2: CTA classification results
7 CTAs for Predicting social unrest
To estimate the potential usefulness of CTAs
as indicators of offline protest events, we ran
the trained RuBERT CTA classifier over 91K
posts falling in the date range between Dec 2011
through Jul 2013 from the Bolotnaya dataset.
Figure 3 shows the volume of posts identified
as CTAs, plotted against the Wikipedia data about
attendance of individual rallies8. When no atten-
dance data is available, we assume that there were
0 protest events. The two green lines correspond
to upper and lower attendance estimates. The blue
line shows the detected CTAs.
Despite the noisiness and incompleteness of
the available protest data (see subsection 9.1),
the Pearson’s correlation between attendance es-
timates and the number of detected CTAs is about
0.4, which is considered to be “moderate”. This
could make CTAs a useful additional factor to
systems based on spatiotemporal, demographic,
and/or network activity features.
8Russian Wikipedia, Protest movement in Russia (2011-
2013): https://tinyurl.com/y46qyb9w.
Figure 3: The correlation between the detected CTAs
(blue) and the rally attendance (green) per month. The
two green lines reflect the upper and lower attendance
estimates depending on the source of data used.
40
Figure 4: Average number of likes and reposts on CTA and non-CTA posts vs rally attendance
We also conducted experiments to estimate the
real-world effect of likes and reposts of CTA posts.
Intuitively, one would expect that a higher num-
ber of likes and reposts of CTA posts should re-
sult in higher attendance for protest rallies. To see
whether that was the case for Bolotnaya data we
calculated the number of shares and likes on posts
detected as CTAs by our classifier, and all other
posts in the sample. Figure 4 shows these num-
bers plotted against the attendance of the protest
events.
The pattern we actually observed in Bolotnaya
data is different: before the March of the Millions
the average number of both reposts and likes is
spiking before a protest event, and going down af-
ter it. This corresponds to preparation and the af-
termath of a major event. Interestingly, after the
March of the Millions there was much like/repost
activity which did not result in any larger events.
This can be attributed to the introduction of the
anti-protest laws that effectively stifled the move-
ment: the link between social media and real-
world activity clearly becomes weaker.
8 Discussion
8.1 Censoring CTAs
Our annotated dataset is quite small (only 871
posts), and this is on purpose: our point is that
even with such a small (and unbalanced) dataset
it is already possible to obtain a reasonably good
classifier (and its performance would likely im-
prove with more data). This is an additional fac-
tor in censorship potential: if a system for detect-
ing CTAs could be built quickly and cheaply, it is
highly likely that such systems are already being
developed by the well-sponsored research teams
employed by the authoritarian states. Our study
should at least level the playing field for censor-
ship monitors, as will be discussed below. The
guidelines we developed will be made available on
request by researchers.
The data specific to our Bolotnaya case study
would not be openly released because, 8 years af-
ter the events, the issues that were driving them
continue to be the key factors in the activities of
the Russian opposition movements. In particular,
Russia has just experienced a new wave of protests
estimated to be the largest since 2012 (Wilpert,
2019), also driven by the issues of corruption and
fair elections, and resulting in hundreds of arrests
(BBC, 2019a,b). Many of the key political figures
on both sides are also the same. All this makes
our Bolotnaya data potentially useful for censor-
ing new protests.
The situation actually became worse for the
protesters because since 2011 a range of new laws
went into action to restrict activity on social me-
dia. The social network users and popular blog-
gers are personally identifiable (via their phone
numbers), VPNs are illegal, and social network
operators are obliged to store activity data for 6
months and decrypt them for authorities (House,
2018; Wesolowsky, 2019). Activists can be im-
prisoned for sharing “inauthentic and illegal in-
formation of social importance”, a broad formu-
lation that is interpreted freely by the authorities
(Schreck, 2017).
9 Web monitoring potential
As discussed above, materials with collective ac-
tion potential are already undergoing active cen-
sorship in authoritarian states, and it is highly
likely that classifiers similar to ours are actually
already in place. We hope that our study would
somewhat level the playing field for those who
combat the censorship.
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In particular, if authoritarian states are able to
detect CTAs for censorship, it is equally possible
to use CTA classifiers in monitoring systems that
would scan the web for content that is removed,
and report on the ongoing censorship. At present
monitoring efforts rely on manual and keyword
analysis (MacKinnon, 2009; Verkamp and Gupta,
2012; Chaabane et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2013).
Note that if data on what is being censored were
continually collected, the censors would actually
“help” the monitoring efforts: by flagging and re-
moving content they would essentially be provid-
ing free annotation.
One more use of CTA classifiers would be to
help the protesters to find new creative ways of
expressing their views that would pass the au-
tomatic filters, such as the Chinese egao phe-
nomenon (Horsburgh, 2014; Yates and Hasmath,
2017). Providing an independent web-service with
which the activists could check how easy their
message is to flag would arguably boost such cre-
ativity and provide the activists with their own
weapons in the linguistic race against the authori-
tarian states.
9.1 Limitations
The present study is limited in several ways. First,
the small size of annotated data ony provides a
lower bound on the performance on CTA classi-
fiers, which would likely increase with more anno-
tated data. However, our point was not in achiev-
ing the best possible performance, but in showing
that automatic detection of CTAs is possible even
with relatively little data.
The second limitation comes from the lack of
reliable attendance data for Bolotnaya protests -
a situation pervasive in authoritarian states with
tight control over media and civic organizations.
For example, the official police report for the
Kaluga square event stated 8,000 people, while
opposition politicians reported 100-120,000. Ac-
cording to bloggers, there were 30,000 people, and
a Russian parliamentarian estimated 50-60,0009.
However, this limitation would impact any predic-
tion method, and it arises precisely in the situa-
tions in which the most important protest activity
is happening.
Last but not the least, the whole field of fore-
casting in with social media data is suffering from
9Russian Wikipedia, Protest movement in Russia (2011-
2013): https://tinyurl.com/y46qyb9w.
the lack of common best practices, which is aggra-
vated by the impossibility to replicate most of the
results due to data sharing concerns (Phillips et al.,
2017). This study is not an exception: Bolotnaya
data in this study was used by an agreement with
New Media Center, and we cannot release it pub-
licly. Without major changes in accessibility of
social network data for researchers, the only way
forward in the field seems to be partial validation
by similar patterns uncovered in other case stud-
ies.
10 Conclusion
Calls to action are a vital part of mobilization ef-
fort in social movements, but, to the best of our
knowledge, their potential for censorship and pre-
dicting offline protest events has not yet been eval-
uated.
We examine political calls to action in a case
study on historical data on Bolotnaya protests in
Russia (2011-2013). We identify 14 core and
borderline types of political CTAs, and we show
that they are relatively easy to annotate (with IAA
0.78) and detect automatically (F1 of 0.77, even
with a small amount of annotated data), which puts
them at high risk for censorship in authoritarian
states. We also find that in Bolotnaya data, the
volume of CTAs on social media has a moderate
positive correlation with actual rally attendance.
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Abstract
Digital media enables not only fast sharing
of information, but also disinformation. One
prominent case of an event leading to circu-
lation of disinformation on social media is
the MH17 plane crash. Studies analysing the
spread of information about this event on Twit-
ter have focused on small, manually anno-
tated datasets, or used proxys for data anno-
tation. In this work, we examine to what ex-
tent text classifiers can be used to label data
for subsequent content analysis, in particular
we focus on predicting pro-Russian and pro-
Ukrainian Twitter content related to the MH17
plane crash. Even though we find that a neural
classifier improves over a hashtag based base-
line, labeling pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
content with high precision remains a chal-
lenging problem. We provide an error analysis
underlining the difficulty of the task and iden-
tify factors that might help improve classifica-
tion in future work. Finally, we show how the
classifier can facilitate the annotation task for
human annotators.
1 Introduction
Digital media enables fast sharing of information,
including various forms of false or deceptive in-
formation. Hence, besides bringing the obvious
advantage of broadening information access for
everyone, digital media can also be misused for
campaigns that spread disinformation about spe-
cific events, or campaigns that are targeted at spe-
cific individuals or governments. Disinformation,
in this case, refers to intentionally misleading con-
tent (Fallis, 2015).
A prominent case of a disinformation campaign
are the efforts of the Russian government to con-
trol information during the Russia-Ukraine crisis
(Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014). One of the most
important events during the crisis was the crash
of Malaysian Airlines (MH17) flight on July 17,
2014. The plane crashed on its way from Ams-
terdam to Kuala Lumpur over Ukrainian territory,
causing the death of 298 civilians. The event im-
mediately led to the circulation of competing nar-
ratives about who was responsible for the crash
(see Section 2), with the two most prominent nar-
ratives being that the plane was either shot down
by the Ukrainian military, or by Russian sepa-
ratists in Ukraine supported by the Russian gov-
ernment (Oates, 2016). The latter theory was con-
firmed by findings of an international investigation
team. In this work, information that opposes these
findings by promoting other theories about the
crash is considered disinformation. When study-
ing disinformation, however, it is important to ac-
knowledge that our fact checkers (in this case the
international investigation team) may be wrong,
which is why we focus on both of the narratives
in our study.
MH17 is a highly important case in the con-
text of international relations, because the tragedy
has not only increased Western, political pressure
against Russia, but may also continue putting the
government’s global image at stake. In 2020, at
least four individuals connected to the Russian
separatist movement will face murder charges for
their involvement in the MH17 crash (Harding,
2019), which is why one can expect the waves
of disinformation about MH17 to continue spread-
ing. The purpose of this work is to develop an ap-
proach that may help both practitioners and schol-
ars of political science, international relations and
political communication to detect and measure the
scope of MH17-related disinformation.
Several studies analyse the framing of the crash
and the spread of (dis)information about the event
in terms of pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian fram-
ing. These studies analyse information based
on manually labeled content, such as television
transcripts (Oates, 2016) or tweets (Golovchenko
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et al., 2018; Hjorth and Adler-Nissen, 2019). Re-
stricting the analysis to manually labeled content
ensures a high quality of annotations, but prohibits
analysis from being extended to the full amount
of available data. Another widely used method
for classifying misleading content is to use dis-
tant annotations, for example to classify a tweet
based on the domain of a URL that is shared
by the tweet, or a hashtag that is contained in
the tweet (Guess et al., 2019; Gallacher et al.,
2018; Grinberg et al., 2019). Often, this approach
treats content from uncredible sources as mislead-
ing (e.g. misinformation, disinformation or fake
news). This methods enables researchers to scale
up the number of observations without having to
evaluate the fact value of each piece of content
from low-quality sources. However, the approach
fails to address an important issue: Not all content
from uncredible sources is necessarily misleading
or false and not all content from credible sources is
true. As often emphasized in the propaganda liter-
ature, established media outlets too are vulnerable
to state-driven disinformation campaigns, even if
they are regarded as credible sources (Jowett and
O’donnell, 2014; Taylor, 2003; Chomsky and Her-
man, 1988)1.
In order to scale annotations that go beyond
metadata to larger datasets, Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) models can be used to automat-
ically label text content. For example, several
works developed classifiers for annotating text
content with frame labels that can subsequently
be used for large-scale content analysis (Boydstun
et al., 2014; Tsur et al., 2015; Card et al., 2015;
Johnson et al., 2017; Ji and Smith, 2017; Naderi
and Hirst, 2017; Field et al., 2018; Hartmann et al.,
2019). Similarly, automatically labeling attitudes
expressed in text (Walker et al., 2012; Hasan and
Ng, 2013; Augenstein et al., 2016; Zubiaga et al.,
2018) can aid the analysis of disinformation and
misinformation spread (Zubiaga et al., 2016). In
this work, we examine to which extent such clas-
sifiers can be used to detect pro-Russian framing
related to the MH17 crash, and to which extent
classifier predictions can be relied on for analysing
information flow on Twitter.
1The U.S. media coverage of weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq stands as one of the most prominent examples
of how generally credible sources can be exploited by state
authorities.
MH17 Related (Dis-)Information Flow on Twit-
ter We focus our classification efforts on a
Twitter dataset introduced in Golovchenko et al.
(2018), that was collected to investigate the flow of
MH17-related information on Twitter, focusing on
the question who is distributing (dis-)information.
In their analysis, the authors found that citizens are
active distributors, which contradicts the widely
adopted view that the information campaign is
only driven by the state and that citizens do not
have an active role.
To arrive at this conclusion, the authors manu-
ally labeled a subset of the tweets in the dataset
with pro-Russian/pro-Ukrainian frames and build
a retweet network, which has Twitter users as
nodes and edges between two nodes if a retweet
occurred between the two associated users. An
edge was considered as polarized (either pro-
Russian or pro-Ukrainian), if at least one retweet
between the two users connected by the edge was
pro-Russian/pro-Ukrainian. Then, the amount of
polarized edges between users with different pro-
files (e.g. citizen, journalist, state organ) was com-
puted.
Labeling more data via automatic classifica-
tion (or computer-assisted annotation) of tweets
could serve an analysis as the one presented in
Golovchenko et al. (2018) in two ways. First,
more edges could be labeled.2 Second, edges
could be labeled with higher precision, i.e. by
taking more tweets comprised by the edge into
account. For example, one could decide to
only label an edge as polarized if at least half
of the retweets between the users were pro-
Ukrainian/pro-Russian.
Contributions We evaluate different classifiers
that predict frames for unlabeled tweets in
Golovchenko et al. (2018)’s dataset, in order to
increase the number of polarized edges in the
retweet network derived from the data. This is
challenging due to a skewed data distribution and
the small amount of training data for the pro-
Russian class. We try to combat the data sparsity
using a data augmentation approach, but have to
report a negative result as we find that data aug-
mentation in this particular case does not improve
classification results. While our best neural classi-
fier clearly outperforms a hashtag-based baseline,
generating high quality predictions for the pro-
2Only 26% of the available tweets in Golovchenko et al.
(2018)’s dataset are manually labeled.
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Russian class is difficult: In order to make predic-
tions at a precision level of 80%, recall has to be
decreased to 23%. Finally, we examine the appli-
cability of the classifier for finding new polarized
edges in a retweet network and show how, with
manual filtering, the number of pro-Russian edges
can be increased by 29%. We make our code,
trained models and predictions publicly available3.
2 Competing Narratives about the MH17
Crash
We briefly summarize the timeline around the
crash of MH17 and some of the dominant narra-
tives present in the dataset. On July 17, 2014,
the MH17 flight crashed over Donetsk Oblast in
Ukraine. The region was at that time part of
an armed conflict between pro-Russian separatists
and the Ukrainian military, one of the unrests fol-
lowing the Ukrainian revolution and the annexa-
tion of Crimea by the Russian government. The
territory in which the plane fell down was con-
trolled by pro-Russian separatists.
Right after the crash, two main narratives
were propagated: Western media claimed that
the plane was shot down by pro-Russian sepa-
ratists, whereas the Russian government claimed
that the Ukrainian military was responsible. Two
organisations were tasked with investigating the
causes of the crash, the Dutch Safety Board
(DSB) and the Dutch-led joint investigation team
(JIT). Their final reports were released in Octo-
ber 2015 and September 2016, respectively, and
conclude that the plane had been shot down by
a missile launched by a BUK surface-to-air sys-
tem. The BUK was stationed in an area con-
trolled by pro-Russian separatists when the mis-
sile was launched, and had been transported there
from Russia and returned to Russia after the inci-
dent. These findings are denied by the Russian
government until now. There are several other
crash-related reports that are frequently mentioned
throughout the dataset. One is a report by Almaz-
Antey, the Russian company that manufactured
the BUK, which rejects the DSB findings based on
mismatch of technical evidence. Several reports
backing up the Dutch findings were released by
the investigative journalism website Bellingcat.4
The crash also sparked the circulation of sev-
eral alternative theories, many of them promoted
3https://github.com/coastalcph/mh17
4https://www.bellingcat.com/
in Russian media (Oates, 2016), e.g. that the plane
was downed by Ukrainian SU25 military jets, that
the plane attack was meant to hit Putin’s plane that
was allegedly traveling the same route earlier that
day, and that the bodies found in the plane had al-
ready been dead before the crash.
3 Dataset
For our classification experiments, we use the
MH17 Twitter dataset introduced by Golovchenko
et al. (2018), a dataset collected in order to study
the flow of (dis)information about the MH17 plane
crash on Twitter. It contains tweets collected based
on keyword search5 that were posted between July
17, 2014 (the day of the plane crash) and Decem-
ber 9, 2016.
Golovchenko et al. (2018) provide annotations
for a subset of the English tweets contained in the
dataset. A tweet is annotated with one of three
classes that indicate the framing of the tweet with
respect to responsibility for the plane crash. A
tweet can either be pro-Russian (Ukrainian au-
thorities, NATO or EU countries are explicitly
or implicitly held responsible, or the tweet states
that Russia is not responsible), pro-Ukrainian
(the Russian Federation or Russian separatists in
Ukraine are explicitly or implicitly held responsi-
ble, or the tweet states that Ukraine is not respon-
sible) or neutral (neither Ukraine nor Russia or
any others are blamed). Example tweets for each
category can be found in Table 2. These exam-
ples illustrate that the framing annotations do not
reflect general polarity, but polarity with respect
to responsibility to the crash. For example, even
though the last example in the table is in general
pro-Ukrainian, as it displays the separatists in a
bad light, the tweet does not focus on responsibil-
ity for the crash. Hence the it is labeled as neutral.
Table 1 shows the label distribution of the anno-
tated portion of the data as well as the total amount
of original tweets, and original tweets plus their
retweets/duplicates in the network. A retweet is a
repost of another user’s original tweet, indicated
by a specific syntax (RT @username: ). We con-
sider as duplicate a tweet with text that is iden-
tical to an original tweet after preprocessing (see
Section 5.1). For our classification experiments,
5These keywords were: MH17, Malazijskij [and] Boeing
(in Russian), #MH17, #Pray4MH17, #PrayforMH17. The
dataset was collected using the Twitter Garden hose, which
means that it contains a 10% of all tweets within the specified
period that matched the search criterion.
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Label Original All
Labeled
Pro-Russian 512 4,829
Pro-Ukrainian 910 12,343
Neutral 6,923 118,196
Unlabeled - 192,003 377,679
Total - 200,348 513,047
Table 1: Label distribution and dataset sizes. Tweets
are considered original if their preprocessed text is
unique. All tweets comprise original tweets, retweets
and duplicates.
we exclusively consider original tweets, but model
predictions can then be propagated to retweets and
duplicates.
4 Classification Models
For our classification experiments, we compare
three classifiers, a hashtag-based baseline, a logis-
tic regression classifier and a convolutional neural
network (CNN).
Hashtag-Based Baseline Hashtags are often
used as a means to assess the content of a tweet
(Efron, 2010; Godin et al., 2013; Dhingra et al.,
2016). We identify hashtags indicative of a class
in the annotated dataset using the pointwise mu-
tual information (pmi) between a hashtag hs and a
class c, which is defined as
pmi(hs, c) = log
p(hs, c)
p(hs) p(c)
(1)
We then predict the class for unseen tweets as the
class that has the highest pmi score for the hash-
tags contained in the tweet. Tweets without hash-
tag (5% of the tweets in the development set) or
with multiple hashtags leading to conflicting pre-
dictions (5% of the tweets in the development set)
are labeled randomly. We refer to to this baseline
as HS_PMI.
Logistic Regression Classifier As non-neural
baseline we use a logistic regression model.6 We
compute input representations for tweets as the av-
erage over pre-trained word embedding vectors for
all words in the tweet. We use fasttext embeddings
(Bojanowski et al., 2017) that were pre-trained on
Wikipedia.7
6As non-neural alternative, we also experimented with
SVMs. These showed inferior performance to the regression
model.
7In particular, with cross-lingual experiments in mind
(see Section 7), we used embeddings that are pre-aligned
Convolutional Neural Network Classifier As
neural classification model, we use a convolutional
neural network (CNN) (Kim, 2014), which has
previously shown good results for tweet classifi-
cation (dos Santos and Gatti, 2014; Dhingra et al.,
2016).8 The model performs 1d convolutions over
a sequence of word embeddings. We use the same
pre-trained fasttext embeddings as for the logistic
regression model. We use a model with one con-
volutional layer and a relu activation function, and
one max pooling layer. The number of filters is
100 and the filter size is set to 4.
5 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the classification models using 10-
fold cross validation, i.e. we produce 10 different
datasplits by randomly sampling 60% of the data
for training, 20% for development and 20% for
testing. For each fold, we train each of the models
described in Section 4 on the training set and mea-
sure performance on the test set. For the CNN and
LOGREG models, we upsample the training exam-
ples such that each class has as many instances
as the largest class (Neutral). The final reported
scores are averages over the 10 splits.9
5.1 Tweet Preprocessing
Before embedding the tweets, we replace urls,
retweet syntax (RT @user_name: ) and @men-
tions (@user_name) by placeholders. We low-
ercase all text and tokenize sentences using the
StandfordNLP pipeline (Qi et al., 2018). If a
tweet contains multiple sentences, these are con-
catenated. Finally, we remove all tokens that con-
tain non-alphanumeric symbols (except for dashes
and hashtags) and strip the hashtags from each to-
ken, in order to increase the number of words that
are represented by a pre-trained word embedding.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
We report performance as F1-scores, which is the
harmonic mean between precision and recall. As
the class distribution is highly skewed and we
between languages available here https://fasttext.
cc/docs/en/aligned-vectors.html
8We also ran intitial experiments with recurrent neural
networks (RNNs), but found that results were comparable
with those achieved by the CNN architecture, which runs
considerably faster.
9We train with the same hyperparameters on all splits,
these hyperparameters were chosen according to the best
macro f score averaged over 3 runs with different random
seeds on one of the splits.
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Label Example tweet
Pro-Ukrainian
Video - Missile that downed MH17 ’was brought in from Russia’ @peterlane5news
RT @mashable: Ukraine: Audio recordings show pro-Russian rebels tried to hide #MH17 black boxes.
Russia Calls For New Probe Into MH17 Crash. Russia needs to say, ok we fucked up.. Rather than play games
@IamMH17 STOP LYING! You have ZERO PROOF to falsely blame UKR for #MH17 atrocity. You will need to apologize.
Pro-Russian
Why the USA and Ukraine, NOT Russia, were probably behind the shooting down of flight #MH17
RT @Bayard_1967: UKRAINE Eyewitness Confirm Military Jet Flew Besides MH17 Airliner: BBC ...
RT @GrahamWP_UK: Just read through #MH17 @bellingcat report, what to say - written by frauds, believed by the gullible. Just that.
Neutral
#PrayForMH17 :(
RT @deserto_fox: Russian terrorist stole wedding ring from dead passenger #MH17
Table 2: Example tweets for each of the three classes.
are mainly interested in accurately classifying the
classes with low support (pro-Russian and pro-
Ukrainian), we report macro-averages over the
classes. In addition to F1-scores, we report the
area under the precision-recall curve (AUC).10 We
compute an AUC score for each class by convert-
ing the classification task into a one-vs-all classi-
fication task.
6 Results
The results of our classification experiments are
presented in Table 3. Figure 1 shows the per-class
precision-recall curves for the LOGREG and CNN
models as well as the confusion matrices between
classes.11
Comparison Between Models We observe that
the hashtag baseline performs poorly and does not
improve over the random baseline. The CNN
classifier outperforms the baselines as well as the
LOGREG model. It shows the highest improve-
ment over the LOGREG for the pro-Russian class.
Looking at the confusion matrices, we observe
that for the LOGREG model, the fraction of True
Positives is equal between the pro-Russian and the
pro-Ukrainian class. The CNN model produces a
higher amount of correct predictions for the pro-
Ukrainian than for the pro-Russian class. The
absolute number of pro-Russian True Positives is
lower for the CNN, but so is in return the amount
of misclassifications between the pro-Russian and
pro-Ukrainian class.
Per-Class Performance With respect to the per
class performance, we observe a similar trend
across models, which is that the models perform
10The AUC is computed according to the trapezoidal rule,
as implemented in the sklearn package (Pedregosa et al.,
2011)
11Both the precision-recall curves and the confusion ma-
trices were computed by concatenating the test sets of all 10
datasplits
best for the neutral class, whereas performance
is lower for the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian
classes. All models perform worst on the pro-
Russian class, which might be due to the fact that it
is the class with the fewest instances in the dataset.
Considering these results, we conclude that the
CNN is the best performing model and also the
classifier that best serves our goals, as we want to
produce accurate predictions for the pro-Russian
and pro-Ukrainian class without confusing be-
tween them. Even though the CNN can im-
prove over the other models, the classification per-
formance for the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
class is rather low. One obvious reason for this
might be the small amount of training data, in par-
ticular for the pro-Russian class.
In the following, we briefly report a negative re-
sult on an attempt to combat the data sparseness
with cross-lingual transfer. We then perform an
error analysis on the CNN classifications to shed
light on the difficulties of the task.
7 Data Augmentation Experiments using
Cross-Lingual Transfer
The annotations in the MH17 dataset are highly
imbalanced, with as few as 512 annotated exam-
ples for the pro-Russian class. As the annotated
examples were sampled from the dataset at ran-
dom, we assume that there are only few tweets
with pro-Russian stance in the dataset. This ob-
servation is in line with studies that showed that
the amount of disinformation on Twitter is in fact
small (Guess et al., 2019; Grinberg et al., 2019). In
order to find more pro-Russian training examples,
we turn to a resource that we expect to contain
large amounts of pro-Russian (dis)information.
The Elections integrity dataset12 was released by
Twitter in 2018 and contains the tweets and ac-
12https://about.twitter.com/en_us/
values/elections-integrity.html#data
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Macro-avg Pro-Russian Pro-Ukrainian Neutral
Model F1 AUC F1 AUC F1 AUC F1 AUC
RANDOM 0.25 - 0.10 - 0.16 - 0.47 -
HS_PMI 0.25 - 0.10 - 0.16 - 0.48 -
LOGREG 0.59 0.53 0.38 0.34 0.51 0.41 0.88 0.86
CNN 0.69 0.71 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.93 0.94
Table 3: Classification results on the English MH17 dataset measured as F1 and area under the precision-recall
curve (AUC).
count information for 3,841 accounts that are be-
lieved to be Russian trolls financed by the Russian
government. While most tweets posted after late
2014 are in English language and focus on topics
around the US elections, the earlier tweets in the
dataset are primarily in Russian language and fo-
cus on the Ukraine crisis (Howard et al., 2018).
One feature of the dataset observed by Howard
et al. (2018) is that several hashtags show high
peakedness (Kelly et al., 2012), i.e. they are posted
with high frequency but only during short inter-
vals, while others are persistent during time.
We find two hashtags in the Elections integrity
dataset with high peakedness that were exclusively
posted within 2 days after the MH17 crash and
that seem to be pro-Russian in the context of re-
sponsibility for the MH17 crash: #КиевСка-
жиПравду (Kiew tell the truth) and #Киев-
сбилбоинг (Kiew made the plane go down). We
collect all tweets with these two hashtags, result-
ing in 9,809 Russian tweets that we try to use as
additional training data for the pro-Russian class
in the MH17 dataset. We experiment with cross-
lingual transfer by embedding tweets via aligned
English and Russian word embeddings.13 How-
ever, so far results for the cross-lingual models do
not improve over the CNN model trained on only
English data. This might be due to the fact that the
additional Russian tweets rather contain a general
pro-Russian frame than specifically talking about
the crash, but needs further investigation.
8 Error Analysis
In order to integrate automatically labeled exam-
ples into a network analysis that studies the flow
of polarized information in the network, we need
to produce high precision predictions for the pro-
13We use two sets of monolingual fasttext embeddings
trained on Wikipedia (Bojanowski et al., 2017) that were
aligned relying on a seed lexicon of 5000 words via the RC-
SLS method (Joulin et al., 2018)
Russian and the pro-Ukrainian class. Polarized
tweets that are incorrectly classified as neutral will
hurt an analysis much less than neutral tweets that
are erroneously classified as pro-Russian or pro-
Ukrainian. However, the worst type of confu-
sion is between the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
class. In order to gain insights into why these
confusions happen, we manually inspect incor-
rectly predicted examples that are confused be-
tween the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian class.
We analyse the misclassifications in the develop-
ment set of all 10 runs, which results in 73 False
Positives of pro-Ukrainian tweets being classified
as pro-Russian (referred to as pro-Russian False
Positives), and 88 False Positives of pro-Russian
tweets being classified as pro-Ukrainian (referred
to as pro-Ukrainian False Positives). We can iden-
tify three main cases for which the model produces
an error:
1. the correct class can be directly inferred from
the text content easily, even without back-
ground knowledge
2. the correct class can be inferred from the text
content, given that event-specific knowledge
is provided
3. the correct class can be inferred from the text
content if the text is interpreted correctly
For the pro-Russian False Positives, we find that
42% of the errors are category I and II errors, re-
spectively, and 15% of category III. For the pro-
Ukrainian False Positives, we find 48% category I
errors, 33% category II errors and and 13% cate-
gory III errors. Table 4 presents examples for each
of the error categories in both sets which we will
discuss in the following.
Category I Errors Category I errors could eas-
ily be classified by humans following the annota-
tion guidelines (see Section 3). One difficulty can
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Figure 1: Confusion matrices for the CNN (left) and the logistic regression model (right). The y-axis shows the
true label while the x-axis shows the model prediction.
be seen in example f). Even though no background
knowledge is needed to interpret the content, in-
terpretation is difficult because of the convoluted
syntax of the tweet. For the other examples it
is unclear why the model would have difficulties
with classifying them.
Category II Errors Category II errors can
only be classified with event-specific background
knowledge. Examples g), i) and k) relate to the
theory that a Ukrainian SU25 fighter jet shot down
the plane in air. Correct interpretation of these
tweets depends on knowledge about the SU25
fighter jet. In order to correctly interpret exam-
ple j) as pro-Russian, it has to be known that the
bellingcat report is pro-Ukrainian. Example l) re-
lates to the theory that the shoot down was a false
flag operation run by Western countries and the
bodies in the plane were already dead before the
crash. In order to correctly interpret example m),
the identity of Kolomoisky has to be known. He is
an anti-separatist Ukrainian billionaire, hence his
involvement points to the Ukrainian government
being responsible for the crash.
Category III Errors Category III errors occur
for examples that can only be classified by cor-
rectly interpreting the tweet authors’ intention. In-
terpretation is difficult due to phenomena such as
irony as in examples n) and o). While the irony
is indicated in example n) through the use of the
hashtag #LOL, there is no explicit indication in ex-
ample o).
Interpretation of example q) is conditioned on
world knowledge as well as the understanding of
the speakers beliefs. Example r) is pro-Russian as
it questions the validity of the assumption AC360
is making, but we only know that because we
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Error
cat.
True
class
Model
prediction
id Tweet
I
Pro-U Pro-R
a) RT @ChadPergram: Hill intel sources say Russia has the capability to potentially shoot down a
#MH17 but not Ukraine.
b) RT @C4ADS: .@bellingcat’s new report says #Russia used fake evidence for #MH17 case to
blame #Ukraine URL
c) The international investigation blames Russia for MH17 crash URL #KievReporter #MH17 #Rus-
sia #terror #Ukraine #news #war
Pro-R Pro-U
d) RT @RT_com: BREAKING: No evidence of direct Russian link to #MH17 - US URL URL
e) RT @truthhonour: Yes Washington was behind Eukraine jets that shot down MH17 as pretext to
conflict with Russia. No secrets there
f) Ukraine Media Falsely Claim Dutch Prosecutors Accuse Russia of Downing MH17: Dutch pros-
ecutors de URL #MH17 #alert
II
Pro-U Pro-R
g) @Werteverwalter @Ian56789 @ClarkeMicah no SU-25 re #MH17 believer has ever been able to
explain it,facts always get in their way
h) Rebel theories on #MH17 "total nonsense", Ukrainian Amb to U.S. Olexander Motsyk interviewed
by @jaketapper via @cnn
i) Ukrainian Pres. says it’s false "@cnnbrk: Russia says records indicate Ukrainian warplane was
flying within 5 km of #MH17 on day of crash.
Pro-R Pro-U
j) Russia has released some solid evidence to contradict @EliotHiggins + @bellingcat’s #MH17
report. http://t.co/3leYfSoLJ3
k) RT @masamikuramoto: @MJoyce2244 The jets were seen by Russian military radar and
Ukrainian eyewitnesses. #MH17 @Fossibilities @irina
l) RT @katehodal: Pro-Russia separatist says #MH17 bodies "weren’t fresh" when found in Ukraine
field,suggesting already dead b4takeoff
m) RT @NinaByzantina: #MH17 redux: 1) #Kolomoisky admits involvement URL 2) gets $1.8B of
#Ukraine’s bailout funds
III
Pro-U Pro-R
n) #Russia again claiming that #MH17 was shot down by air-to-air missile, which of course wasn’t
russian-made. #LOL URL
o) RT @20committee: New Moscow line is #MH17 was shot down by a Ukrainian fighter. With an
LGBT pilot, no doubt.
Pro-R Pro-U
q) RT @merahza: If you believe the pro Russia rebels shot #MH17 then you’ll believe Justine Bieber
is the next US President and that Coke is a
q) So what @AC360 is implying is that #US imposed sanctions on #Russia, so in turn they shot down
a #Malaysia jet carrying #Dutch people? #MH17
r) RT @GrahamWP_UK: #MH17 1. A man on sofa watching YouTube thinks it was a ’separatist
BUK’. 2. Man on site for over 25 hours doesn’t.
Table 4: Examples for the different error categories. Error category I are cases where the correct class can easily
be inferred from the text. For error category II, the correct class can be inferred from the text with event-specific
knowledge. For error category III, it is necessary to resolve humour/satire in order to infer the intended meaning
that the speaker wants to communicate.
know that the assumption is absurd. Example s)
requires to evaluate that the speaker thinks people
on site are trusted more than people at home.
From the error analysis, we conclude that cat-
egory I errors need further investigation, as here
the model makes mistakes on seemingly easy in-
stances. This might be due to the model not be-
ing able to correctly represent Twitter specific lan-
guage or unknown words, such as Eukraine in ex-
ample e). Category II and III errors are harder to
avoid and could be improved by applying reason-
ing (Wang and Cohen, 2015) or irony detection
methods (Van Hee et al., 2018).
9 Integrating Automatic Predictions into
the Retweet Network
Finally, we apply the CNN classifier to label new
edges in Golovchenko et al. (2018)’s retweet net-
work, which is shown in Figure 2. The retweet
network is a graph that contains users as nodes and
an edge between two users if the users are retweet-
ing each other.14 In order to track the flow of
polarized information, Golovchenko et al. (2018)
label an edge as polarized if at least one tweet
contained in the edge was manually annotated as
14Golovchenko et al. (2018) use the k10 core of the net-
work, which is the maximal subset of nodes and edges, such
that all included nodes are connected to at least k other nodes
(Seidman, 1983), i.e. all users in the network have interacted
with at least 10 other users.
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Figure 2: The left plot shows the original k10 retweet network as computed by Golovchenko et al. (2018) together
with the new edges that were added after manually re-annotating the classifier predictions. The right plot only
visualizes the new edges that we could add by filtering the classifier predictions. Pro-Russian edges are colored
in red, pro-Ukrainian edges are colored in dark blue and neutral edges are colored in grey. Both plots were made
using The Force Atlas 2 layout in gephi (Bastian et al., 2009).
pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian. While the network
shows a clear polarization, only a small subset of
the edges present in the network are labeled (see
Table 5).
Automatic polarity prediction of tweets can
help the analysis in two ways. Either, we can label
a previously unlabeled edge, or we can verify/con-
firm the manual labeling of an edge, by labeling
additional tweets that are comprised in the edge.
9.1 Predicting Polarized Edges
In order to get high precision predictions for un-
labeled tweets, we choose the probability thresh-
olds for predicting a pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian
tweet such that the classifier would achieve 80%
precision on the test splits (recall at this precision
level is 23%). Table 5 shows the amount of polar-
ized edges we can predict at this precision level.
Upon manual inspection, we however find that
the quality of predictions is lower than estimated.
Hence, we manually re-annotate the pro-Russian
and pro-Ukrainian predictions according to the of-
ficial annotation guidelines used by (Golovchenko
et al., 2018). This way, we can label 77 new pro-
Russian edges by looking at 415 tweets, which
means that 19% of the candidates are hits. For
the pro-Ukrainian class, we can label 110 new
edges by looking at 611 tweets (18% hits). Hence
even though the quality of the classifier predic-
tions is too low to be integrated into the network
analysis right away, the classifier drastically facil-
itates the annotation process for human annotators
compared to annotating unfiltered tweets (from the
original labels we infer that for unfiltered tweets,
only 6% are hits for the pro-Russian class, and
11% for the pro-Ukrainian class).
Pro-R Pro-U Neutral Total
# labeled edges in k10 270 678 2193 3141
# candidate edges 349 488 - 873
# added after filtering
predictions
77 110 - 187
Table 5: Number of labeled edges in the k10 network
before and after augmentation with predicted labels.
Candidates are previously unlabeled edges for which
the model makes a confident prediction. The total num-
ber of edges in the network is 24,602.
10 Conclusion
In this work, we investigated the usefulness of text
classifiers to detect pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian
framing in tweets related to the MH17 crash, and
to which extent classifier predictions can be relied
on for producing high quality annotations. From
our classification experiments, we conclude that
the real-world applicability of text classifiers for
labeling polarized tweets in a retweet network is
restricted to pre-filtering tweets for manual anno-
tation. However, if used as a filter, the classifier
can significantly speed up the annotation process,
making large-scale content analysis more feasible.
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Abstract
Considering diverse aspects of an argumenta-
tive issue is an essential step for mitigating
a biased opinion and making reasonable de-
cisions. A related generation model can pro-
duce flexible results that cover a wide range of
topics, compared to the retrieval-based method
that may show unstable performance for un-
seen data. In this paper, we study the problem
of generating sentential arguments from multi-
ple perspectives, and propose a neural method
to address this problem. Our model, ArgDiver
(Argument generation model from Diverse
perspectives), in a way a conversational sys-
tem, successfully generates high-quality sen-
tential arguments. At the same time, the au-
tomatically generated arguments by our model
show a higher diversity than those generated
by any other baseline models. We believe that
our work provides evidence for the potential of
a good generation model in providing diverse
perspectives on a controversial topic.
1 Introduction
If one wants to address a potentially controversial
issue, it is important to consider all of its aspects.
When there are many such issues, some means of
automating the process are called for. Automati-
cally providing diverse aspects of an argumenta-
tive topic has thus received much attention. For
instance, Wachsmuth et al. (2017) and Stab et al.
(2018) developed a search engine for various ar-
guments, while distinguishing the stance of each
for a given claim. Ajjour et al. (2018) retrieved
related arguments on a given topic, mapped the ar-
guments to a topic space, and visualized such ar-
guments within the topic space according to their
distribution and their topical tendency.
These researches on a retrieval-based system
have been very active, such as retrieving claims
† Corresponding author
from documents (Levy et al., 2014; Lippi and Tor-
roni, 2015, 2016) and discovering multiple view-
points from an online debate (Trabelsi and Zaiane,
2018). As the outputs of these retrieval-based sys-
tems are based on sentences originally written by a
human writer (as implied in the name “retrieval”),
their outputs are often quite diverse and of high-
quality.
However, a retrieval-based system does not
have sufficient flexibility towards input with miss-
ing keywords or topics unseen to the database on
which the system is based. Therefore, the perfor-
mance of a retrieval-based system is bound by the
coverage of the database. In response, a genera-
tion system has recently been looked into for ar-
gument mining. Wang and Ling (2016) summa-
rized arguments to show only important contents
in large text. Hua and Wang (2018) and Hua et al.
(2019) generated counter-arguments for a given
statement. Hidey and McKeown (2019) edited an
original claim from the Reddit comments to gen-
erate contrastive claims. Online review genera-
tion, taking into account the personality of each
e-commerce user, has also been actively studied
(Ni and McAuley, 2018; Li et al., 2019). Well-
trained generation-based systems could generate
the results relatively independent of the coverage
of the training data, since these systems could be
generalized easily for an unseen dataset.
Still, a common problem that generation-based
systems suffer from is that they often provide too
generic output regardless of the input text (e.g., “I
don’t know.”, “I don’t agree with you.”). Also,
a popular sequence-to-sequence (Seq2Seq) frame-
work (Sutskever et al., 2014) for various text gen-
eration tasks is designed to generate only one out-
put from an input (one-to-one). Therefore, it is
hard to model a one-to-many relationship, which
is arguably more suitable for argument generation
as a real-world argument may have multiple per-
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Claim
This House believes university
education should be free.
Sentential
argument 1
Individuals have a right to the
experience of higher education.
Sentential
argument 2
The state benefits from the skills
of a university educated populace.
Sentential
argument 3
The cost to the state is far too great
to sustain universal free education.
Sentential
argument 4
State control of acceptance and
curriculum criteria has negative
effects.
Table 1: Example of a claim and its diverse sentential
arguments.
spectives.
In this paper, we describe a model called
ArgDiver, which stands for Argument generation
model from Diverse perspectives, to overcome the
limitations above of a generation-based argumen-
tation system. For a given claim, ArgDiver gener-
ates multiple sentential arguments that cover di-
verse perspectives on the given claim. Table 1
shows an example1 of the input and outputs of
our system. More specifically, given a claim in
favor of free university education, sentential ar-
guments 1 and 2 support the claim, considering
the right for higher education and benefits of the
state, respectively. On the other hand, sentential
arguments 3 and 4 are against the claim, consider-
ing the financial burden of the state and the nega-
tive effects of the intervention by the state, respec-
tively. We understand that diverse perspectives of
this kind should be provided with deep and var-
ied stances, not only with a binary stance, towards
given claims.
Our model adopts a Seq2Seq framework and in-
troduces latent mechanisms based on the hypoth-
esis that each latent mechanism may be matched
with one perspective (Zhou et al., 2017, 2018; Tao
et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2019a).
We present a model that is trained by simply se-
lecting a latent mechanism to optimize the model
towards each target argument. Our model can
avoid the generation of redundant outputs and be
trained with a more accurate optimization strategy.
We use the PERSPECTRUM dataset proposed
by Chen et al. (2019b). This dataset consists of
pairs of one claim sentence (e.g., “Animals should
have lawful rights.”) and more than one cluster of
1https://idebate.org/debatabase
sentential arguments (e.g., “Animals are equal to
human beings.”, “Animals have no interest or ra-
tionality.”). Each cluster contains more than one
sentential argument that share the same perspec-
tive within the cluster. In our research, we use a
claim sentence as the input sequence of the model
and each sentential argument as a target sequence
of the model.
We evaluate our model with two measures, a)
the quality of each of the generated sentential ar-
guments, and b) their diversities. For the genera-
tion quality, we use BLEU score (Papineni et al.,
2002) and three word embedding based metrics
(Liu et al., 2016). For diversity, we use Dist-1/2
metric (Li et al., 2016) and a newly proposed met-
ric. Experimental results show that our model gen-
erates sentential arguments of quality comparable
to that of strong baseline models. Furthermore,
our model generates more diverse sentential argu-
ments than the baseline models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
We describe the related work in Section 2 and
present our neural model in Section 3. We then
describe the experimental settings and results in
Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Finally, we con-
clude our work in Section 6.
2 Related Work
2.1 Argumentative Text Generation
Argumentative text generation is an active re-
search area. Paul and Girju (2010) detected var-
ious contrastive viewpoints from an argumenta-
tive text by summarization. Le et al. (2018)
proposed a chatbot to interact and debate with
people with both retrieval-based and generation-
based methods. Hua and Wang (2018) and Hua
et al. (2019) generated counter-arguments given
a statement on a controversial topic. They used
an external knowledge (e.g., Wikipedia) to en-
rich their model. Hidey and McKeown (2019)
edited the original claim semantically to generate
a contrastive claim. Wachsmuth et al. (2018) and
Khatib et al. (2017) discovered effective strategies
and patterns that enhance persuasive argumenta-
tion. The most relevant work to the present re-
search would be a retrieval-based system by Sato
et al. (2015) that collects relevant sentences with
frequently mentioned topics for debate (e.g., pol-
lution, disease, poverty), and reorders them to of-
fer related arguments. However, their system re-
quires a pre-defined topic, a dictionary, and rules,
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unlike ours.
2.2 Response Generation
Recently, neural generation models built upon a
Seq2Seq framework (Sutskever et al., 2014) have
been widely used in many text generation tasks,
such as machine translation, document summa-
rization and response generation (Bahdanau et al.,
2015; Luong et al., 2015; Vinyals and Le, 2015;
Nallapati et al., 2016; Xing et al., 2017). A few of
them incorporate latent mechanisms to model the
diversity of acceptable responses and one-to-many
relationships. (Zhou et al., 2017, 2018) proposed
an augmented Seq2Seq model with multiple latent
mechanism embedding. Gao et al. (2019) used la-
tent keywords as an additional factor to generate
multiple responses and trained a model using a re-
inforcement learning algorithm. Tao et al. (2018)
proposed a multi-head attention mechanism with a
Seq2Seq model to attend various semantic aspects
of an input text, using the heads to generate mul-
tiple responses. Chen et al. (2019a) claimed the
importance of accurate optimization using a latent
mechanism while proposing a posterior mapping
selection that considers both the input text and tar-
get responses.
3 Method
3.1 Overview of ArgDiver
Our model is based on a neural Seq2Seq model
with attention mechanism (Sutskever et al., 2014;
Bahdanau et al., 2015). We extend this frame-
work by inserting N different latent mechanisms
to model the one-to-many relationship. Our model
is trained to generate an independent sentential ar-
gument for a latent mechanism. In training, our
model generates N different candidate arguments
for a claim and uses only one of them using the
minimum negative log-likelihood (NLL) for opti-
mization. By this, our model can avoid general
and redundant responses and each latent mecha-
nism can help generate diverse arguments. In test-
ing, each latent mechanism is utilized to generate
a sentential argument. Our model may be under-
stood as an extension of the model suggested by
Zhou et al. (2017), in using latent mechanisms.
Our model selects proper latent mechanisms to in-
crease the diversity of the arguments that it gener-
ates.
3.2 Proposed Model
Assume a claim X and a group of related ar-
guments P1, P2, P3. Our proposed model takes
a sequence of tokens within the claim X =
(x1, x2 . . . , x|X|) as input, where xi is a token at
timestep i and |X| is the length of the claim. Each
token is passed to the word embedding layer and
transformed into a fixed size word embedding vec-
tor e(xi). Each word embedding vector is then
transformed into a hidden state hi by one-layer
bidirectional GRU (bi-GRU) encoder (Cho et al.,
2014) as follows:
hi = [
−→
hi ;
←−
hi ] (1)
−→
hi = GRU(
−−→
hi−1, e(xi)) (2)
←−
hi = GRU(
←−−
hi+1, e(xi)) (3)
where [
−→
hi ;
←−
hi ]] denotes the concatenation of for-
ward and backward hidden states at timestep i,−→
hi and
←−
hi are the forward and backward hidden
states at timestep i, respectively. The last hidden
states of both directions are then concatenated into
h = [
−→
h|x|;
←−
h1]]. This vector is used as the final se-
mantic representation of the input claim.
Our model uses one-layer unidirectional
GRU as the decoder. The semantic rep-
resentation of the claim is concatenated
with randomly initialized N different la-
tent mechanisms M=(m1,m2 . . . ,mN ), to
make N different semantic representations
H=([h;m1], [h;m2], . . . , [h;mN ]). These
concatenated representations are then used in-
dependently as N different initial states of the
decoder.
The hidden state of the decoder is updated by
an attention mechanism as proposed by Bahdanau
et al. (2015):
skt = GRU(skt−1, ckt−1, e(yt−1)); sk1 = hk
(4)
ckt =
|X|∑
i=1
aktihi (5)
akti =
exp(ekti)∑|X|
j=1 exp(ektj)
(6)
ekti = v
T tanh(Wh[skt;hi]) (7)
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Figure 1: Overview of our sentential arguments generation model.
where skt denotes the hidden state at timestep t
with the kth latent mechanism, andWh and vT are
learnable parameters. e(yt−1) is the word embed-
ding vector of the target token at timestep t − 1.
ckt−1 is the context vector at timestep t − 1 with
the kth latent mechanism, which is the weighted
sum of the hidden states of the encoder.
3.3 Objective Function
The remaining part of the model architecture is
choosing the proper objective function to train our
model for one target and multiple generated re-
sults. A general and typical approach in this case is
calculating all losses of each generated argument
and averaging them:
LNLL avg = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
logP (Y |X,mi) (8)
where NLL means negative log-likelihood and
P (Y |X,mi) is the conditional probability that the
model generates the target argument Y when in-
put claim X and latent mechanism mi are given.
However, a naı¨ve and rough optimization that
does not select the appropriate latent mechanism
to generate the given target argument may result
in poor and redundant performance (Gao et al.,
2019; Chen et al., 2019a). To avoid this, we select
only one generated argument that shows minimum
NLL for the given target argument to optimize our
model, following Gao et al. (2019):
LNLL min = min({− logP (Y |X,m1),
. . . ,− logP (Y |X,mN )})
(9)
This is based on the hypothesis that the most ap-
propriate latent mechanism to generate the target
sentential argument would generate the best result
with target (minimum NLL), compared with other
generated results using other latent mechanisms.
We compare the impacts of two different objective
functions on performance in Section 5.2.
3.4 Penalty Term
We introduce an additional penalty term into the
objective function, to regularize each latent mech-
anism to attend different semantic aspects of the
input claim and avoid redundant outcomes within
different latent mechanisms. We follow the work
by Lin et al. (2017) and Tao et al. (2018), to en-
courage each latent mechanism to focus consis-
tently on different and diverse semantic aspects of
the input text. We accumulate the attention distri-
bution of the decoder for each decoder timestep
per latent mechanism, and normalize it by the
length of the target sequence. We then concate-
nate them to make an N × |X| dimension matrix
as follows:
Ak =
∑|Y |
i=1 akti
|Y | ∈ R
1×|X| (10)
A = {A1||A2|| . . . ||AN} ∈ RN×|X| (11)
where Ak is the result of mean pooling across the
decoding timestep, where
∑
Ak is 1. We then
introduce a Frobenius norm after dot product be-
tween A and AT , and subtract an identity matrix
from it:
Lpenalization =
∥∥AAT − I∥∥2
F
(12)
where ‖·‖2F is the square after standard Frobenius
norm and I is an identity matrix. Note that each
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elementAAT [i, j] is the summation after element-
wise product of the two attention distributions Ai
and Aj . To minimize the term above, the diago-
nal elements and other elements of AAT should
be approximated to 1 and 0, respectively. This
makes two attention distributions by different la-
tent mechanisms to become more orthogonal to
each other on the semantic space, encouraging
each attention distribution to become more sparse.
The final objective function of our model is de-
fined as:
Ltotal = λLNLL min + (1− λ)Lpenalization (13)
where LNLL min is negative log likelihood that is
defined in Equation 9 and Lpenalization is defined
in Equation 12. λ is the hyperparameter that con-
trols the weight of two loss terms.
4 Experiments
4.1 Dataset
We use the PERSPECTRUM dataset (Chen et al.,
2019b), which consists of a sentence that corre-
sponds to a claim (e.g., “Animals should have law-
ful rights.”) and more than one group of sen-
tential arguments. Each argument group contains
diverse sentential arguments regarding the claim
(e.g., “Animals are equal to human beings.”, “An-
imals have no interest or rationality.”), and sen-
tences in the same group share the same perspec-
tive towards the claim. We use the claim sen-
tence as an input sequence and each sentence of
every sentence group as the target sequence of
our model. The dataset contains 907 claims and
11,164 related sentential arguments. We split the
dataset into 541, 139, and 227 claims (and the cor-
responding sentential arguments) for training, val-
idation, and testing, respectively. We use the split
guidelines from Chen et al. (2019b), making sure
that claims on the same topic are in the same parti-
tion. The split guidelines are to prevent the model
from overfitting to a fixed set of keywords.
4.2 Compared Method
We compare our proposed model with several neu-
ral response generation models.
Seq2Seq + attention (Bahdanau et al., 2015):
The standard sequence-to-sequence architecture
with soft attention mechanism.
MMI-bidi (Li et al., 2016): Beam search us-
ing Maximum Mutual Information (MMI) to gen-
erate diverse outputs, by using both input sequence
to output sequence and vice versa. We train
another Seq2Seq model that generates input se-
quence from output sequence. We used the hy-
perparameters of λ=0.5, γ=1 and beam size=100.
MARM (Zhou et al., 2017): This model aug-
ments the Seq2Seq model with latent mechanism
embedding to model the diversity of responding
mechanisms. The number of latent mechanisms is
set to 5.
CMHAM (Tao et al., 2018): This model uses
multi-head attention with a Seq2Seq architecture
and introduces a penalty term to encourage diverse
attentions over different heads. We used 5 heads in
our experiments.
MMPMS (Chen et al., 2019a): This model
maps the semantic representation of the input text
into multiple semantic spaces, and selects an ap-
propriate mapping using both the input text and a
target response. We set the number of mappings
to 12.
ArgDiver: We use a model that is trained with
the objective function in Equation 9 as our pro-
posed model (ArgDiver). In addition, we compare
our model with a variant that is trained with the
objective function in Equation 8 (ArgDiveravg) as
described in Section 5.2.
4.3 Evaluation
We evaluate the models with two critics, the qual-
ity and the diversity of the generated sentential ar-
guments for each.
For the quality, we use the following metrics.
For the evaluation of a multiple argument genera-
tion system, we measure the score of each gener-
ated argument and report their average score.
BLEU-1/2 (Papineni et al., 2002): A widely
used metric for the text generation task by mea-
suring n-gram precision. We regard the target ar-
guments that correspond to an input claim as the
multiple references to calculate the score.
Embedding Average/Greedy/Extreme (Liu
et al., 2016): These metrics evaluate results based
on the semantic similarity between hypothesis and
references, using a semantic representation by
word embedding. These metrics take into account
the diversity of a possible hypothesis and have
been adopted for the evaluation of a conversation
system (Xu et al., 2017; Tao et al., 2018).
For the diversity, we use the following metrics.
Dist-1/2 (Li et al., 2016): The number of unique
unigrams/bigrams within a sentence normalized
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Method BLEU-1 BLEU-2 EmbeddingAverage
Embedding
Greedy
Embedding
Extreme
Seq2Seq 0.3189 0.0947 0.8489 0.6198 0.4142
MMI-bidi 0.2263 0.0755 0.8660 0.6507 0.3971
MARM 0.2352 0.0099 0.7875 0.6707 0.4497
CMHAM 0.3227 0.1009 0.8334 0.6192 0.4069
MMPMS 0.2676 0.0725 0.8162 0.6256 0.4186
ArgDiver 0.3268 0.0964 0.8107 0.6002 0.4146
Table 2: Automatic evaluation results on generation quality. The highest and second highest scores are highlighted
by bold and underline, respectively, for each metric.
Method Dist-1 Dist-2 Dist-1-within Dist-2-within
Seq2Seq 0.1230 0.2697 0.1624 0.2903
MMI-bidi 0.0707 0.2014 0.0868 0.1757
MARM 0.0456 0.0753 0.0377 0.1200
CMHAM 0.1418 0.3236 0.3222 0.5412
MMPMS 0.0650 0.1376 0.1485 0.3389
ArgDiver 0.1585 0.2909 0.3645 0.6134
Table 3: Automatic evaluation results on diversity of generation. The highest and second highest scores are
highlighted by bold and underline, respectively, for each metric.
by the total number of unigrams/bigrams.
Dist-1/2-within: To the best of our knowledge,
there has been no widely used metric to measure
the diversity among multiple generated texts. We
propose a simple metric to measure the diversity
within the generated texts from the given input
text, namely, Dist-1/2-within. To this end, this
metric is calculated by (The sum of the numbers of
unique n-grams for each result that does not oc-
cur in other results) / (The sum of all generated
numbers of unigrams/bigrams).
4.4 Implementation Details
We use a Tensorflow framework (Abadi et al.,
2016) to implement our model and baselines. We
adopt the pre-trained 300-dimensional Glove word
embedding (Pennington et al., 2014) for the word
embedding layer of each model. The vocabulary
size is the same for all models and set as 50K.
Stanford CoreNLP (Manning et al., 2014) is used
to tokenize our dataset. We use 256-dimensional
hidden states for encoder and 384-dimensional
hidden states for decoder. We use a dropout on
the GRU cells with a probability of 0.2 (Srivastava
et al., 2014), and apply gradient clipping (Pascanu
et al., 2013) with a maximum norm of 3. The max-
imum numbers of tokens for encoder and decoder
are set both to 50 and the batch size is set to 16
for all models. We use Adam optimizer (Kingma
and Ba, 2015), with the initial learning rate set to
0.0005. In our model, the number and the dimen-
sion of the latent mechanism are set to 5 and 128,
respectively. We initialized each of the vectors that
represent latent mechanisms to a uniform distribu-
tion over [-0.001, 0.001]. We use beam search for
generation, where the beam size is set to 10, except
for the MMI-bidi model. We pre-train the weights
of our encoder and decoder with the Wikitext 103
dataset proposed by Merity et al. (2017), and use it
to initialize the weights of all baseline models and
ours. We set λ in Equation 13 as 0.5.
5 Results
5.1 Overall Performance
Table 2 shows the evaluation results of each model
in terms of generation quality using BLEU score
and word embedding based metrics. We can see
that our model achieves competitive performance
in nearly all metrics. In BLEU score, our model
ArgDiver and CMHAM outperform other baseline
models. For the word embedding metrics, how-
ever, the two models show relatively low perfor-
mance.
The evaluation results about the diversity of the
generation are shown in Table 3. We see that
ArgDiver achieves the best performance in three
metrics (Dist-1, Dist-1/2-within), and the second
performance in one metric (Dist-2). Except for
our model, CMHAM outperforms other baselines
in all metrics. By this, we can see that our model
can generate diverse and multiple arguments to ex-
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Method BLEU-1 BLEU-2 EmbeddingAverage
Embedding
Greedy
Embedding
Extreme
ArgDiveravg 0.3376 0.1100 0.8561 0.6335 0.4270
ArgDiver 0.3268 0.0964 0.8107 0.6002 0.4146
Table 4: Automatic evaluation results on generation quality with different objective functions.
Method Dist-1 Dist-2 Dist-1-within Dist-2-within
ArgDiveravg 0.0976 0.1611 0.0159 0.0261
ArgDiver 0.1585 0.2909 0.3645 0.6134
Table 5: Automatic evaluation results on diversity of generation with different objective functions.
amine diverse aspects of a given claim.
5.2 Effect of Objective Function
As we described in Section 3.3, we compare the
impact on performance of two different objective
functions. Table 4 and Table 5 show the evalua-
tion results of our models in terms of quality and
diversity of generated text, respectively. In terms
of the generation quality, ArgDiveravg shows sim-
ilar but slightly better performance than ArgDiver.
Meanwhile, ArgDiver shows more promising re-
sults than ArgDiveravg against the diversity met-
ric. In particular, we see that each latent mecha-
nism generates exactly the same texts to the given
claim about 74% for ArgDiveravg, though only
about 6% for ArgDiver. These results indicate
that ArgDiveravg fails to utilize the full capacity
of latent mechanisms, and goes back to the vanilla
Seq2Seq model. By this, we postulate that the
accurate optimization of a model considering the
difference of each latent mechanism is the key for
generating truly diverse arguments.
5.3 Case Study
The sample generated sentential arguments by
each model and by a human are displayed in Table
6. The human-generated arguments are from the
PERSPECTRUM dataset. The results of Seq2Seq
model begin with the same phrase, and make a dif-
ference by selecting different words at the end-
ing steps of decoding. In case of the MMPMS
model, some of the mappings generate meaning-
less and repeated results. This may be due to the
absence of a posterior mapping selection as it re-
quires the target argument for the generation to
proceed, which is absent in the testing scenario.
CMHAM model and ArgDiver generate diverse
and high quality multiple arguments. Including
the CMHAM model and our proposed model, ex-
actly the same texts with different latent mecha-
nisms are often found in the results. This may
point out the limitation of a small size of the
dataset and the necessity of advanced approaches,
which is left for future work.
5.4 Limitations and Future Work
In this subsection, we discuss the limitations of
the current work and possible ways to improve our
proposal as future work.
For the prior distribution of latent mechanisms,
our current model uses all latent mechanisms to
generate individual sentential arguments for all
kinds of claim. It is yet reasonable to posit that the
appropriate degree of each latent mechanism for
its use in generation may depend on the topic of
the given claim. As future work, we plan to devise
a model which considers the probability by which
each latent mechanism would be used to generate
sentential arguments with the given claim.
For the low interpretability of latent mecha-
nism, ideal results of our model would be that
there exist shared characteristics in the generated
sentential arguments with the same latent mech-
anism and a different input claim. However, it
is hard to observe these characteristics within the
generated results of our model. In addition, the
latent mechanism sometimes tends to generate
the output by memorizing some of the frequent
phrases in the dataset (e.g., “This is the right of
(. . . ).”, “There is no need for compulsion.”). One
of the possible reasons is that each latent mecha-
nism focuses on the syntactic difference of each
sentential argument, rather than semantic differ-
ences such as topics or characteristics.
As future work, we plan to present an improved
model to distinguish the semantic and syntactic
factors of each perspective. One possibility is to
model the latent personality in the sentential argu-
ments. For instance, the person who is interested
in environmental issues is more likely to have a
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Claim We should fear the power of
government over the internet.
Human
Internet regulation is necessary to
ensure a safe internet.
Internet regulation is a euphemism for
censorship.
Internet governance is necessary to
combat heinous crimes committed via
the internet.
Internet regulation is an attempt by
big interest groups to regulate the
internet in their favour.
Seq2Seq
There is no reason to have the negative
impact on nationalist sentiment.
There is no reason to have the negative
impact on them.
There is no reason to have the negative
impact on politics.
There is no reason to have the problems
in the environment.
There is no reason to have the negative
impact on nationalist footprint.
CMHAM
Everyone should be allowed free
speech.
It is clear to impose their religion!
The American people would be more
accountable for the council.
The American people would be more
accountable for the council.
This is a part of a crime and should
not be the state.
MMPMS
The result of all should have the rights
to have the right to have the right to
all their own decisions.
Domestic protect the vote.
Make these equal off taken off against
equal off countries would make all
these rights as illegal as as as as as (. . . )
The freedom of the economy would
have the freedom of the freedom of
the freedom of the freedom of the (. . . )
It would have a negative impact .
ArgDiver
National sovereignty would result in a
government’s freedom of expression.
The government should not be
celebrated.
It is a necessary for national security.
It’s conceivable to the wrong hands.
The government is a best way to have
a universal right to have a universal
right to practice.
Table 6: Sample arguments of a claim generated by
human and models.
relatively predictable and specific perspective on
certain topics than those who are not. The gener-
ation model considering these aspects could pro-
vide more human-like arguments with a wide cov-
erage of many persons’ characteristics.
Another possibility would be for our model to
incorporate the background knowledge to gener-
ate the arguments. We believe that such an ex-
plicit provision of the background knowledge to
the model can increase the informativeness and the
relevance of the generated arguments to the input
claim.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we looked into a new task that
generates diverse and multiple sentential argu-
ments with the given claim on a controversial
topic. To address this task, we introduced a
new model based on the Seq2Seq framework,
called ArgDiver, to optimize each latent mecha-
nism more properly and generate diverse outputs.
Experimental results confirm that diverse senten-
tial arguments could be generated with high qual-
ity, and that our model shows higher diversity than
any other baseline models.
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Abstract 
Social media platforms have been used for 
information and news gathering, and they are 
very valuable in many applications. However, 
they also lead to the spreading of rumors and 
fake news. Many efforts have been taken to 
detect and debunk rumors on social media by 
analyzing their content and social context 
using machine learning techniques.  This 
paper gives an overview of the recent studies 
in the rumor detection field. It provides a 
comprehensive list of datasets used for rumor 
detection, and reviews the important studies 
based on what types of information they 
exploit and the approaches they take.  And 
more importantly, we also present several 
new directions for future research. 
 
1 Introduction 
Rumors sometimes may spread very quickly over 
social media platforms, and rumor detection has 
gained great interest in both academia and 
industry recently. Government authorities and 
social media platforms are also taking efforts to 
defeat the negative impacts of rumors. In the 
following sub sections, we first introduce the 
rumor detection definition, the problem statement, 
and user stance, an important concept for the rest 
of this paper. 
1.1 Rumor Detection 
Different publications may have different 
definitions for rumor. It is hard to do a head-to-
head comparison between existing methods due 
to the lack of consistency. In this survey, a rumor 
is defined as a statement whose truth value is true, 
unverified or false (Qazvinian et al., 2011). When 
a rumor’s veracity value is false, some studies call 
it “false rumor” or “fake news”. However, many 
previous studies give “fake news” a stricter 
definition:  fake news is a news article published 
by a news outlet that is intentionally and 
verifiably false (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Shu et al., 
2017a; Cao et al., 2018). The focus of this study 
is rumor on social media, not fake news. There are 
also different definitions for rumor detection. In 
some studies, rumor detection is defined as 
determining if a story or online post is a rumor or 
non-rumor (i.e. a real story, a news article), and 
the task of determining the veracity of a rumor 
(true, false or unverified) is defined as rumor 
verification (Zubiaga et al., 2016; Kochkina et al., 
2018). But in this survey paper, as well as in (Ma 
et al., 2016; Cao et al., 2018; Shu et al, 2017; Zhou 
et al., 2018), rumor detection is defined as 
determining the veracity value of a rumor. This 
means it is the same as rumor verification defined 
in some other studies.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The rumor detection problem is defined as follow: 
A story x is defined as a set of n pieces of related 
messages M = {m1, m2, …, mn}. m1 is the source 
message (post) that initiated the message chain, 
which could be a tree-structure having multiple 
branches. For each message mi, it has attributes 
representing its content, such as text and image. 
Each message is also associated with a user who 
posted it. The user also has a set of attributes, 
including name, description, avatar image, past 
posts, etc.  The rumor detection task is then 
defined as: Given a story x with its message set M 
and user set U, the rumor detection task aims to 
determine whether this story is true, false or 
unverified (or just true or false for datasets having 
just two labels).  This definition formulates the 
rumor detection task as a veracity classification 
task.  The definition is the same as the definition 
used in many studies (Cao et al., 2018; Shu et al, 
2017b; Ma et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 2018). 
1.3 User Stance 
User responses to a source post (the first message) 
have been exploited in some rumor detection 
models. Most studies use four stance  categories:
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Dataset 
Total 
rumors 
(claims) 
Text User info 
Time 
stamp 
Propagati
on info Platform Description 
PHEME-R 330 y y y y Twitter Tweets from [Zubiaga et al., 2016] 
PHEME 6425 y y y y Twitter Tweets from [Kochkina et al., 2018] 
Ma-Twitter 992 y y y   Twitter Tweets from [Ma et al., 2016] 
Ma-Weibo 4,664 y y y   Weibo Weibo data from [Ma et al., 2016] 
Twitter15 1,490 y y y y Twitter Tweets from [Liu et al., 2015; Ma et al.,2016] 
Twitter16 818 y y y y Twitter Tweets from [Ma et al., 2017b] 
BuzzFeedNews 2,282 y       Facebook Facebook data from [Silverman et al., 2016]  
SemEval19 325 y y y y Twitter, Reddit SemEval 2019 Task 7 data set.  
Kaggle 
Emergent 2145 y       Twitter, Facebook Kaggle rumors based on Emergent.info 
Kaggle Snopes 16.9K y       Twitter, Facebook Kaggle rumors based on Snopes.com 
Facebook Hoax 15.5K y y y   Facebook Facebook data from [Tacchini et al., 2017] 
Kaggle 
PolitiFact 2923 y y y y Twitter Kaggle rumors based on PolitiFact 
FakeNewsNet 23,196 y y y y Twitter Dataset from [Shu et al., 2019], enhanced from PolitiFact and GossipCop 
Table 1: Datasets for rumor detection and their properties 
 
supporting, denying, querying and commenting. 
Some studies have explicitly used stance 
information in their rumor detection model, and 
have shown big performance improvement (Liu et 
al., 2015; Enayet and El-Beltagy, 2017; Ma et al., 
2018a; Kochkina et al., 2018), including the two 
systems, (Enayet and El-Beltagy, 2017) and (Li et 
al., 2019a), that were ranked No. 1 in SemEval 
2017 and SemEval 2019 rumor detection tasks, 
respectively.  Stance detection is not the focus of 
this paper, but stance information has been used 
explicitly or implicitly in many rumor detection 
models, and in the next section we will also 
discuss some multi-task learning approaches that 
jointly learn stance detection and rumor detection 
models. 
In the following sections, we will 1. introduce 
a comprehensive list of datasets for rumor 
detection, 2. discuss the research efforts 
categorized by the information and approaches 
they use, and 3. present several directions for 
future research 
2 Datasets and Evaluation Metrics 
2.1 Datasets 
Datasets could vary depending on what platforms 
the data are collected from, what types of contents 
are included, whether propagation information is 
recorded, and so on. Table 1 lists the datasets for 
rumor detection. There are also other datasets for 
fake news detection. Because this paper focuses 
on rumor detection on social media, and those 
datasets are only for fake news detection and do 
not have social context information (e.g. user 
responses, user data, and propagation 
information), so we did not list them here. The 
data of datasets in Table 1 are collected from four 
social media platforms: Twitter, Facebook, 
Reddit and Weibo. Weibo is a Chinese social 
media platform with over 400 million users, and 
it is very similar to Twitter. More than half of 
these datasets have three veracity labels: true, 
false and unverified. Others have only two labels: 
true and false. Among these datasets, PHEME-R 
has been used by SemEval 2017 rumor detection 
task and SemEval19 has been used by SemEval 
2019 rumor detection task (Gorrell et al., 2019). 
The dataset links are listed below: 
• PHEME-R: 
https://figshare.com/articles/PHEME_rumour_scheme_da
taset_journalism_use_case/2068650 
• PHEME: 
https://figshare.com/articles/PHEME_dataset_for_Rumou
r_Detection_and_Veracity_Classification/6392078 
• Ma-Twitter: http://alt.qcri.org/~wgao/data/rumdect.zip 
• Ma-Weibo: http://alt.qcri.org/~wgao/data/rumdect.zip 
• Twitter15: 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/7ewzdrbelpmrnxu/rumdetect
2017.zip?dl=0 
• Twitter16: 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/7ewzdrbelpmrnxu/rumdetect
2017.zip?dl=0 
• BuzzFeedNews: https://github.com/BuzzFeedNews/2016-
10-fac\ebook-fact-check 
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• SemEval19: 
https://competitions.codalab.org/competitions/19938#lear
n_the_details-overview 
• Kaggle Emergent: 
https://www.kaggle.com/arminehn/rumor-citation 
• Kaggle Snopes: 
https://www.kaggle.com/arminehn/rumor-citation 
• Facebook Hoax: https://github.com/gabll/some-like-it-
hoax/tree/master/dataset 
• Kaggle PolitiFact: 
https://www.kaggle.com/arminehn/rumor-citation 
• FakeNewsNet: 
https://github.com/KaiDMML/FakeNewsNet 
2.2 Evaluation Metrics 
Most existing approaches consider rumor 
detection as a classification problem. Usually it is 
either a binary (true or false) or a multi-class (true, 
false or unverified) classification problem. The 
evaluation metrics used the most are precision, 
recall, F1 and accuracy measures.  Because some 
datasets are skewed, Macro F1 measure will 
provide a better view on the algorithm 
performance over all classes. Here we briefly 
describe them. For each class C, we calculate its 
precision (p), recall (r) and F1 score as follow: 𝑝	 = 	 $%.		%'	()*%(+	,(-./0-1.	2+	3	0%((-0145		$%.		%'	()*%(+	,(-./01-.	2+	3	 		              (1) 𝑟	 = 	 $%.		%'	()*%(+	,(-./0-1.	2+	3	0%((-0145		$%.		%'	()*%(+	2$$%121-.	2+	3               (2) 																									𝐹1	 =	 9	∗	,	∗	(		,	;	(                                (3) 
Consider all the classes together, then the Macro 
F1 score is: 		𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜	𝐹1 = 	 @A 		∑ 𝐹1CACD@                         (4) 
where n is the number of classes, and F1i is the 
score for class i.  The overall accuracy for all the 
rumor types is: 								𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦	 = 	 $%.		%'	()*%(+	,(-./0-1.	0%((-0145		$%.		%'	()*%(+	     (5) 
3 Features and Approaches 
In this section, we review previous studies based 
on the type of information they exploited in their 
models. The information for rumor detection can 
be categorized from several information 
dimensions: content, user, propagation path, and 
network. We will also give a brief overview for 
studies employing multi-task learning for stance 
detection and rumor detection, and introduce the 
contests for rumor detection.   Table 2 presents the 
studies and their related information. From this 
table we can see that most studies have exploited 
text content, user information and propagation 
path. A few of them also explicitly incorporate 
user stance in their models. It also shows that 
almost all the most recent studies utilized neural 
networks in their models. Due to the space 
limitation, we just describe the representative 
studies in this paper. 
3.1 Approaches Using Content Information 
Textual Content. Text content is utilized by 
almost all the previous studies on rumor detection. 
It includes the source post and all user replies. 
According to deception style theory, the content 
style of deceptive information that aims to 
deceive readers should be somewhat different 
from that of the truth, e.g., using exaggerated 
expressions or strong emotions.  And from user 
response text, we can also explore stance and 
opinion of users towards rumors. 
Generally, text features can be grouped into 
attribute-based or structure-based features (Zhou 
and Zafarani, 2018). Attribute-based features 
include quantity (word, noun, verb, phrase, etc.), 
uncertainty (number of question mark, quantifiers, 
tentative terms, modal terms), subjectivity 
(percentage of subjective verbs, imperative 
commands), sentiment (positive/negative words, 
exclamation marks), diversity (unique content 
words, unique function words), and readability. 
Structure-based features include lexicon, syntax, 
semantic and discourse information, such as part-
of-speech taggers, context-free grammar, and 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC). 
An early study from (Castillo et al., 2011) uses 
many text features in their model, such as the 
fraction of tweets with hashtags. These features 
and other additional text features are also used in 
other studies (Liu et al., 2015; Enayet and El-
Beltagy, 2017; Li et al., 2019a; Ma et al., 2017; Li 
et al., 2019b). Kwon et al. (2013) also use LIWC 
dictionaries. Chua and Banerjee (2016) analyzed 
six categories of features: comprehensibility, 
sentiment, time orientation, quantitative details, 
writing style, and topic. Some important features 
reported were: negation words, past, present, 
future POS in the tweets, discrepancy, sweat and 
exclusion features. Textual content plays an 
important role in rumor detection, but most 
studies show that just utilizing text content is not 
enough.  
Visual Content: Visual features (images or 
videos) have been shown to be an important 
indicator for rumor detection (Jin et al., 2017a; Jin  
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Study 
Information Used 
Approach 
Text Visual User Propagation Network 
Explicitly  
using 
user  
stance 
[Castillo et al., 2011]  y   y y     DT 
[Chang et al., 2016] y y y        Clustering 
[Chen et al., 2016] y   y y   y Anomaly detection, KNN 
[Chua and Banerjee, 2016] y           LR 
[Enayet and El-Beltagy, 
2017]  y   y     y SVM 
[Giasemidis et al., 2016] y    y    y    DT 
[Gupta et al., 2012] y   y   y   Graph  
[Gupta et al., 2013]   y y   y    DT, Graph 
[Jin et al., 2016] y   y   y y Graph, LDA  
[Kwon et al., 2013] y   y y     SVM, RF, LR 
[Kwon et al., 2017] y   y y      SpikeM 
[Li et al., 2016] y  y y   SVM 
[Li et al., 2019] y y y y   y Deep NN, LSTM 
[Liu et al., 2015] y y y     y SVM 
[Liu and Wu, 2018] y     y     CNN, RNN 
[Ma et al., 2017] y     y       NN 
[Ma et al., 2015] y        SVM, RF, DT 
[Ma et al., 2018a] y     y     LSTM, multi-task 
[Ma et al., 2018b] y     y     Recursive NN 
[Qin et al., 2016] y            SVM 
[Shu et al., 2017b] y   y   y   NN 
[Vosoughi, 2015] y   y y     HMM 
[Wang and Terano, 2015] y   y  y y Graph 
[Wang et al., 2018] y y         CNN, Adversarial NN 
[Wu et al., 2015] y   y y     SVM 
[Yang et al., 2012] y   y       SVM 
[Yang et al., 2015] y   y   y    Graph 
[Yang et al., 2018] y     y     CNN 
[Zhang et al., 2018] y   y   y   RNN 
Table 2: Previous studies, used information, and methods. Note: SVM - support vector machine, RF - random 
forest, DT- decision tree, LR – logistic regression, KNN – k nearest neighbor, NN – neural network, HMM – 
hidden Markov model.
et al., 2017b; Shu et al., 2017a; Wang et al., 2018). 
Rumors exploit the individual vulnerabilities and 
often use sensational or fake images to provoke 
emotional user responses.  There are two visual 
feature types: statistical features and content 
features. Statistical features include image/video 
count, image ratio, etc. (Gupta et al., 2013; Jin et 
al., 2017a; Jin et al., 2017b; Shu et al., 2017a; Liu 
et al., 2015; Li et al., 2019a; Li et al., 2019b; Shu 
et al., 2017).  Visual content features include 
clarity score, coherence score, diversity score, 
similarity distribution histogram, etc. (Wang et al., 
2018; Shu et al., 2017).  Jin et al. (2017a; 2017b) 
use various visual content and statistical features 
for rumor detection.  Wang et al. (2018) employ a 
multi-modal feature extractor to extract the 
textual and visual features from posts, and then 
the textual feature representation and visual 
feature representation are concatenated together 
to form the multi-modal feature representation. 
3.2 Approaches Exploiting User 
Information 
Users engage in rumor dissemination in multiple 
ways, such as sharing, liking, forwarding and 
reviewing. Many previous studies have shown 
that user credibility information is very important 
in rumor verification (Castillo et al., 2011; Yang 
et al., 2012; Gupta et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015; 
Vosoughi, 2015; Shu et al., 2017b; Zhang et al., 
2018; Liu and Wu, 2018; Li et al., 2019a; Li et al., 
2019b). Based on 421 false rumors and 1.47 
million related tweets, Li et al. (2016) study 
various semantic aspects of false rumors, and 
analyze their spread and user characteristics. 
Some findings are: when people do not have 
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clarity about the veracity of a rumor, they usually 
just spread it without adding their opinions; 
credible users are less likely to support rumors, 
while low credibility accounts provide the most 
support; in terms of supporting or debunking a 
rumor, credible users are much more stringent, 
and hence a more trustworthy source than their 
corresponding counterparts. 
Hand-crafted user features like registration age 
of users, number of followers, the number of posts 
the user had authored, and the like, are leveraged 
along with other textual and propagation features 
in Castillo et al. (2011) and other studies (Liu et 
al., 2015; Enayet and El-Beltagy, 2017; Li et al., 
2019a; Li et al., 2019b). Liu and Wu (2018) 
construct user representations using network 
embedding approaches on the social network 
graph. There has been evidence that lots of rumors 
come from either fake news websites or hyper-
partisan websites (Silverman, 2016; Li et al., 2016; 
Liu et al., 2015).  
3.3 Approaches Based on Propagation Path 
and Network 
Rumors spread through social media in the form 
of shares and re-shares of the source post and 
shared posts, resulting in a diffusion cascade or 
tree. The path of re-shares and other propagation 
dynamics are utilized for rumor detection. We 
group current studies into (1) cascade-based 
rumor detection techniques, which take direct 
advantage of rumor propagation paths, and (2) 
network-based detection methods, which 
construct a flexible network from cascades, from 
which rumors are indirectly detected. 
Propagation-based: When using cascades to 
detect rumors, one either distinguishes them by 
computing the similarity of its cascade to that of 
other true/false rumors, or by generating a 
cascade representation that facilitates 
distinguishing false and true rumors. Ma et al. 
(2018b) construct a tree-structured neural 
network, based on fake news cascades, for rumor 
detection. Liu and Wu (2018) employ propagation 
path classification with RNN for early rumor 
detection. Zubiaga et al. (2018b) propose a 
method based on an LSTM layer followed by 
several dense ReLU layers.  Other studies 
utilizing propagation path are (Kwon et al., 2017; 
Wu et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016; Yang et al., 
2018; Li et al., 2019a; Li et al., 2019b). 
Experiments from these studies show that models 
employing propagation path perform better than 
the feature-based algorithms. But we should keep 
in mind that we usually do not have much 
propagation information at the early stage of a 
rumor spread, and early detection is especially 
critical for a real-time rumor detection system.  
The study from (Vosoughi et al., 2018) shows that 
unconfirmed news tends to exhibit multiple and 
periodic discussion spikes, whereas confirmed 
news typically has a single prominent spike, and 
false rumor spreads farther, faster, and more 
widely than true news. 
Network-based: Network-based rumor 
detection constructs flexible networks to 
indirectly capture rumor propagation information. 
The constructed networks can be homogeneous, 
heterogeneous, or hierarchical. Gupta et al. (2012) 
construct a network consisting of users, messages 
and events, using PageRank-like algorithm to 
compute event credibility. Yang et al. (2015) 
incorporate network features derived from 
comments, and they said that when the network 
feature was added to the traditional features, the 
results improved substantially. Wang and Terano 
(2015) propose social graphs to model the 
interaction between users and identify influential 
rumor spreaders. Heterogeneous networks have 
multiple types of nodes or edges. An example is 
the tri-relationship network among news creators, 
the rumors, and users (Shu et al., 2017b), which 
uses entity embedding and relation modeling to 
build a hybrid framework for rumor detection. In 
(Zhang et al., 2018), an RNN model is designed 
to detect rumors through exploring creators, 
contents, subjects and their relationships. 
3.4 Joint Learning for User Stance and 
Rumor Detection 
User stance plays an important role in rumor 
detection. Recent works have employed multi-
task learning approaches to jointly learn stance 
detection and veracity prediction, in order to 
improve classification accuracy by utilizing the 
interdependence between them. Ma et al. (2018a) 
jointly learn the stance detection and the veracity 
prediction tasks, where each task has a task-
specific GRU layer, and the tasks also share a 
GRU layer. The shared layer is to capture patterns 
common to both tasks, and the task specific layer 
is to capture the patterns that are more important 
to that task. In the rumor detection task, the 
hidden state at the last time step is used for 
prediction through a fully-connected output layer. 
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Ma et al. found that joint learning improves the 
performance of individual tasks, and utilizing 
shared and task-specific parameters is more 
beneficial than using only the shared parameters 
without the task-specific layer. Kochkina et al. 
(2018) propose a multi-task method without task 
specific layer for rumor verification. Both 
approaches do not employ attention in their 
models, and user information is not used. Li et al. 
(2019b) exploit both user credibility information 
and attention mechanism in their joint learning 
approach. 
3.5 Rumor Detection Contests 
There are two contests for rumor detection:  1. 
SemEval-2017 Task 8: Determining rumor 
veracity and support for rumors (Derczynski et al., 
2017). The approach from (Enayet and El-Beltagy, 
2017) was ranked No. 1 for the rumor detection 
task. 2. SemEval-2019 Task 7: Determining 
rumor veracity and support for rumors (Gorrell et 
al., 2019).  The approach from (Li et al., 2019a) 
was ranked No. 1 for the rumor detection task.  
The datasets used in these two tasks are listed in 
Table 1. Both (Enayet and El-Beltagy, 2017) and 
(Li et al., 2019a) exploited content, user and 
propagation information. They also utilized user 
stance directly in their models. The main 
difference between them are that Li et al. (2019a) 
used neural networks, while Enayet and El-
Beltagy (2017) employed an SVM model. 
There are also two contests related to fake 
news, but actually both of them are about stance 
detection, not fake news detection. They are the 
Fake News Challenge at: 
http://www.fakenewschallenge.org, and the 
WSDM 2019 cup: classification of fake news 
article at: https://www.kaggle.com/c/fake-news-
pair-classification-challenge 
4 Future Research Directions 
Although significant advances have been made in 
debunking rumors on social media, nevertheless, 
there remain many challenges to overcome. Based 
on the review of previous studies and also our 
experiences in both research and practical system 
implementation of rumor detection, here we 
present several directions for future rumor 
detection research. 
4.1 Knowledge Base 
Knowledge base (KB) is very helpful for fake 
news detection (Hassan et al., 2017). There have 
been some studies on employing KB for fake 
news detection, but very few or none on rumor 
detection over social media.  One reason is that 
for rumors on social media, we already have much 
information, especially the social context 
information, to exploit and do research on. 
Another reason is that, compared to fake news 
detection which mainly deals with news articles, 
rumors on social media are about various topics, 
and it is hard to build appropriate KBs that cover 
them.  Therefore, most previous studies on rumor 
detection have not paid attention to exploiting KB 
for debunking rumors.   
The automatic fact-checking process aims to 
assess the claim by comparing the knowledge 
extracted from rumor text to known facts (true 
knowledge) stored in the constructed KB or 
knowledge graph. One advantage of utilizing KB 
for debunking rumor on social media is that the 
source posts (claims) are usually short, and it is 
easier to extract the main claim from the short 
message, compared to analyzing a long news 
article which might have several claims.  
Research from (Kwon et al., 2017) shows that text 
features are very important when we want to 
detect rumor at its very early stage, since there is 
no propagation information or very few feedbacks 
from users when a rumor just emerges. By 
extracting knowledge from rumor text, we 
hypothesize that the KB-based approach would be 
especially helpful for the rumor early detection. 
As a starting point, the initial research effort can 
focus on the topic areas of popular rumors, and 
the approaches that are already effective in fake 
news detection can be explored first.  We think 
how effective KBs can help in rumor detection 
and how we can integrate it with other social 
context information will be an interesting 
research topic.  
4.2 Target of User Response 
User responses are quite informative for rumor 
detection. Usually false rumors will receive more 
negative and questioning responses, which can be 
leveraged for rumor detection. Each source 
message (rumor claim) has many replies, and they 
are either direct replies, or replies to other 
messages in the conversion thread. The structure 
of the conversion thread is important for 
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understanding the real stance of the user of a reply. 
For example, given a message “This is fake” and 
a reply to it “I totally agree”, if we do not consider 
that the reply is towards “This is fake”, then we 
will give a wrong stance label, “support”, to this 
reply.  But actually, this response is denying the 
rumor claim. Although the neural network models 
based on propagation analysis may partially learn 
this information, we think explicitly handle this 
situation would improve rumor detection 
performance. 
Another issue with the user response target is 
that sometimes the user response is not towards 
the claim of the source message, but certain 
aspects of the rumor story.  For example, this is a 
false rumor in SemEval19 rumor detection task: 
“National Geographic channel has reportedly paid 
$ 1 million for this daring video. 
https://t.co/CDbjf65bKG.” Many responses 
towards this rumor are talking about how great the 
video is or how brave the goat in the video is, e.g. 
“Perseverance and fighting spirit!!” and “Nice 
one!!!!!!”. For a stance detection algorithm, it is 
very possible to predict this type of responses as 
“support”, due to their positive sentiment. This 
obviously will also mislead the rumor detection 
algorithm. We think it is worthwhile to research 
on the intent of user responses, to better 
understand the actual target of a user comment.  
4.3 Cross-domain and Cross-language  
Most previous studies emphasize on 
distinguishing false rumors from truth with 
experimental settings that are generally limited to 
a specific social media platform, or certain topic 
domains, such as politics.  Analyzing rumors 
across topics or platforms would let us gain 
deeper understanding of rumors and discover 
their unique characteristics that can further assist 
debunking them across domains (topic and 
platform). 
Recently, we have seen rumors spreading 
across languages, especially rumors involving 
topics on politics, investment, business and 
finance. Often times, a rumor is already debunked 
in one language, but it is still spreading in another 
language, due to the language barrier and the lack 
of cross-language rumor detection tool. This is 
quite true for some rumors in Chinese on Weibo 
and WeChat, a social media platform similar to 
Facebook. These rumors are usually about politics, 
world affairs, business and health/medical topics.   
For example, in WeChat, there are many rumors 
about some supplements, claiming they are good 
for certain diseases and also presenting certain 
fake evidences citing some foreign studies. This 
type of rumors is very hard for ordinary users to 
verify, especially the elder people who are the 
main group who are interested in rumors related 
to healthcare, medicine, and longevity.  This has 
becoming more serious in the last couple of years, 
since more people in the rural areas start to use 
smart phone and social media. How to deal with 
this type of cross-language and cross-platform 
rumor detection problem would also be an 
interesting research topic. 
4.4 Explanatory Detection 
Most rumor detection approaches only predict the 
veracity of a rumor, and very little information is 
revealed why it is a false rumor. Finding the 
evidences supporting the prediction and 
presenting them to users would be very beneficial, 
since it helps users to debunk rumors by 
themselves.   Making the result explanatory has 
attracted research in other areas, such as 
explanatory recommendation, but it is still a new 
topic in rumor detection field. This may become 
harder as more models are using deep learning 
techniques nowadays. However, as AI techniques 
are used in more applications, the demands for 
result explanation from users are also increasing.  
For example, now we are designing and 
implementing a rumor detection system for an 
Alibaba product, and one important product 
feature required by the product designers and 
users is to provide explanation for the veracity 
prediction result. 
4.5 Integrating User Stance and User 
Credibility Together 
Several studies have shown that both user stance 
and user credibility information help improve 
rumor detection performance (Liu et al., 2015; 
Enayet and El-Beltagy, 2017; Li et al., 2019b). 
However, these studies just treat the stance label 
and the features reflecting user credibility, such as 
no. of followers and user account age, as separate 
features in the overall prediction model. None of 
them has tried to integrate these two types of 
information together systematically, to get a 
unified indicator to reflect how important a 
response is for determining the veracity of a 
rumor. For example, we want to clearly 
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differentiate these two different situations: an 
authoritative and credible user, such as a credible 
news agency or government agent, debunks or 
supports a claim, and a low credible user, e.g. a 
malicious account, debunks or supports a claim. 
And as explained in the “Target of User Response” 
section, we also need to take the real target into 
consideration when designing the integration 
model.  
4.6 Utilizing External Textual Information 
Besides KBs mentioned before, other types of 
external information may also help rumor 
detection, such as articles from credible new 
agency websites, announcements or documents 
from governments and authorities, official 
announcements from involved parties, past 
rumors that have been verified, etc. We can 
compare the current rumor with these external 
text data, to gain more insights on the rumor.  This 
sounds like a boring idea and an old information 
retrieval and text matching problem, but actually 
it will have very practical impact on rumor 
detection, especially for a real rumor detection 
system.  Many rumors are just resurfacing of old 
ones, or their variants. And for a human, when we 
verify a rumor, one of the things we will do is also 
to check relevant website to see if there is any 
relevant information about this rumor, such as 
official announcement. The study from (Qin et al. 
2016) shows that this approach is very effective 
when detecting rumors that have variants in the 
past at real-time.   One system implementation 
challenge is to monitor these websites and scrape 
the relevant text information.    
4.7 Multi-task Learning 
Studies already show that jointly learning of 
stance detection and rumor detection improves 
the performance of rumor detection (Kochkina et 
al., 2018; Ma et al., 2018a). In the rumor detection 
workflow, depending on the algorithms, the 
following tasks might be involved: user 
credibility evaluation, source credibility 
evaluation, knowledge extraction, etc. If there are 
appropriate datasets with annotations for these 
data types, one research direction is to explore 
multi-task learning for these tasks, in addition to 
the user stance and rumor detection tasks. We 
expect it will benefit the rumor veracity prediction 
task, at least. 
4.8 Rumor Early Detection 
Rumor early detection is to detect a rumor at its 
early stage before it wide-spreads on social media, 
so that one can take appropriate actions earlier. 
Early detection is especially important for a real-
time system, since the more a rumor spreads, the 
more damages it causes, and more likely for 
people to trust it. This is a very challenging task, 
since at its early stage a rumor has little 
propagation information and very few user 
responses.  The algorithm has to primarily rely on 
the content and external knowledge, such as KB.  
Several studies have tested their algorithms on the 
early stage of rumors (Liu et al., 2015, Ma et al., 
2016; Kwon et al., 2017; Liu and Wu, 2018).  
Kwon et al. (2017) analyzed feature stability over 
time and reported that user and linguistic features 
are better than structured and propagation features 
for determining the veracity of a rumor at its early 
stage.  Although there are already some studies on 
this direction, more research efforts are still 
needed, due to its importance in the real systems.  
4.9 Framework for a Real Rumor Detection 
System 
Although there are many studies on rumor 
detection, most of them focus on models that 
utilize only part of the available information and 
test them on datasets that are platform or domain-
specific. Very few of them are designed for real-
time systems (Liu et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016). A 
framework for a practical rumor detection system 
should try to exploit all the available information, 
and apply these information and models 
appropriately for different situations that might 
involve multiple factors, such as platforms, rumor 
stages, topics, languages, and content types (text, 
video or image). From the exploiting information 
point of view, we think the following information 
or data are worth to explore: text content (lexical, 
syntactical, semantic, writing style, etc.), visual 
content (video, image), rumor topics, knowledge 
bases, external documents, old rumors, 
propagation information, user features, source 
credibility, user credibility, heterogenous and 
homogeneous network structures, cross-platform 
information, and cross-language information. 
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Abstract
Many discussions on online platforms suffer
from users offending others by using abusive
terminology, threatening each other, or being
sarcastic. Since an automatic detection of abu-
sive language can support human moderators
of online discussion platforms, detecting abu-
siveness has recently received increased atten-
tion. However, the existing approaches sim-
ply train one classifier for the whole variety of
abusiveness. In contrast, our approach is to
distinguish explicitly abusive cases from the
more “shadowed” ones. By dynamically ex-
tending a lexicon of abusive terms (e.g., includ-
ing new obfuscations of abusive terms), our ap-
proach can support a moderator with explicit
unraveled explanations for why something was
flagged as abusive: due to known explicitly
abusive terms, due to newly detected (obfus-
cated) terms, or due to shadowed cases.
1 Introduction
The web has become the primary medium for peo-
ple to share and discuss their opinions, stances, and
knowledge. But not all people behave ethically on
the respective online platforms: different types of
abusive language have widely spread on the web.
Systems that (semi-)automatically detect abusive
language have gained quite some attention in the
recent years. Such tools could support human mod-
erators who try to protect online platforms from
abusive language and to maintain high-quality user-
generated content.
People use various ways to offend others. On
one hand, they either directly offend the recipient
of a text (direct recipient) or indirectly offend some
other person, entity, or group (other recipient). On
the other hand, abusive words and phrases may be
used explicitly (e.g., “asshole!”), possibly in obfus-
cated form (e.g., “a$$h0le”), or abusiveness can
also happen implicitly via sarcasm (e.g., “go back
to school, whatever you learned didn’t stick”) or via
new racist or abusive codes (e.g., on the platform
4chan, “Google” is used as a slur for black people,
“skittle” for Arabs, and “butterfly” for gays).1
Some recent studies have pointed to different
types and to the importance of separating them,
especially (Waseem et al., 2017). However, the dis-
tinction between the different offending dimensions
has hardly been investigated for the development of
abusive language classifiers (Schmidt and Wiegand,
2017). Accordingly, existing approaches consider
the language of all abusive texts irrespective of their
offending dimensions as one single search space.
They simply train one machine learning model with
different linguistic features on this space in order to
classify unseen text as being abusive or not. Due to
the diversity of language in offending dimensions,
we expect such models to often result in limited
effectiveness in practice. The reason is that, when
learning to detect abusive texts following one way,
for instance, the inclusion of training texts follow-
ing other ways induces noise that diminishes the
visibility of discriminative patterns.
As a solution, we propose to unravel the search
space of abusive language via a three-stage classifi-
cation approach. First, utilizing an abusive lexicon,
we split the search space into two subspaces: texts
with abusive words or phrases from the lexicon,
1https://mic.com/articles/155739
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Figure 1: (a) Standard abusive language detection: Train a single classifier on all instances. (b) Proposed approach:
Iteratively split the search space based on the offending dimension and train classifiers for each subspace.
and texts without such words. Second, we train a
distinct classifier for each subspace. Third, using
the predictions of the two classifiers, we perform
an ablation test to discover new abusive terms from
the subspaces. The found abusive words are added
to the abusive lexicon that can serve as a dynamic
source of explanations for a moderator that ques-
tions the detectors decision to flag a text as abusive.
Figure 1 compares our approach to the “standard”
single-search-space method.
To evaluate our approach to abusive language
detection, we carried out several experiments us-
ing the personal attacks corpus of Wulczyn et al.
(2017). The corpus consists of more than 100,000
comments from Wikipedia talk pages, each labeled
as being a personal attack or not. In addition, the
corpus includes manual labels for the target of at-
tack, i.e., being the direct recipient or a third party.
The experimental results show that our search
space unraveling slightly improves over state-of-
the-art single-space classifiers with the additional
bonus of a dynamic abusiveness lexicon that can
help to explain the classifier’s decisions.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold:
• We investigate how to unravel the search space
of abusive language based on the underlying
offending way.
• We develop computational approach that per-
forms the unraveling in practice, and we eval-
uate it for the classification of Wikipedia talk
page comments as being abusive or not.
• We dynamically develop a new lexicon for
new abusive terms.
The developed resources are freely available on
https://webis.de.
2 Related Work
The automatic detection of abusive language has
been studied extensively in the last years. Pro-
posed approaches target different types of abusive
language, ranging from hate speech (Warner and
Hirschberg, 2012) and cyberbullying (Nitta et al.,
2013) to profanity (Sood et al., 2012) and personal
attacks (Wulczyn et al., 2017).
Despite the importance of labeled data for abu-
sive language detection, only few datasets are avail-
able so far for this task. Most of them come from
large online platforms, such as Twitter (Waseem
and Hovy, 2016), Yahoo (Nobata et al., 2016), and
Wikipedia (Wulczyn et al., 2017). In terms of the
number of labeled texts, the latter is the biggest,
consisting of more than 100,000 Wikipedia talk
page comments. We use this dataset for the evalua-
tion of our approach.
Abusive (or offensive) language detection usu-
ally follows a supervised learning paradigm with
either binary or multi-class classifiers. While exist-
ing abusiveness classifiers exploit a variety of lexi-
cal, syntactic, semantic, and knowledge-based fea-
tures, one study showed character n-grams alone
to be very good features (Mehdad and Tetreault,
2016). Until recently, the most effective overall ap-
proaches rely on neural network architectures such
as CNN and RNN (Badjatiya et al., 2017; Pavlopou-
los et al., 2017). On the personal attacks corpus,
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) have developed several
very effective deep learning models with word em-
bedding features. We employ the best-performing
neural model, but we analyze the effect of adding
our new approach (i.e., to unravel the abusiveness
search space) that simultaneously helps to improve
lexicon-based explainability.
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An approach somewhat comparable to ours has
been proposed by Dinakar et al. (2011) to detect
cyberbullying on YouTube: different classifiers
trained for different cyberbullying topics (e.g., sex-
uality, intelligence, and culture). The best results
come from combining the individual classifiers,
while a single multi-class classifier (mixing the
different topics) was less effective.
Our approach is also related to co-training (Blum
and Mitchell, 1998) and iterative feature selec-
tion/discovery (Liu et al., 2003; Xiang et al., 2012).
In co-training, a labeled training set is extended
by iteratively adding trustful instances from an un-
labeled set based on the predictions of the classi-
fier. Similarly, our approach extends its abusive-
ness lexicon iteratively. The iterative feature selec-
tion/discovery aims at finding new discriminating
features to train the classifiers. This is in line with
the third stage of our approach where new abusive
terms are learned based on the predictions of the
classifiers. The dynamically-updated lexicon can
then serve as a good source for explaining many
classifier decisions on the in-lexicon cases.
3 Data
In this section, we detail the data that we employ for
the implementation and evaluation of our approach.
Specifically, we describe the Wikipedia personal at-
tack corpus (Wulczyn et al., 2017) and the abusive
language lexicon of Wiegand et al. (2018).
3.1 Wikipedia Personal Attack Corpus
Wikipedia is one of the online platforms suffering
from abusive language, especially from personal
attacks (Shachaf and Hara, 2010). In particular,
each Wikipedia article is associated to a so called
talk page, where users are solicited to write com-
ments in order to discuss and improve the quality
of the article’s content. While the large majority
of comments is valuable, some users attack others
with texts comprising hate speech and harassment,
among others.
Our analysis and evaluation are based on the
personal attack corpus (Wulczyn et al., 2017)
that includes 115,864 comments extracted from
Wikipedia talk page comments. Each comment has
been labeled by at least ten crowdsourced anno-
tators as an ‘attack’ (i.e., being abusive) or ‘not-
attack’ (i.e., non-abusive) with an inter-annotator
agreement of 0.45 in terms of Krippendorff’s α.
The label of each comment was aggregated based
Train Validation Test
Attack 8,079 2,755 2,880
Not-attack 61,447 20,405 20,298
All 69,526 23,160 23,178
Table 1: Statistics of the personal attacks corpus.
on the distribution of the labels and the majority
vote (about 12% are attacks). The corpus comes
with a 60-20-20 split into training, validation, and
test set (see Table 1 for corpus statistics).
3.2 Abusive Language Lexicon
To carry out our approach, we employ the lexicon
of Wiegand et al. (2018). This lexicon has been
built through an in-depth examination of negative
polar expressions. To this end, a set of candidate
abusive words has been collected from the negative
polar expressions from the ‘subjectivity lexicon’ of
(Wilson et al., 2005) as well as the frequently listed
abusive words in the lexicons surveyed by Schmidt
and Wiegand (2017). The expressions in this set
have been manually labeled into abusive and non-
abusive using a crowdsourcing setting. Based on
the resulting labels, a new supervised classifier that
distinguishes between abusive and non-abusive ex-
pressions has been developed. This classifier, then,
has been applied to a large number of negative po-
lar expressions derived from Wiktionary, in order
to label them into abusive and non-abusive.
Accordingly, two versions of the lexicon have
been created: (1) the base lexicon which comprises
the manually labeled expressions, and (2) the ex-
panded lexicon which includes the automatically
labeled expressions in accordance with the predic-
tions of the developed classifier. The first lexicon
contains 1650 words and expressions in which 551
of them are abusive, while the second contains 8478
words and expressions with 2989 abusive ones.
The results of using the lexicon for detecting
the abusive language in micro-posts demonstrate
high effectiveness, particularly in cross-domain set-
tings.
4 Approach
Our approach unravels the search space based on
the hypothesis that the differences of abusive texts
with and without explicit abusive words are re-
flected in varying, possibly opposite feature dis-
tributions on the lexical, syntactic, semantic, or
pragmatic level. In an iterative ablation test step,
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more domain-specific abusive words are detected.
4.1 Unraveling the Search Space
In contrast to standard approaches training abusive-
ness classifiers on all examples at once, we propose
to apply a three-stage approach.
1) Splitting the Search Space Using an abusive
lexicon, we split the training and validation sets
into two subspaces of texts containing explicit abu-
sive terms and other texts (see Figure 1(b)).
2) Training Two Abusiveness Classifiers On
each training set of the two resulting subspaces
(explicit / other), a distinct classifier is trained to
predict the ’not-attack’ probability.
3) Collecting New Abusive Terms Each of the
two classifiers is run on 100 random attack and
100 random not-attack texts from the respective
validation set (‘attack’ / ‘not-attack’ according to
ground-truth majority vote). In an ablation test,
each word from these selected texts is iteratively
removed and the probability of the text to be ‘not-
attack’ is compared to the prediction with that word.
The words are then ordered by their “abusiveness”
(i.e., words are ranked higher the more their re-
moval raises the ‘not-attack’ score). Ideally, obfus-
cated abusive words and sarcastic expressions will
be ranked high. The top-k “new” abusive words
for each subset (explicit / other) and each ground-
truth label (‘attack’ / ‘not-attack’) are added to the
lexicon (≤ 4k words at most per iteration, k being
set to 20 after pilot experiments).
4.2 Iterative Unraveling
At the end of an iteration (i.e., splitting the datasets,
training two classifiers, and collecting new abusive
words), the effectiveness of the classifiers is tested
on the validation set. When there is no improve-
ment for three iterations, the process stops.
4.3 Abusiveness Classification
Given an unknown text (e.g., in the test set), we
check whether it contains an explicit abusive word
from the developed lexicon, and select the appro-
priate classifier accordingly.
5 Experiments and Results
We compare our approach to the state of the art
on the personal attack corpus, following the origi-
nal suggestion of using the 2-class area under the
ROC curve (AUC) and Spearman rank correlation
as the evaluation metrics (AUC computed between
derived ‘attack’ probabilities and the corpus major-
ity vote while Spearman considers the fraction of
corpus votes agreeing with a prediction).
5.1 Experimental Setup
To represent the state of the art, we employ the
best-performing model on the personal attack cor-
pus proposed by Pavlopoulos et al. (2017): an
RNN model where the basic cell is a GRU. An em-
bedding layer transforms an input word sequence
into a word embedding sequence. Then, the model
learns a hidden state from the word embeddings.
The hidden state is employed to predict the proba-
bility of ‘not-attack’ using a linear regression layer.
We use 300-dimensional word embeddings (Pen-
nington et al., 2014) pre-trained on the Common
Crawl with 840 billion tokens and a vocabulary
size of 2.2 million. Out-of-vocabulary words are
mapped to one random vector. We use Glorot (Glo-
rot and Bengio, 2010) to initialize the model, with
mean-square error as loss function, Adam for op-
timization (Kingma and Ba, 2014), a learning rate
of 0.001, and a batch size of 128.
The initial abusive lexicon used for splitting the
search space is the complete set of words in the
base lexicon of Wiegand et al. (2018) containing
1650 negative polar expressions. This lexicon per-
formed better in our pilot experiments compared
to the weakly labeled set of expressions in the ex-
panded lexicon.
5.2 Results
On the personal attacks corpus, we compare our
approach to the effectiveness reported by Wulczyn
et al. (2017) and Pavlopoulos et al. (2017), and
to our re-implementation of the RNN model of
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) that forms the basis of our
approach (some implementation details missing in
the original paper).
As can be seen in Table 2, our approach is
slightly better than the re-implementation in terms
of AUC and Spearman in both splits and the whole
test set. Our approach is on a par with the previous
best approach reported (slight AUC improvement
to 97.80, but slightly lower Spearman score). The
fact that the concatenation of explicit and other
yields a higher AUC than any subspace is a result
of the substantially lower predicted probabilities
of attack on the other set as well as of the highly
imbalanced distribution of ‘attack’ in the two sets.
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Go fuk your Momma Rancie
Stop erasing my work you MF Douche bag
why are you such an idiot
You re fuck of bitch
Go fuk your Momma Rancie
Stop erasing my work you MF Douche bag
why are you such an idiot
You re fuck of bitch
Second IterationFirst Iteration
Other
Explicit
Figure 2: The abusiveness of words in texts with explicit abusive terms (above the line) and without abusive terms
(below the line) in the first two iterations. Darker color indicates a higher abusiveness.
Approach AUC Spearman
Our proposed approach
- all cases 97.80 70.26
- explicit 97.69 78.06
- other 97.05 55.37
Reimplementation
- all cases 97.17 67.98
- explicit 97.08 75.45
- other 96.38 52.06
Pavlopoulos et al. (2017) 97.71 72.79
Wulczyn et al. (2017) 96.59 68.17
Table 2: Effectiveness on the test set of the per-
sonal attacks corpus (AUC and Spearman coefficients):
our proposed approach, the previous state of the art
(Pavlopoulos et al., 2017), our reimplementation of it,
and the “standard” approach by Wulczyn et al. (2017).
Table 3 shows the AUC values and Spearman co-
efficients for the first five iterations of our approach
on the unraveled validation and test set. The ap-
proach stops at the fifth iteration since the highest
AUC performance (our target evaluation measure)
on all and the explicit subspace of the validation set
was obtained in the second iteration (three failed
improvement attempts). The highest AUC for the
other subspace is achieved in the first iteration,
though. The Spearman values increase after each
iteration, except again for the other subspace where
the first iteration works best.
The expansion rates of the abusive lexicon are
shown in Table 4. Fewer and fewer terms are added
in later iterations since it becomes increasingly less
likely for the ablation test to discover important
new abusive words. Additionally, we asked two
experts to also check the newly added words; they
confirmed that more and more abusive terms are
added (inter-annotator agreement of 0.59).
Our approach iteratively identifies new “highly
abusive” words and moves the respective texts from
the other subspace to the explicit subspace. Since
the abusive terms are important clues for the clas-
sification, this will force the model for the other
subspace to utilize new features. As a result, the
Measure 1 2 3 4 5
AUC - Valid. all 97.17 97.46 97.40 97.34 97.33
AUC - Valid. explicit 96.94 97.40 97.21 97.25 97.14
AUC - Valid. other 97.63 96.58 96.36 95.46 95.32
AUC - Test all 97.58 97.80 97.74 97.68 97.69
AUC - Test explicit 97.25 97.69 97.51 97.55 97.55
AUC - Test other 97.29 97.05 96.94 94.14 96.15
Spearman - Valid. all 69.19 70.26 70.40 70.25 70.41
Spearman - Valid. explicit 76.67 77.43 78.05 78.47 78.46
Spearman - Valid. other 56.88 54.62 51.64 49.21 47.73
Spearman - Test all 69.73 71.07 71.26 70.87 71.26
Spearman - Test explicit 77.38 78.06 78.47 78.79 78.59
Spearman - Test other 57.10 55.37 53.37 50.50 50.14
Table 3: Effectiveness (AUC values and Spearman co-
efficients) of our approach’s first five iterations.
1 2 3 4 5
Size 1650 1725 1780 1829 1875
Increment +75 +55 +49 +46
Partially abusive +20 +30 +24 +18
Abusive +14 +13 +18 +21
Non-abusive +41 +12 + 7 + 7
Table 4: Increment and of the abusive lexicon in the
first five iterations of our approach. The rows partially
abusive, abusive, and non-abusive indicate the numbers
of abusive words agreed by one of, both, none of the
experts in the newly added words respectively.
texts without explicit abusive terms become more
“difficult”, such that the effectiveness in the other
subspace decreases over time.
Table 5 shows the newly found words in each
of the first iterations. For every iteration, we show
words labeled as ‘abusive’ (two experts both agree
they are abusive), ‘partial abusive’ (one of the ex-
perts agreed they are abusive) and ‘non-abusive’
(none of two experts both agrees they are abu-
sive). For each label and each iteration, we se-
lect three words which have the highest ‘abusive-
ness’ (see the definition of ‘abusiveness’ in sec-
tion 4.1). We found that our approach can find un-
usual abusive words (such as ‘faggots’) and also ob-
fuscated/misspelled abusive words (such as ‘fvck’).
Figure 2 illustrates some texts with the abusive-
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Iteration Abusive Partially abusive Non-abusive
2 jerk masturbating headline
fuckheads freak heck
douchebag clowns nightmare
3 fucking rudely hometown
fvck dunce lifetime
bastard pederast imature
4 bithces filthy policemans
sissy lame foot
fuk harrassing die
5 niggers nazi pint
faggots hypocritical boss
fuckers imposter pay
Table 5: The newly added abusive words in the first it-
erations. By ‘abusive’, we refer to the words that both
experts label as abusive. By ‘partially abusive’, we re-
fer to the words that only one of the experts labels as
abusive, and by ‘non-abusive’, we refer to the words
that both experts label as non-abusive.
ness of each word in the first and second iteration.
The classifier for the explicit subspace learns to em-
phasize the explicit abusive words (e.g., the more
important “fuck” or “bitch” and the less impor-
tant “are” or “an” in the second iteration) while
the classifier for the other subspace identifies “new”
abusive terms (e.g., “Douche” or “fuk”) to be added
to the lexicon.
6 Conclusion
Abusive language has become a ubiquitous prob-
lem on online platforms. Previous work aimed to
train detectors on a single search space of poten-
tially abusive texts. In contrast, we suggest to di-
vide the search space into texts containing explicit
abusive words (according to a dynamic lexicon)
and texts that do not contain such terms. For each
subspace, a different classifier is trained.
In an online scenario of consistently running our
approach on new comments (some users may report
offensive ones, etc.) to support human moderators
on online platforms, newly “emerging” obfuscated
offensive terms will quickly be spotted and are not
“lost” in the dominating space of explicit abusive-
ness. The iterative extension of the lexicon also
helps to increase effectiveness in our experiments
showing our approach to be on a par with the previ-
ous state of the art on the personal attacks corpus.
Besides matching the previous state-of-the-art
“black box” classification performance, our new
approach with its dynamic lexicon comes with the
benefit of an improved explainability that a human
moderator may appreciate for the in-lexicon cases.
For the human-in-the-loop platform moderation
scenario, we plan a user study also including a
functionality to manually add or blacklist terms
from the lexicon in each iteration.
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Abstract
The goal of fine-grained propaganda detec-
tion is to determine whether a given sentence
uses propaganda techniques (sentence-level)
or to recognize which techniques are used
(fragment-level). This paper presents the sys-
tem of our participation in the sentence-level
subtask of the propaganda detection shared
task. In order to better utilize the document
information, we construct context-dependent
input pairs (sentence-title pair and sentence-
context pair) to fine-tune the pretrained BERT,
and we also use the undersampling method to
tackle the problem of imbalanced data1.
1 Introduction
Propaganda detection is a process of determining
whether a news article or a sentence is misleading.
Several research works have been proposed to de-
tect propaganda on document-level (Rashkin et al.,
2017; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019b), sentence-
level and fragment-level (Da San Martino et al.,
2019). Sentence-level detection or classification
(SLC) is to determine whether a given sentence
is propagandistic and it is a special binary classi-
fication problem, while the goal of fragment-level
classification (FLC) is to extract fragments and as-
sign with given labels such as loaded language,
flag-waving and causal oversimplification, and it
could be treated as a sequence labeling problem.
Compared with document-level, sentence-level
and fragment-level detection are much more help-
ful, since detection on sentences and fragments are
more practical for real-life applications. However,
these fine-grained tasks are more challenging. Al-
though Da San Martino et al. (2019) indicates that
multi-task learning of both the SLC and the FLC
could be beneficial for the SLC, in this paper, we
1Code is available at https://github.com/Wenjun-
Hou/Propaganda-Detection-SLC
only focus on the SLC task so as to better inves-
tigate whether context information could improve
the performance of our system. Since several pre-
trained language models (Devlin et al., 2019; Liu
et al., 2019) have been proved to be effective for
text classification and other natural language un-
derstanding tasks, we use the pretrained BERT
(Devlin et al., 2019) for the SLC task. This paper
elaborates our BERT-based system for which we
construct sentence-title pairs and sentence-context
pairs as input. In addition, in order to tackle the
problem of imbalanced data, we apply the un-
dersampling method (Zhou and Liu, 2006) to the
training data, and we find that this method greatly
boosts the performance of our system.
2 Related Work
Various methods have been proposed for propa-
ganda detection. Rashkin et al. (2017) proposed
to use LSTM and other machine learning methods
for deception detection in different types of news,
including trusted, satire, hoax and propaganda.
Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al. (2019b) proposed to use
Maximum Entropy classifier (Berger et al., 1996)
with different features replicating the same exper-
imental setup of Rashkin et al. (2017) for two-
way and four-way classifications. A fine-grained
propaganda corpus was proposed in Da San Mar-
tino et al. (2019) which includes both sentence-
level and fragment-level information. Based on
this corpus and the pretrained BERT which is one
of the most powerful pretrained language model, a
multi-granularity BERT was proposed and it out-
performed several strong BERT-based baselines.
3 Methodology
In our system, we utilize BERT as our base model
and construct different kinds of input pairs to fine-
tune it. When constructing the input representa-
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Figure 1: Two kinds of input pairs for BERT. [CLS] and [SEP] are two special tokens.
tion, a special token [CLS] is padded in front of
every sentence and another token [SEP] is added
at the end of it. In addition, for each input pair,
a [SEP] is added between a sentence and its con-
text or title. Finally, a linear layer and a sigmoid
function are applied to the final representation of
[CLS] to obtain the probability for classification.
For comparison, we also use the official method
(Random) as baseline which randomly labels sen-
tences.
3.1 Data
The dataset is provided by NLP4IF 2019 Shared
Task (Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019a), and the train-
ing set, the development set, and the test set
contain approximately 16,000, 2,000 and 3,400
sentences respectively. According to the statis-
tics, only 29% of the training sentences are la-
beled as propaganda, and thus in this paper, we
treat propaganda sentences as positive samples
and non-propaganda sentences as negative sam-
ples. More details of the dataset could be found
in Da San Martino et al. (2019).
3.2 Input pairs
Sentence Only: We only use the current sentence
to fine-tune the model and models trained with this
kind of input are used as baselines for those mod-
els trained with the following two kinds of input
pairs.
Sentence-Title Pair: As described in
Da San Martino et al. (2019), the source of
the dataset that we use is news articles, and
since the title is usually the summarization of a
news article, we use the title as supplementary
information.
Sentence-Context Pair: In addition to setting the
title as the supplementary information, we con-
struct the sentence-context pair which also in-
cludes preceding sentences as additional context,
since preceding sentences usually convey the same
or related events and this historical content is
closely related to the current sentence. Figure 1.
shows the details of this kind of input pair in which
the preceding sentence and the title are directly
concatenated.
3.3 Undersampling
As mentioned above, there are only 29% of train-
ing sentences labeled as propaganda (positive). In
order to tackle the problem of imbalanced data, we
first collect positive samples which size is Spos and
negative samples, then we resample Sneg (X per-
cent of Spos) from negative samples at the begin-
ning of each training epoch. Finally, we combine
and shuffle both positive samples and sampled
negative samples as a new training set Ssampled.
Sneg = X ∗ Spos (1)
Ssampled = Sneg + Spos (2)
3.4 Experiment Details
In this paper, we use the pretrained uncased ver-
sion of BERTBASE and BERTLARGE 2 for the
SLC, and more details of these two models could
2https://github.com/google-research/bert
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Model Input Sample Rate Precision Recall F1
Random - - 44.38 50.74 47.35
BERTBASE
Sentence Only - 72.76 52.77 61.18
Sentence-Title
- 70.54 56.70 62.87
0.8 57.83 77.94 66.40
0.9 60.77 70.64 65.33
1.0 63.70 68.88 66.19
Sentence-Context
- 71.10 54.94 61.98
0.8 57.53 77.54 66.05
0.9 60.95 73.07 66.46
1.0 63.44 66.44 64.90
BERTLARGE
Sentence Only - 73.19 50.61 59.84
Sentence-Title
- 71.23 54.26 61.60
0.8 58.69 75.37 66.00
0.9 61.89 64.82 63.31
1.0 60.85 71.31 65.67
Sentence-Context
- 71.88 49.12 58.36
0.8 59.43 79.30 67.94
0.9 63.73 66.58 65.12
1.0 62.28 73.07 67.25
Table 1: Experiment results of different models on the SLC task, and the model with the highest F1 score which
has been underlined is chosen to be evaluated on the test set. ’-’ in sample rate means undersampling is not used.
Model Data Prec. Rec. F1
Random
Dev. 44.38 50.74 47.35
Test 38.80 49.42 43.47
BERTLARGE
Dev. 59.43 79.30 67.94
Test 51.81 74.44 61.10
Table 2: Experiment results of the chosen model and
the random baseline for the SLC task.
be found in Devlin et al. (2019). Before fine-
tuning, sentences are first converted to lower case
and their maximum sequence length is set to 128.
For a sentence-context pair, the maximum length
of context is set to 100. If the sequence length of
an input pair exceeds 128, then the context or title
is truncated to meet the length.
When fine-tuning, we use the Adam (Kingma
and Ba, 2014) with learning rate 2e-5 for 2 epochs,
the batch size is 32 and the dropout probability
is kept at 0.1. Since the title or context informa-
tion could help improve the performance, we only
apply the undersampling method to input pairs
(sentence-title and sentence-context). For those
models involved with undersampling, the sample
rate X is set to 0.8, 0.9 or 1.0 empirically. During
the training stage, all training samples are used.
We directly evaluate all the models on the develop-
ment set, and the best model is chosen to generate
predictions of the test data.
4 Result
Our approach is evaluated on Propaganda Detec-
tion@NLP4IF SLC dataset. In the development
stage, we use three kinds of input and three dif-
ferent sample rates for BERT. Table 1. shows the
results of the development set. From Table 1.,
without considering undersampling, we can see
that using the sentence-title pair could boost the
performance of BERTBASE, compared with the
model using only the current sentence and the ran-
dom baseline. While using the sentence-context
pair could improve the F1 score of BERTBASE by
0.8% with precision rising to 71.10 and recall de-
creasing to 54.94, the performance of BERTBASE
drops by around 1% with recall dropping signifi-
cantly to 49.12.
We also observe that both performances of
BERTBASE and BERTLARGE trained with orig-
inal training sentences are competitive compared
with the random baseline. However, the pre-
cision of BERTBASE at 70.54 and the one of
BERTLARGE at 71.23 are significantly higher
than the recall of both models, at 56.70 and at
85
54.26 respectively, and this may result from the
problem of imbalanced instances. Thus, we intro-
duce the undersampling technique using 0.8, 0.9
or 1.0 sample rate to tackle this issue. We observe
from Table 1. that the F1 score of BERTBASE
with the sentence-title pair and 0.8 sample rate
rises around by 5% and the same model using
the sentence-context pair and 0.9 sample rate per-
forms similarly. As for BERTLARGE, while using
the sentence-title pair has the similar performance
as it is employed in the base version model, using
the sentence-context pair strongly boosts the F1
score, at 67.94 with 0.8 sample rate and at 67.25
with 1.0 sample rate. In addition, it is worth not-
ing that there is a better trade-off between preci-
sion and recall with 1.0 sample rate than the one
with 0.8.
In the test stage, since we are only allowed to
submit a single run on the test set, we choose the
model with the highest F1 score (67.94) to gener-
ate predictions and the evaluated results are listed
in Table 2. From Table 2., we can see that the
recall raises by nearly 5% and the precision of it
drops significantly, by around 7%, compared with
the results on the development set, while the re-
call of Random Baseline also drops by approxi-
mately 5.5% and the precision of it remains nearly
the same.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we examine capability of the
context-dependent BERT model. In the sentence-
level propaganda detection task, we construct
sentence-title pairs and sentence-context pairs in
order to better utilize context information to im-
prove the performance of our system. Further-
more, the undersampling method is utilized to
tackle the data imbalanced problem. Experiments
show that both sentence-title/context pairs and the
undersampling method could boost the perfor-
mance of BERT on the SLC task.
In the future, we plan to apply multi-task learn-
ing to this context-dependent BERT, similar to the
method mentioned in Da San Martino et al. (2019)
or introducing other kinds of tasks, such as senti-
ment analysis or domain classification.
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Abstract
This paper presents the winning solution of the
Fragment Level Classification (FLC) task in
the Fine Grained Propaganda Detection com-
petition at the NLP4IF’19 workshop. The goal
of the FLC task is to detect and classify tex-
tual segments that correspond to one of the 18
given propaganda techniques in a news arti-
cles dataset. The main idea of our solution is
to perform word-level classification using fine-
tuned BERT, a popular pre-trained language
model. Besides presenting the model and its
evaluation results, we also investigate the at-
tention heads in the model, which provide in-
sights into what the model learns, as well as
aspects for potential improvements.1
1 Introduction
Propaganda is a type of informative communica-
tion with the goal of serving the interest of the
information giver (i.e., the propagandist), and not
necessarily the recipient (Jowett and O’donnell,
2018). Recently, Da San Martino et al. compiled a
new dataset for training machine learning models,
containing labeled instances of several common
types of propaganda techniques. Through such
fine-grained labels, the authors aim to alleviate the
issue of noise arising from classifying at a coarse
level, e.g., the whole article, as attempted in previ-
ous works on propaganda classification (Barro´n-
Ceden˜o et al., 2019; Rashkin et al., 2017). Us-
ing this dataset, the Fragment Level Classifica-
tion (FLC) task of the Fine-Grained Propaganda
Detection Challenge in NLP4IF’19 requires de-
tecting and classifying textual fragments that cor-
respond to at least one of the 18 given propa-
ganda techniques (Da San Martino et al., 2019a).
For instance, given the sentence “Manchin says
1Code for reproducing the results can be found
at https://github.com/shehel/BERT_
propaganda_detection
Democrats acted like babies ...”, the ground truth
of FLC includes the detected propaganda tech-
nique for the fragment “babies”, i.e., name-calling
and labeling, as well as the start and end positions
in the given text, i.e., from the 34th to the 39th
characters in the sentence.
This paper describes the solution by the team
“newspeak”, which achieved the highest evalu-
ation scores on both the development and test
datasets of the FLC task. Our solution uti-
lizes BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), a Transformer
(Vaswani et al., 2017) based language model rely-
ing on multiheaded attention, and fine-tunes it for
the purpose of the FLC task. One benefit of us-
ing the transformer architecture is that it leads to
a more explainable model, especially with the fine
grained information available through the dataset.
We take a step in this direction by exploring the
internals of the fine-tuned BERT model. To do
so, we adapt the methods used in (Clark et al.,
2019) and (Michel et al., 2019). In particular,
we explore the average attention head distribu-
tion entropy, head importance, impact of mask-
ing out layers, and study the attention maps. The
results reveal that the attention heads capture in-
terpretable patterns, similar to ones observed in
(Clark et al., 2019).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents our solution and elaborates on
the architecture, training considerations and im-
plementation details. Section 3 provides the re-
sults and analysis. Section 4 concludes with future
directions.
2 Method
2.1 Solution Overview
We approach the problem by classifying each to-
ken in the input article into 20 token types, i.e.,
one for each of the 18 propaganda techniques,
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a “background” token type that signifies that the
corresponding token is not part of a propaganda
technique, and another “auxiliary” type to han-
dle WordPiece tokenization (Devlin et al., 2018).
For example, the word “Federalist” is converted to
“Federal” and “ist” tokens after tokenization, and
the latter would be assigned the auxiliary token
type. Since the labels provided in the dataset are
at character level, before training our classifier, we
first perform a pre-processing step that converts
these character level labels to token level, which
is later reversed during post-processing to obtain
the outputs at the character level. This is done by
keeping track of character indices of every word in
the sentence.
The token classifier is obtained by fine-tuning
a pre-trained BERT model with the input dataset
and the token-level labels from the pre-processing
step. Specifically, we add a linear classification
head to the last layer of BERT for token classifi-
cation. To limit training costs, we split articles by
sentence and process each sentence independently
in the subsequent token classifier. The classifica-
tion results are combined in the post-processing
step to obtain the final predictions, as mentioned
earlier.
Figure 1: Architecture of our solution
2.2 Modeling
During the competition, we mainly explored three
model architectures. The first is a simple scheme
of fine-tuning a pre-trained BERT language model
with a linear multilabel classification layer, as
shown in Figure 1. The second performs unsu-
pervised fine-tuning of the language model on the
1M news dataset (Corney et al., 2016) before su-
pervised training on the competition dataset. This
is motivated by the consideration of accounting for
domain shift factors, since the BERT base model
used in our solution was pretrained on BookCor-
pus and Wikipedia datasets (Devlin et al., 2018),
whereas the dataset in this competition are news
articles (Rietzler et al., 2019; Peters et al., 2019).
Finally, the third model uses a single language
model with 18 linear binary classification layers,
one for each class. This is mainly to overcome the
issue of overlapping labels, which is ignored in the
former two model designs. Our final submission
is based on the first architecture. Additionally, a
fine-tuned BERT model with default parameters,
i.e., the same setup described in the implementa-
tion section except for the learning rate schedule
and sampling strategy, is used as a baseline for
comparison in our experiments.
Preprocessing. Our solution performs token-
level classification, while the data labels are at the
character level. In our experiments, we observe
that the conversion from character-level to token-
level labels (for model fitting), as well as the re-
verse process (for prediction) incur a small perfor-
mance penalty due to information lost in the con-
version processes. Our final model in this compe-
tition does not consider overlapping labels, which
occurs when one token belongs to multiple pro-
paganda techniques simultaneously. Through ex-
periments, we found that due to the above issues,
the ground truth labels in the training data lead to
an imperfect F1 score of 0.89 on the same dataset.
This suggests that there is still much space for fur-
ther improvement.
Dealing with Class Imbalance. The dataset
provided in this competition is unbalanced with
respect to propaganda classes. Some classes, such
as “Strawmen”, only have a few tens of training
samples. To alleviate this problem, our solution
employs two oversampling strategies: (i) weight-
ing rarer classes with higher probability and (ii)
sample propaganda sentences with a higher proba-
bility (say, 50% higher) than non-propaganda sen-
tences. Such oversampling, however, also have
adverse effects such as loss of precision and over-
fitting. Hence, the sampling method in our final
submission strikes a balance through curriculum
learning (Bengio et al., 2009), whereby an over-
sampling strategy is used in the first half of the
training and sequential sampling is used in the sec-
ond half.
Implementation. We trained all models on
a machine with 4 Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti graphic
cards. Our implementation is based on the Py-
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Torch framework, using the pytorch-transformers
package.2 To accelerate training, all models were
trained in mixed precision.
Our best models are based on the uncased base
model of BERT which was found to work bet-
ter than cased model, containing 12 transformer
layers and 110 million parameters trained using
the following hyper-parameters: batch size 64, se-
quence length 210, weight decay 0.01, and early
stopping on F1 score on the validation set with pa-
tience value 7. Each model, including the final
submission, was trained for 20 epochs. We used
the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 3e-5
and cosine annealing cycles with hard restarts and
warmup of 10% of the total steps.
During the event, participants had only access to
the training set labels which was split into a train-
ing set and a validation set with 30% of the articles
chosen randomly. Models for submitting to the de-
velopment set was chosen based on validation F1
scores, which in turn, informed the submissions
for the test set.
2.3 Attention Analysis
We first measure the general change in behavior of
the attention heads after finetuning on the dataset.
We do this by visualizing the average entropy of
each head’s attention distribution before and af-
ter finetuning on the dataset. Intuitively, this mea-
sures how focused the attention weights of each of
the heads are.
Next, we calculate head importance using
Ih = Ex∼X
∣∣∣∣∂L(x)∂ξh
∣∣∣∣ , (1)
where ξh is a binary mask applied to the multihead
attention function to nullify it. X is the data distri-
bution and L(x) is the loss on sample x. If Ih has
a large value, it can be interpreted as an important
head since changing it could also have a greater
impact on the performance of the model. We use
these scores to determine heads to visualize.
3 Results
The model that performed the best empirically was
the BERT language model with a simple classi-
fier, with parameter tuning, masked logits, cycli-
cal learning rates and a sampling strategy. Ta-
ble 1 shows the scores on the development set of
2https://github.com/huggingface/
pytorch-transformers
Model F1 Precision Recall
BERT-baseline 0.2214 0.252 0.1972
BERT-18 Binary 0.2273 0.2603 0.2017
BERT-1M News 0.2078 0.2671 0.17
BERT-submission 0.242 0.289 0.208
Table 1: Evaluation results on official development set
Technique Dev F1 Test F1
Appeal-Authority 0 0
Appeal-Fear 0.3268 0.209
Bandwagon 0 0
Black-White-Fallacy 0 0.09
Casual-Oversimplification 0.05 0
Doubt 0.125 0.169
Exaggeration-Minimisation 0.276 0.159
Flag-Waving 0.409 0.438
Loaded-Language 0.4078 0.331
Namecalling-Labeling 0.2605 0.394
Obfuscation-Confusion 0 0
Red-Herring 0 0
Reductio-Hitlerum 0.206 0
Repetition 0.014 0.011
Slogans 0.153 0.1305
Strawmen 0 0
Thought-Cliches 0 0
Whataboutism 0.16 0
Table 2: Classwise F1 scores for final submission
the models we tried including the baseline BERT
model. Retraining language model on 1M News
dataset failed to match the performance of the
original model. The model design with multiple
binary classification linear layers (which is capa-
ble of predicting multiple labels for a token) ob-
tained better results on some rarer classes; how-
ever, its performance on more common classes is
lower, leading to a lower overall F1 score. How-
ever, we cannot draw conclusions on these ap-
proaches as we hypothesize that this could be im-
proved by using a more optimal learning approach.
The model with the highest score based on
BERT with a single multilabel token classifica-
tion head was chosen as our submission to eval-
uate on the test set which yielded a test F1 score
of 0.2488, 0.286 precision and 0.22 recall (see ta-
ble 2 for class wise scores). This model won the
competition.
We improved on the strong performance of
baseline BERT model by firstly using an oversam-
pling strategy where sentences with propaganda
are weighted more, which in our final submission
was 50%. Such an approach works because the
number of sentences with no propaganda is much
higher than that of ones with propaganda. At-
tempts at fixing the imbalance among propaganda
techniques was found to be detrimental for the
purpose of this competition, because the evalua-
tion metric does not take into account this imbal-
ance. Although oversampling helped the model
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Figure 2: Attention maps labeled by their layer and head number respectively. Green highlights propaganda
fragment and red highlights the behaviour. The darkness of the line corresponds to the strength of the weight.
learn, we found that this led to overfitting and the
model losing precision. Ablation studies showed
that following oversampling with sequential sam-
pling did indeed help improve the precision of the
system. Second, we used an appropriate cyclic
learning rate scheme to avoid poor local minima
(Smith, 2017) as explained in previous section.
Figure 3: Average entropy of the attention weights of
every attention head across layers
We examined attention heads from different
layers based on their importance score. Exclud-
ing the linguistic patterns reported in (Clark et al.,
2019), additional task specific patterns were ob-
served indicating the model’s ability to represent
complex relationships (See Fig 2). For example,
a number of heads appear to attend to adjectives
and adverbs that could be useful for several pro-
paganda techniques. Similarly, some heads pick
out certain “loaded” words which all words in the
sentence strongly attend to. However, it should be
noted that the roles of attention heads are not clear
cut, and further experimentation is required to fur-
ther study this issue.
Next, we calculated the average entropy of the
attention distribution of heads before and after
fine-tuning. Fig 3 shows the entropy after the 8th
layer increasing after fine-tuning while the earlier
layers remain almost unchanged. It also happens
that most of the high importance ranked heads are
clustered between layers 5 and 8. We tried mask-
ing out the last 4 layers and fine-tuning the model
giving an F1 score of 0.2 on the development set.
This leads us to believe that BERT is still under-
trained after fine-tuning as explored in (Liu et al.,
2019) and requires better training strategies and
hyperparameter selection schemes to fully utilize
it.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper describe our winning solution in the
Fragment Level Classification (FLC) task of the
Fine-Grained Propaganda Detection Challenge in
NLP4IF’19. Our approach is based on the BERT
language model, which exhibits strong perfor-
mance out of the box. We explored several tech-
niques and architectures to improve on the base-
line, and performed attention analysis methods
to explore the model. Our work highlights the
difficulty of applying overparameterized models
which can easily lead to sub-optimal utilization as
shown in our analysis. The results confirm that
language models are clearly a step forward for
NLP in terms of linguistic modeling evident from
its strong performance in detecting complex pro-
paganda techniques.
Regarding future work, we plan to explore
further methods for parameter efficient modeling
which we hypothesize as being key for capturing
interpretable linguistic patterns and consequently
better representations. One related direction of re-
search is spanBERT (Joshi et al., 2019), which in-
cludes a pretraining phase consisting of predict-
ing spans instead of tokens which is inherently
more suited for the propaganda dataset. Further,
we plan to investigate methods and models that
are capable of capturing features across multiple
sentences, which are important for detecting some
propaganda classes such as repetition. Finally, we
also plan to look into visualizing and identifying
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additional patterns from the attention heads.
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Abstract
This paper describes our system (MIC-CIS)
details and results of participation in the
fine-grained propaganda detection shared task
2019. To address the tasks of sentence (SLC)
and fragment level (FLC) propaganda detec-
tion, we explore different neural architectures
(e.g., CNN, LSTM-CRF and BERT) and ex-
tract linguistic (e.g., part-of-speech, named en-
tity, readability, sentiment, emotion, etc.), lay-
out and topical features. Specifically, we have
designed multi-granularity and multi-tasking
neural architectures to jointly perform both the
sentence and fragment level propaganda de-
tection. Additionally, we investigate different
ensemble schemes such as majority-voting,
relax-voting, etc. to boost overall system per-
formance. Compared to the other participating
systems, our submissions are ranked 3rd and
4th in FLC and SLC tasks, respectively.
1 Introduction
In the age of information dissemination without
quality control, it has enabled malicious users to
spread misinformation via social media and aim
individual users with propaganda campaigns to
achieve political and financial gains as well as ad-
vance a specific agenda. Often disinformation is
complied in the two major forms: fake news and
propaganda, where they differ in the sense that the
propaganda is possibly built upon true information
(e.g., biased, loaded language, repetition, etc.).
Prior works (Rashkin et al., 2017; Habernal
et al., 2017; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019) in de-
tecting propaganda have focused primarily at doc-
ument level, typically labeling all articles from
a propagandistic news outlet as propaganda and
thus, often non-propagandistic articles from the
outlet are mislabeled. To this end, Da San Mar-
tino et al. (2019) focuses on analyzing the use of
propaganda and detecting specific propagandistic
techniques in news articles at sentence and frag-
ment level, respectively and thus, promotes ex-
plainable AI. For instance, the following text is a
propaganda of type ‘slogan’.
Trump tweeted: ‘‘BUILD THE WALL!”︸ ︷︷ ︸
slogan
Shared Task: This work addresses the two
tasks in propaganda detection (Da San Mar-
tino et al., 2019) of different granularities: (1)
Sentence-level Classification (SLC), a binary clas-
sification that predicts whether a sentence con-
tains at least one propaganda technique, and (2)
Fragment-level Classification (FLC), a token-level
(multi-label) classification that identifies both the
spans and the type of propaganda technique(s).
Contributions: (1) To address SLC, we de-
sign an ensemble of different classifiers based on
Logistic Regression, CNN and BERT, and lever-
age transfer learning benefits using the pre-trained
embeddings/models from FastText and BERT. We
also employed different features such as linguistic
(sentiment, readability, emotion, part-of-speech
and named entity tags, etc.), layout, topics, etc. (2)
To address FLC, we design a multi-task neural se-
quence tagger based on LSTM-CRF and linguistic
features to jointly detect propagandistic fragments
and its type. Moreover, we investigate perform-
ing FLC and SLC jointly in a multi-granularity
network based on LSTM-CRF and BERT. (3) Our
system (MIC-CIS) is ranked 3rd (out of 12 partic-
ipants) and 4th (out of 25 participants) in FLC and
SLC tasks, respectively.
2 System Description
2.1 Linguistic, Layout and Topical Features
Some of the propaganda techniques (Da San Mar-
tino et al., 2019) involve word and phrases that
express strong emotional implications, exaggera-
tion, minimization, doubt, national feeling, label-
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Category Feature Description
Linguistic
POS part-of-speech tags using NLTk toolkit
NER
named-entity tags using spacy toolkit, selected tags:
{PERSON, NORP, FAC, ORG, GPE, LOC, EVENT, WORK OF ART, LAW, LANGUAGE}
character analysis
count of question and exclamation marks in sentence
capital features for each word: first-char-capital, all-char-capital, etc.
readability readability and complexity scores using measures from textstat API
multi-meaning sum of meanings of a word (grouped by POS) or its synonym nest in the sentence using WordNet
sentiment
polarity (positive, negative, neural, compound) scores using spacy; subjectivity using TextBlob;
max pos: maximum of positive, max neg: max of negative scores of each word in the sentence
emotional Emotion features (sadness, joy, fear, disgust, and anger) using IBM Watson NLU API
loaded words list of specific words and phrases with strong emotional implications (positive or negative)
Layout sentence position
categorized as [FIRST, TOP, MIDDLE, BOTTOM, LAST], where, FIRST: 1st,
TOP: < 30%, Middle: between 30-70%, BOTTOM: > 70%, LAST: last sentence of document
sentence length (l) categorized as [= 2, 2 < l ≤ 4, 4 < l ≤ 8, 8 < l ≤ 20, 20 < l ≤ 40, 40 < l ≤ 60, l > 60]
Topical
topics
document-topic proportion using LDA, features derived using dominant topic (DT): [DT of current
sentence == DT of document, DT of current sentence == DT of the next and previous sentences]
Representation
word vector pre-trained word vectors from FastText (FastTextWordEmb) and BERT (BERTWordEmb)
sentence vector summing word vectors of the sentence to obtain FastTextSentEmb and BERTSentEmb
Decision relax-boundary (binary classification) Relax decision boundary and tag propaganda if prediction probability ≥ τ
Ensemble
majority-voting Propaganda if majority says propaganda. In conflict, take prediction of the model with highest F1
relax-voting Propaganda ifM∈ [20%, 30%, 40%] of models in the ensemble says propaganda.
Table 1: Features used in SLC and FLC tasks
ing , stereotyping, etc. This inspires1 us in extract-
ing different features (Table 1) including the com-
plexity of text, sentiment, emotion, lexical (POS,
NER, etc.), layout, etc. To further investigate, we
use topical features (e.g., document-topic propor-
tion) (Blei et al., 2003; Gupta et al., 2019a, 2018)
at sentence and document levels in order to deter-
mine irrelevant themes, if introduced to the issue
being discussed (e.g., Red Herring).
For word and sentence representations, we use
pre-trained vectors from FastText (Bojanowski
et al., 2017) and BERT (Devlin et al., 2019).
2.2 Sentence-level Propaganda Detection
Figure 1 (left) describes the three components of
our system for SLC task: features, classifiers and
ensemble. The arrows from features-to-classifier
indicate that we investigate linguistic, layout and
topical features in the two binary classifiers: Lo-
gisticRegression and CNN. For CNN, we fol-
low the architecture of Kim (2014) for sentence-
level classification, initializing the word vectors by
FastText or BERT. We concatenate features in the
last hidden layer before classification.
One of our strong classifiers includes BERT that
has achieved state-of-the-art performance on mul-
1some features from datasciencesociety.net/
detecting-propaganda-on-sentence-level/
tiple NLP benchmarks. Following Devlin et al.
(2019), we fine-tune BERT for binary classifica-
tion, initializing with a pre-trained model (i.e.,
BERT-base, Cased). Additionally, we apply a de-
cision function (Table 1) such that a sentence is
tagged as propaganda if prediction probability of
the classifier is greater than a threshold (τ ). We
relax the binary decision boundary to boost recall,
similar to Gupta et al. (2019b).
Ensemble of Logistic Regression, CNN and
BERT: In the final component, we collect pre-
dictions (i.e., propaganda label) for each sentence
from the three (M = 3) classifiers and thus, ob-
tain M number of predictions for each sentence.
We explore two ensemble strategies (Table 1):
majority-voting and relax-voting to boost preci-
sion and recall, respectively.
2.3 Fragment-level Propaganda Detection
Figure 1 (right) describes our system for FLC task,
where we design sequence taggers (Vu et al., 2016;
Gupta et al., 2016) in three modes: (1) LSTM-
CRF (Lample et al., 2016) with word embed-
dings (w e) and character embeddings c e, token-
level features (t f ) such as polarity, POS, NER,
etc. (2) LSTM-CRF+Multi-grain that jointly per-
forms FLC and SLC with FastTextWordEmb and
BERTSentEmb, respectively. Here, we add binary
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Figure 1: (Left): System description for SLC, including features, transfer learning using pre-trained word embed-
dings from FastText and BERT and classifiers: LogisticRegression, CNN and BERT fine-tuning. (Right): System
description for FLC, including multi-tasking LSTM-CRF architecture consisting of Propaganda Fragment Detec-
tion (PFD) and FLC layers. Observe, a binary classification component at the last hidden layer in the recurrent
architecture that jointly performs PFD, FLC and SLC tasks (i.e., multi-grained propaganda detection). Here, P:
Propaganda, NP: Non-propaganda, B/I/O: Begin, Intermediate and Other tags of BIO tagging scheme.
sentence classification loss to sequence tagging
weighted by a factor of α. (3) LSTM-CRF+Multi-
task that performs propagandistic span/fragment
detection (PFD) and FLC (fragment detection +
19-way classification).
Ensemble of Multi-grain, Multi-task LSTM-
CRF with BERT: Here, we build an ensemble
by considering propagandistic fragments (and its
type) from each of the sequence taggers. In doing
so, we first perform majority voting at the frag-
ment level for the fragment where their spans ex-
actly overlap. In case of non-overlapping frag-
ments, we consider all. However, when the spans
overlap (though with the same label), we consider
the fragment with the largest span.
3 Experiments and Evaluation
Data: While the SLC task is binary, the FLC con-
sists of 18 propaganda techniques (Da San Mar-
tino et al., 2019). We split (80-20%) the annotated
corpus into 5-folds and 3-folds for SLC and FLC
tasks, respectively. The development set of each
the folds is represented by dev (internal); however,
the un-annotated corpus used in leaderboard com-
parisons by dev (external). We remove empty and
single token sentences after tokenization.
Experimental Setup: We use PyTorch frame-
work for the pre-trained BERT model (Bert-base-
cased2), fine-tuned for SLC task. In the multi-
granularity loss, we set α = 0.1 for sentence clas-
sification based on dev (internal, fold1) scores. We
2github.com/ThilinaRajapakse/
pytorch-transformers-classification
Task: SLC (25 participants) Task: FLC (12 participants)
Team F1 / P / R Team F1 / P / R
ltuorp .6323 / .6028 / .6649 newspeak .2488 / .2863 / .2201
ProperGander .6256 / .5649 / .7009 Antiganda .2267 / .2882 / .1869
YMJA .6249 / .6253 / .6246 MIC-CIS .1999 / .2234 / .1808
MIC-CIS .6231 / .5736 / .6819 Stalin .1453 / .1921 / .1169
TeamOne .6183 / .5779 / .6649 TeamOne .1311 / .3235 / .0822
Table 2: Comparison of our system (MIC-CIS) with
top-5 participants: Scores on Test set for SLC and FLC
use BIO tagging scheme of NER in FLC task. For
CNN, we follow Kim (2014) with filter-sizes of [2,
3, 4, 5, 6], 128 filters and 16 batch-size. We com-
pute binary-F1and macro-F13 (Tsai et al., 2006) in
SLC and FLC, respectively on dev (internal). See
Table 5 for hyper-parameter settings for FLC task
using LSTM-CRF.
3.1 Results: Sentence-Level Propaganda
Table 3 shows the scores on dev (internal and ex-
ternal) for SLC task. Observe that the pre-trained
embeddings (FastText or BERT) outperform TF-
IDF vector representation. In row r2, we apply
logistic regression classifier with BERTSentEmb
that leads to improved scores over FastTextSen-
tEmb. Subsequently, we augment the sentence
vector with additional features that improves F1 on
dev (external), however not dev (internal). Next,
we initialize CNN by FastTextWordEmb or BERT-
WordEmb and augment the last hidden layer (be-
fore classification) with BERTSentEmb and fea-
ture vectors, leading to gains in F1 for both the dev
sets. Further, we fine-tune BERT and apply differ-
3evaluation measure with strict boundary detection
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Dev (internal), Fold1 Dev (external)
Features F1 / P / R F1 / P / R
r1 logisticReg + TF-IDF .569 / .542 / .598 .506 / .529 / .486
r2 logisticReg + FastTextSentEmb .606 / .544 / .685 .614 / .595 / .635
+ Linguistic .605 / .553 / .667 .613 / .593 / .633
+ Layout .600 / .550 / .661 .611 / .591 / .633
+ Topical .603 / .552 / .664 .612 / .592 / .633
r3 logisticReg + BERTSentEmb .614 / .560 / .679 .636 / .638 / .635
r4 + Linguistic, Layout, Topical .611 / .564 / .666 .643 / .641 / .644
r5 CNN + FastTextWordEmb .616 / .685 / .559 .563 / .655 / .494
r6 + BERTSentEmb .612 / .693 / .548 .568 / .673 / .491
r7 + Linguistic, Layout, Topical .648 / .630 / .668 .632 / .644 / .621
r8 CNN + BERTWordEmb .610 / .688 / .549 .544 / .667 / .459
r9 + Linguistic, Layout, Topical .616 / .671 / .570 .555 / .662 / .478
r10 BERT + Fine-tune (τ ≥ .50) .662 / .635 / .692 .639 / .653 / .625
r11 BERT + Fine-tune (τ ≥ .40) .664 / .625 / .708 .649 / .651 / .647
r12 BERT + Fine-tune (τ ≥ .35) .662 / .615 / .715 .650 / .647 / .654
Ensemble of (r3, r6, r12) within Fold1
r15 majority-voting |M| > 50% .666 / .663 / .671 .638 / .674 / .605
r16 relax-voting, |M| ≥ 30% .645 / .528 / .826 .676 / .592 / .788
Ensemble+ of (r3, r6, r12) from each Fold1-5, i.e., |M| = 15
r17 majority-voting |M| > 50% .666 / .683 / .649
r18 relax-voting, |M| ≥ 40% .670 / .646 / .696
r19 relax-voting, |M| ≥ 30% .673 / .619 / .737
r20 + postprocess (w=10, λ ≥ .99) .669 / .612 / .737
r21 + postprocess (w=10, λ ≥ .95) .671 / .612 / .741
Ensemble of (r4, r7, r12) within Fold1
r22 majority-voting |M| > 50% .669 / .641 / .699 .660 / .663 / .656
r23 relax-voting, |M| ≥ 30% .650 / .525 / .852 .674 / .584 / .797
Ensemble+ of (r4, r7, r12) from each Fold1-5, i.e., |M| = 15
r24 majority-voting |M| > 50% .658 / .671 / .645
r25 relax-voting, |M| ≥ 40% .673 / .644 / .705
r26 relax-voting, |M| ≥ 30% .679 / .622 / .747
r27 + postprocess (w=10, λ ≥ .99) .674 / .615 / .747
r28 + postprocess (w=10, λ ≥ .95) .676 / .615 / .751
Table 3: SLC: Scores on Dev (internal) of Fold1 and
Dev (external) using different classifiers and features.
ent thresholds in relaxing the decision boundary,
where τ ≥ 0.35 is found optimal.
We choose the three different models in the en-
semble: Logistic Regression, CNN and BERT on
fold1 and subsequently an ensemble+ of r3, r6
and r12 from each fold1-5 (i.e., 15 models) to
obtain predictions for dev (external). We investi-
gate different ensemble schemes (r17-r19), where
we observe that the relax-voting improves recall
and therefore, the higher F1 (i.e., 0.673). In post-
process step, we check for repetition propaganda
technique by computing cosine similarity between
the current sentence and its preceding w = 10
sentence vectors (i.e., BERTSentEmb) in the doc-
ument. If the cosine-similarity is greater than
λ ∈ {.99, .95}, then the current sentence is la-
beled as propaganda due to repetition. Comparing
Dev (internal), Fold1 Dev (external)
Features F1 / P / R F1 / P / R
(I) LSTM-CRF + FastTextWordEmb .153 / .228 / .115 .122 / .248 / .081
(II) + Polarity, POS, NER .158 / .292 / .102 .101 / .286 / .061
(III) + Multi-grain (SLC+FLC) .148 / .215 / .112 .119 / .200 / .085
(IV) + BERTSentEmb .152 / .264 / .106 .099 / .248 / .062
(V) + Multi-task (PFD) .144 / .187 / .117 .114 / .179 / .083
Ensemble of (II and IV) within Fold1
+ postprocess .116 / .221 / .076
Ensemble of (II and IV) within Fold2
+ postprocess .129 / .261 / .085
Ensemble of (II and IV) within Fold3
+ postprocess .133 / .220 / .095
Ensemble+ of (II and IV) from each Fold1-3, i.e., |M| = 6
+ postprocess .164 / .182 / .150
Table 4: FLC: Scores on Dev (internal) of Fold1 and
Dev (external) with different models, features and en-
sembles. PFD: Propaganda Fragment Detection.
r19 and r21, we observe a gain in recall, however
an overall decrease in F1 applying postprocess.
Finally, we use the configuration of r19 on the
test set. The ensemble+ of (r4, r7 r12) was ana-
lyzed after test submission. Table 2 (SLC) shows
that our submission is ranked at 4th position.
3.2 Results: Fragment-Level Propaganda
Table 4 shows the scores on dev (internal and ex-
ternal) for FLC task. Observe that the features
(i.e., polarity, POS and NER in row II) when intro-
duced in LSTM-CRF improves F1. We run multi-
grained LSTM-CRF without BERTSentEmb (i.e.,
row III) and with it (i.e., row IV), where the lat-
ter improves scores on dev (internal), however
not on dev (external). Finally, we perform multi-
tasking with another auxiliary task of PFD. Given
the scores on dev (internal and external) using dif-
ferent configurations (rows I-V), it is difficult to
infer the optimal configuration. Thus, we choose
the two best configurations (II and IV) on dev (in-
ternal) set and build an ensemble+ of predictions
(discussed in section 2.3), leading to a boost in re-
call and thus an improved F1 on dev (external).
Finally, we use the ensemble+ of (II and IV)
from each of the folds 1-3, i.e., |M| = 6 models
to obtain predictions on test. Table 2 (FLC) shows
that our submission is ranked at 3rd position.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
Our system (Team: MIC-CIS) explores differ-
ent neural architectures (CNN, BERT and LSTM-
CRF) with linguistic, layout and topical features
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Hyper-parameter Value
learning rate 0.005
character (char) dimension 25
hidden unit::char LSTM 25
POS dimensions 25
hidden unit::word LSTM 200∗, 100
word embeddings dimension 300
α 1.0, 0.1∗
Table 5: Hyper-parameter settings for FLC task. * de-
notes the optimal parameters.
to address the tasks of fine-grained propaganda
detection. We have demonstrated gains in per-
formance due to the features, ensemble schemes,
multi-tasking and multi-granularity architectures.
Compared to the other participating systems, our
submissions are ranked 3rd and 4th in FLC and
SLC tasks, respectively.
In future, we would like to enrich BERT models
with linguistic, layout and topical features during
their fine-tuning. Further, we would also be in-
terested in understanding and analyzing the neural
network learning, i.e., extracting salient fragments
(or key-phrases) in the sentence that generate pro-
paganda, similar to Gupta and Schu¨tze (2018) in
order to promote explainable AI.
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Abstract
This paper presents the CUNLP submission
for the NLP4IF 2019 shared-task on Fine-
Grained Propaganda Detection. Our system
finished 5th out of 26 teams on the sentence-
level classification task and 5th out of 11 teams
on the fragment-level classification task based
on our scores on the blind test set. We present
our models, a discussion of our ablation stud-
ies and experiments, and an analysis of our
performance on all eighteen propaganda tech-
niques present in the corpus of the shared task.
1 Introduction
Propaganda aims at influencing a target audience
with a specific group agenda using faulty reason-
ing and/or emotional appeals (Miller, 1939). Au-
tomatic detection of propaganda has been studied
mainly at the article level (Rashkin et al., 2017;
Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019). However, in order to
build computational models that can explain why
an article is propagandistic, the model would need
to detect specific techniques present at sentence or
even token level.
The NLP4IF shared task on fine-grained pro-
paganda detection aims to produce models capa-
ble of spotting propaganda techniques in sentences
and text fragments in news articles (Da San Mar-
tino et al., 2019a). The data for this task consist
of news articles that were labeled at the fragment
level with one of eighteen propaganda techniques.
There are two sub-tasks in this shared task. The
first one is a sentence classification task (SLC) to
detect whether a sentence has a propaganda frag-
ment or not. This binary classification task is eval-
uated based on the F1 score of the propaganda
class which approximately represents one-third of
the data. The second sub-task is a fragment level
classification (FLC) task, in which a system needs
to detect the type of propaganda technique ex-
pressed in a text fragment together with the be-
ginning and the end of that text fragment. This
task is evaluated based on the prediction of the
type of propaganda technique and the intersec-
tion between the gold and the predicted spans.
The details to the evaluation measure used for the
FLC task are explained in Da San Martino et al.
(2019a). Both sub-tasks were automatically eval-
uated on a unified development set. The system
performance was centrally assessed without dis-
tributing the gold labels, however allowing for an
unlimited number of submissions. The final per-
formance on the test set was similarly evaluated,
with the difference that the feedback was given
only after the submission was closed, simultane-
ously concluding the shared-task.
In this paper, we describe the data in Section 2,
our proposed methods for both sub-tasks in Sec-
tion 3, and analyze the results and errors of our
models in Section 4.
2 Data
The data for this shared task includes 350 articles
in the training set, 61 articles in the development
set, and 86 articles in the test set. The articles
were taken from 48 news outlets; 13 propagandis-
tic and 35 non-propagandistic as labeled by Me-
dia Bias/Fact Check1. These articles were anno-
tated at the fragment level where each annotator
was asked to tag the start and end of the propa-
ganda text span as well as the type of propaganda
technique. Table 1 lists all eighteen propaganda
techniques and their frequencies in the training
data. Since submissions to the development set
were closed after the release of the test set, we di-
vided the training set (350 articles) into a training
set of 280 articles and a local dev set of 70 articles
to continue to be able to perform ablation studies.
1https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
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Propaganda Technique Frequency
Loaded Language 2,115
Name Calling,Labeling 1,085
Repetition 571
Doubt 490
Exaggeration,Minimisation 479
Flag-Waving 240
Appeal to Fear/Prejudice 239
Causal Oversimplification 201
Slogans 136
Appeal to Authority 116
Black-and-White Fallacy 109
Thought-terminating Cliches 79
Whataboutism 57
Reductio ad hitlerum 54
Red Herring 33
Bandwagon 13
Straw Men 13
Obfuscation,Intentional Vagueness,Confusion 11
Total 6,041
Table 1: Frequency of all eighteen propaganda tech-
niques in the training data
We also conduct our error analysis on the local dev
set because we do not have access to the gold la-
bels of the official dev and test sets of the shared
task.
More details about the dataset and the anno-
tation scheme for the eighteen propaganda tech-
niques can be found in Da San Martino et al.
(2019b). However, the results on the shared task
data are not directly comparable as more articles
were added to shared task’s data. Da San Martino
et al. (2019a) should be referred to for an accurate
comparison between participants who all used the
same development and test sets.
3 Methods
In the following we explain the details of our ap-
proach for the SLC and FLC tasks.
3.1 Sentence Level Classification (SLC)
We fine-tuned BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) for
the binary sentence-level classification task of
propaganda vs. non-propaganda. The
training set has 16,298 sentences, out of which
4,720 are from the propaganda class. We used
bert-base-uncased in our experiments as in
preliminary results the cased version did not pro-
vide any improvements. The model was trained
for 3 epochs using a learning rate of 2e-5, a
maximum sequence length of 128, and a batch
size of 16. We also experiment with a Logistic
Regression Classifiers, where we used Linguistic
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) features (Pen-
nebaker et al., 2001), punctuation features such as
the existence of quotes or question marks, as well
as BERT’s prediction probabilities for each class.
This gave some minor improvement on the devel-
opment set of the shared-task. However, since we
did not have access to the development set submis-
sion after the test set was released, we chose the
final model based on the performance on the local
development set. The final model used the fine-
tuned BERT model mentioned above with a con-
dition to predict non-propaganda only if the
prediction probability is above 0.70 for the non-
propaganda class. Otherwise the prediction of the
sentence will be propaganda even if the ma-
jority of the prediction probability mass was for
the non-propaganda class. This was a way
to handle the unbalance in the training data with-
out having to discard part of the data. The 0.70
threshold was chosen after elaborate experiments
on both the local and the shared-task’s develop-
ment sets. This condition consistently provided an
improvement of around 5 points in F1 score of the
propaganda class on all experiments using differ-
ent sets of features as shown in Table 2.
3.2 Fragment Level Classification (FLC)
Our architecture for the sequence labeling task
builds on the flair framework (Akbik et al., 2018,
2019) that combines character level embeddings
with different kinds of word embeddings as input
to a BiLSTM-CRF model (Ma and Hovy, 2016;
Lample et al., 2016). Akbik et al. (2018) have
shown that stacking multiple pre-trained embed-
dings as input to the LSTM improves performance
on the downstream sequence labeling task. We
combine Glove embeddings (Pennington et al.,
2014) with Urban Dictionary2 embeddings3.
Due to the small-size of our data set we ad-
ditionally include one-hot-encoded features based
on dictionary look-ups from the UBY dictionary
provided by Gurevych et al. (2012). These fea-
tures are based on concepts associated with the
specific word such as offensive, vulgar, coarse,
or ethnic slur. In total, 30 concept features were
added as additional dimensions to the embedding
representations.
We also experimented with stacking BERT em-
beddings with all or some of the embeddings men-
tioned above. However, this resulted on lower
2https://www.urbandictionary.com/
3https://data.world/jaredfern/urban-dictionary-
embedding
99
scores on both the local and shared task devel-
opment sets. The best model used urban-glove
embeddings with concatenated one-hot encoded
UBY features stacked with both forward and back-
ward flair embeddings. The model was trained for
a maximum of 150 epochs with early stopping us-
ing a learning rate of 0.1, a batch size of 32, and a
BiLSTM with hidden size 256. The results of this
model are shown in Table 5.
4 Results and Error Analysis
In this section we discuss the results of both sub-
tasks on all three datasets: the local development
set, the shared task development and test sets.
4.1 SLC Results
In SLC, we ran multiple experiments using BERT
with and without additional features as shown in
Table 2. The features include using the text passed
as is to BERT without any preprocessing. Also,
we experimented with adding the context which
includes the two sentences that come before and
after the target sentence. Context sentences were
concatenated and passed as the second BERT in-
put, while the target sentence was passed as the
first BERT input. In addition, we experimented
with using BERT logits (i.e., the probability pre-
dictions per class) as features in a Logistic Re-
gression (LR) classifier concatenated with hand-
crafted features (e.g., LIWC, quotes, questions),
and with predictions of our FLC classifier (tagged
spans: whether the sentence has a propaganda
fragment or not). However, none of these features
added any statistically significant improvements.
Therefore, we used BERT predictions for our fi-
nal model with a condition to predict the major-
ity class non-propaganda only if its prediction
probability is more than 0.70 as shown in Table 3.
This is a modified threshold as opposed to 0.80 in
the experiments shown in Table 2 to avoid overfit-
ting on a one dataset. The final threshold of 0.70
was chosen after experiments on both the local and
shared task development sets, which also repre-
sents the ratio of the non-propaganda class in
the training set.
Discussion of Propaganda Types: To further
understand our model’s performance in the SLC
task, we looked at the accuracy of each pro-
paganda techniques that occur more than 20
times in the local dev set as shown in Table 4.
Development
Features Model P R F
text BERT 0.69 0.55 0.61
text BERT* 0.57 0.79 0.66
context BERT 0.70 0.53 0.60
context BERT* 0.63 0.67 0.65
BERT logits + handcrafted** LR 0.70 0.56 0.61
BERT logits + handcrafted** LR* 0.60 0.71 0.65
BERT logits + tagged spans LR 0.70 0.53 0.60
BERT logits + tagged spans LR* 0.61 0.71 0.66
BERT logits + all LR 0.71 0.52 0.60
BERT logits + all LR* 0.61 0.71 0.66
*Non-propaganda class is predicted only if its prediction
probability is > 0.80
**handcrafted features include LIWC and presence of
questions or quotes
Table 2: SLC experiments on different feature sets
Dataset P R F
Local Dev 0.60 0.75 0.67
Development 0.62 0.68 0.65
Test 0.58 0.66 0.618
*Non-propaganda class is predicted only if its prediction
probability is > 0.70
Table 3: SLC best model results on all three datasets
Repetition and Doubt are the two most chal-
lenging types for the classifier even though they
are in the four most frequent techniques. It is
expected for Repetition to be challenging as
the classifier only looks at one sentence while
Repetition occurs if a word (or more) is re-
peatedly mentioned in the article. Therefore, more
information needs to be given to the classifier such
as word counts across the document of all words
in a given sentence. Due to time constrains, we
did not test the effect of adding such features.
Doubt on the other hand could have been chal-
lenging due to its very wide lexical coverage and
variant sentence structure as doubt is expressed
in many different words and forms in this corpus
(e.g. “How is it possible the pope signed this de-
cree?” and “I’ve seen little that has changed”). It is
also among the types with high variance in length
where one span sometimes go across multiple sen-
tences.
4.2 FLC Results
In FLC, we only show the results of our best
model in Table 5 to focus more on the differ-
ences between propaganda techniques. A more
elaborate study of performance of different models
should follow in future work. The best model is a
BiLSTM-CRF with flair and urban glove embed-
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Technique Count Accuracy
Loaded Language 299 71%
Name Calling,Labeling 163 69%
Repetition 124 44%
Doubt 71 40%
Exaggeration,Minimisation 63 67%
Flag-Waving 35 74%
Appeal to Fear/Prejudice 42 52%
Causal Oversimplification 24 58%
Slogans 24 54%
Table 4: SLC accuracy on frequent propaganda tech-
niques in the local development set
dings with one hot encoded features as mentioned
in Section 3.2.
Discussion of Propaganda Types: As we can
see in Table 5, we can divide the propa-
ganda techniques into three groups according
to the model’s performance on the development
and test sets. The first group includes tech-
niques with non-zero F1 scores on both datasets:
Flag-Waving, Loaded Language, Name
Calling,Labeling and Slogans. This
group has techniques that appear frequently in the
data and/or techniques with strong lexical signals
(e.g. ”American People” in Flag-Waving) or
punctuation signals (e.g. quotes in Slogans).
The second group has the techniques with a non-
zero F1 score on only one of the datasets but not
the other, such as: Appeal to Authority,
Appeal to Fear, Doubt, Reduction, and
Exaggeration,Minimisation. Two out of
these five techniques (Appeal to Fear and
Doubt) have very small non-zero F1 on the de-
velopment set which indicates that they are gen-
erally challenging on our model and were only
tagged due to minor differences between the two
datasets. However, the remaining three types show
significant drops from development to test sets or
vice-versa. This requires further analysis to un-
derstand why the model was able to do well on
one dataset but get zero on the other dataset, which
we leave for future work. The third group has the
remaining nine techniques were our sequence tag-
ger fails to correctly tag any text span on either
dataset. This group has the most infrequent types
as well as types beyond the ability for our tag-
ger to spot by looking at the sentence only such
as Repetition.
Precision and Recall: Overall, our model has
the highest precision among all teams on both
datasets, which could be due to adding the UBY
Propaganda Development Test
Technique P R F F
Appeal to Authority 0 0 0 0.212
Appeal to Fear/Prejudice 0.285 0.006 0.011 0
Bandwagon 0 0 0 0
Black-and-White Fallacy 0 0 0 0
Causal Oversimplification 0 0 0 0
Doubt 0.007 0.001 0.002 0
Exaggeration,Minimisation 0.833 0.085 0.154 0
Flag-Waving 0.534 0.102 0.171 0.195
Loaded Language 0.471 0.160 0.237 0.130
Name Calling,Labeling 0.270 0.112 0.158 0.150
O,IV,C 0 0 0 0
Red Herring 0 0 0 0
Reductio ad hitlerum 0.318 0.069 0.113 0
Repetition 0 0 0 0
Slogans 0.221 0.034 0.059 0.003
Straw Men 0 0 0 0
Thought-terminating Cliches 0 0 0 0
Whataboutism 0 0 0 0
Overall 0.365 0.073 0.122 0.131∗
*Test set overall precision is 0.323 and recall is 0.082.
Precision and recall per technique were not provided for
the test set by the task organizers.
Table 5: Precision, recall and F1 scores of the FLC task
on the development and test sets of the shared task.
one-hot encoded features that highlighted some
strong signals for some propaganda types. This
also could be the reason for our model to have
the lowest recall among the top 7 teams on both
datasets as having explicit handcrafted signals suf-
fers from the usual sparseness that accompanies
these kinds of representations which could have
made the model more conservative in tagging text
spans.
4.3 Remarks from Both Tasks
In light of our results on both sub-tasks, we notice
that the BERT-based sentence classification model
is performing well on some propaganda types such
as Loaded Language and Flag-Waving. It
would be interesting to test in future work if using
BERT as a sequence tagger (and not BERT em-
beddings in a BiLSTM-CRF tagger like we tested)
would help in improving the sequence tagging re-
sults on those particular types. Finally, we noticed
two types of noise in the data; there were some du-
plicate articles, and in some articles the ads were
crawled as part of the article and tagged as non-
propaganda. These could have caused some errors
in predictions and therefore investigating ways to
further clean the data might be helpful.
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5 Conclusion
Propaganda still remains challenging to detect
with high precision at a fine-grained level. This
task provided an opportunity to develop compu-
tational models that can detect propaganda tech-
niques at sentence and fragment level. We pre-
sented our models for each sub-task and discussed
challenges and limitations. For some propaganda
techniques, it is not enough to only look at one
sentence to make an accurate prediction (e.g.
Repetition) and therefore including the whole
article as context is needed. For future work, we
want to experiment with using a BERT-based se-
quence tagger for the FLC task. In addition, we
want to analyze the relationships between pro-
paganda techniques to understand whether some
techniques share common traits, which could be
helpful for the classification and tagging tasks.
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Abstract 
On the NLP4IF 2019 sentence level 
propaganda classification task, we used a 
BERT language model that was pre-
trained on Wikipedia and BookCorpus as 
team ltuorp ranking #1 of 26. It uses deep 
learning in the form of an attention 
transformer. We substituted the final layer 
of the neural network to a linear real 
valued output neuron from a layer of 
softmaxes. The backpropagation trained 
the entire neural network and not just the 
last layer. Training took 3 epochs and on 
our computation resources this took 
approximately one day. The pre-trained 
model consisted of uncased words and 
there were 12-layers, 768-hidden neurons 
with 12-heads for a total of 110 million 
parameters. The articles used in the 
training data promote divisive language 
similar to state-actor-funded influence 
operations on social media. Twitter shows 
state-sponsored examples designed to 
maximize division occurring across 
political lines, ranging from “Obama calls 
me a clinger, Hillary calls me deplorable, 
… and Trump calls me an American” 
oriented to the political right, to Russian 
propaganda featuring “Black Lives 
Matter” material with suggestions of 
institutional racism in US police forces 
oriented to the political left. We hope that 
raising awareness through our work will 
reduce the polarizing dialogue for the 
betterment of nations. 
1 Introduction and Related Works 
A question can be posed “What is an influence 
operation also known as?” Our system was 
trained to answer these questions but in the form 
of a cloze comprehension test “_____ is an 
influence operation.” Likewise, Wikipedia and 
BookCorpus were used to develop an 
unsupervised language model built from the cloze 
questions by deleting 10% of the words from the 
corpora.  Then the model was fed forward and a 
softmax output selected the most appropriate 
word, if this word was correct no training was 
done, if it was incorrect then the  error was 
backpropagated through the network from the last 
layer’s neurons to the first layer’s word 
embeddings that were the inputs. Because an 
attention-based transformer can discern the 
difference between a river “bank” and a deposit 
“bank” depending on the context of the words, 
these word embeddings are considered dynamic. 
This contrasts with static word embeddings that 
were popularized by Mikolov et al. 2013, where 
bank has the same embedding regardless of 
context. Our model looks both to the left in the 
sentence and to the right and encodes the position 
of a word using a sinusoidal addition to the 
embeddings giving it awareness of the order of 
words. The model we based our approach on is 
called BERT by Google Research (Devlin et al. 
2018). We independently discovered the value of 
using BERT like in D. Giovanni, 2019. BERT has 
undergone many changes to become RoBERTa 
(Liu et al. 2019) from Facebook. BERT and its 
related works have remained close to state of the 
art on tasks such as SQuAD (Rajpurkar et al. 
2016). Although these results are less than a year 
old and nearly perform question answering better 
than humans, the superhuman level has been 
achieved recently in a very rapidly moving field. 
But it cannot be said this was unexpected given 
the results that IBM had when it bested the two 
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strongest Jeopardy Champions (Markoff, 2011) 
for a million-dollar prize nearly 8 years ago. 
2 Methodology  
Our approach was based upon a very recent state-
of-the-art release by Google Research (Github, 
2019), we worked in the Python programming 
language to preprocess the data, set parameters, 
train, validate and predict propaganda. To 
accelerate the pace of our feedback loop (data to 
predictions to metric of success) we used a 
train/test split of 80/20 on the first 10% of the 
training data. We trained for optimal F1 score and 
noted Matthew’s Correlation Coefficient, and 
ROC AUC for additional tuning. These values 
were optimized using a manual grid search for F1 
score while monitoring the other metrics. If one of 
the monitored metrics performed particularly 
poorly, then we chose a model with more 
competitive values for all the metrics. We began 
with a robust model of TF-IDF and Random 
Forest to establish a baseline around which we 
can experiment with several other models. In the 
end we found the unsupervised language model 
BERT to be most effective after supervised re-
training. 
 We will now discuss the parameters that we 
experimented with in our final model and chose 
according to performance on the validation set. 
The BERT parameter of sentence length was set 
to the first 50 words. If a sentence was longer than 
50 words, then the 51st and beyond were 
discarded. Our batch size during training was 32 
and 500 during prediction. Gradually increasing 
the training batch size usually improves 
performance. However, we were running at 
maximum memory on our computational 
resources and were unable to increase batch sizes. 
Our learning rate began at 1e-5 and gradually 
increased according to the default warm-up 
schedule. 
Attention is defined as: 
 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑄, 𝐾, 𝑉) = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥( 𝑄𝐾𝑇)𝑉  (1) 
 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑋) =
exp (𝑋)
∑ exp (𝑋)
 (2) 
Where softmax takes a vector X and Q, K, V are 
all embeddings of dimensionality 768. For a 
more detailed low-level understanding of 
attention see Vaswani et al. 2017. Because each 
time the neural network is initialized a new 
random number is used for the embeddings it is 
useful to ensemble attention neural networks for 
multi-head results. Each head gives a generally 
unique interpretation of the sentences. In our 
case we used 12 attention heads and 12 
transformer blocks. Attention gives a particularly 
interesting result, as it selects for words which 
have an additional significance when used 
together, effectively capturing the interaction 
and sending this signal through to the next layer. 
This interaction along with the position encoding 
give the transformer the ability to consider 
context. For more discussion of transformers see 
Devlin et al. 2018. The dataset used is described 
in D. Giovanni 2019. 
 
Figure 1 BERT-based attention transformer model 
with softmax layer substituted for a real valued 
neuron. 
3 Results 
On the development set we obtained two scores: 
one that was our internal 80/20 split on the 10% 
of the training data and the second that was based 
on the full set submissions to the webserver as 
team ltuorp. We selected the model parameters 
that were best for both. We found a threshold of 
0.3 to classify propaganda was most effective for 
higher F1 scores. The threshold was selected 
using a manual grid search. By using a threshold, 
we formulated the problem as a regression 
problem. During training 0 was non-propaganda 
and 1 was propaganda. Then predictions were 
taken on the validation data and run through the 
regression model. If the predicted value was less 
than 0.3 it was classified as non-propaganda if it 
was equal to or greater than 0.3 it was classified 
as propaganda. We believe by having multiple 
datasets we were able to develop a better model. 
These datasets are both the language model that 
encompasses all of Wikipedia and BookCorpus 
and the partitioned training data. Had time 
allowed we would have used yet another frame of 
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reference on the development set by performing 
10 fold cross validation or leave one out 
validation. 
A thought-provoking finding is that even though 
there are 18 categories of propaganda we were 
able to perform binary classification with a 
precision of 60.1, a recall of 66.5 and an F1 of 
63.2 indicating that most of the propaganda 
follows a repeatable pattern in language and does 
not require human level intelligence or the need to 
recognize complex patterns to discern whether or 
not a sentence is propaganda. The baseline is 
43.7, 38.8 and 49.4 respectively for comparison. 
The remaining 36.8 of F1 however would require 
a more complex model to classify. Because most 
propaganda follows a pattern it is possible to 
objectively and automatedly evaluate a publisher. 
For instance, news network X was found to have 
Y% more biased news than news network Z. 
Governments, critical readers, fact checking 
organizations, policy advisors, news companies, 
social media and internet companies can all make 
informed judgments based on the results of using 
these models. 
4 Discussion and Future Work 
The impact of our results cannot be overstated. 
Peer and near-peer competitors to the USA and 
allies spend money to influence US elections to a 
favorable outcome for the rival at the expense of 
US voters who potentially fail to secure a superior 
candidate. When analyzing home-grown 
propaganda, it is eerily similar, to the point of 
being indistinguishable from the foreign influence 
operations’ divisive language that was found on 
social media such as Twitter and Facebook ads 
such as those in Figure 1. (Persily, 2017 and 
Twitter Data Release, 2019 and House 
Intelligence Committee 2017).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Top Image) Russian propaganda using 
racially divisive content where 12,858 Rubles were 
spent. This is file P(1)0002156.pdf from the 2015-q2 
archive in the citation above. Blue ovals have been 
placed to protect identities. 126 million Americans 
were exposed to organic content based on 3,393 
Russian advertising campaigns. Any divisive topic was 
subject to use in these campaigns. (Bottom Image) 
Twitter based foreign information operations content. 
 
In future works it would be significant to find 
divisive content such as those used in the Russian 
state-sponsored campaigns. It is often more 
subtle, image based, social media based and not 
found in traditional news sources. Also, it is 
usually disguised as counter-dialogue. However, 
this work and model gives a baseline upon which 
we can improve, using techniques such as the 
following. 
We are very interested in the cloze question 
answering pre-training method that BERT uses. 
Perhaps in the future the model will be able to not 
penalize “good” answers. If there is a synonym 
that BERT predicts but it does not match the 
expected word, then it will train to reduce the 
probability of the acceptable but unexpected word 
occurring in that position. 
Another future contribution will be the ability to 
reason using common sense. For example, in the 
Winograd Schema a question can be posed: “The 
city councilmen refused the demonstrators a 
permit because they [feared/advocated] violence.” 
To answer the question the model must 
understand and have knowledge of the world and 
sentence structure to disambiguate the pronouns. 
It must also associate “councilmen refuse permit” 
as being incompatible with “councilmen fear”. 
While “councilmen refuse permit” is compatible 
with “protesters who advocate violence”. The best 
attempt only gets 70% accuracy on a default 
accuracy of 50%. (E. Davis 2019). This means 
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that future works will no doubt raise the level of 
performance on Winograd Schema, a measure of 
commonsense reasoning and therefore likely, also 
the sentence level propaganda detection task. 
5 Conclusion 
We demonstrated good performance on 
classifying propaganda by attaining first place of 
26 on the SLC task. It is our hope that the model 
and methods described in this paper will be used 
to create a more informed public that is resistant 
to divisive messages masked as counter-dialogue. 
One could conjecture that the motivation of 
foreign information operations is to sew discord 
and to reduce unity of a society’s populace. We 
remain politically neutral with a hope that divisive 
language is not used intentionally to polarize 
others and in cases of legitimate promotion of 
already divisive topics, that polarization can be 
functionally minimized as opposed to  
unintentionally creating further division of an 
audience while advancing politically charged  
causes such as healthcare or social security reform 
(Howard, 2018). It may not be apparent how this 
happens, but common devices identified in the 
FLC portion of this competition such as flag 
waving i.e. conflating the opposing viewpoint 
with being unpatriotic, etc. is one example of 
many possible. While some propaganda has an 
element of truth, it is up to the reader to discern 
that they are being targeted to promote the cause 
of an information operation that often has a 
conflicting motivation with the reader’s. 
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Abstract
Bias is ubiquitous in most online sources of
natural language, from news media to social
networks. Given the steady shift in news con-
sumption behavior from traditional outlets to
online sources, the automatic detection of pro-
paganda, in which information is shaped to
purposefully foster a predetermined agenda, is
an increasingly crucial task. To this goal, we
explore the task of sentence-level propaganda
detection, and experiment with both hand-
crafted features and learned dense semantic
representations. We also experiment with ran-
dom undersampling of the majority class (non-
propaganda) to curb the influence of class dis-
tribution on the system’s performance, lead-
ing to marked improvements on the minority
class (propaganda). Our best performing sys-
tem uses pre-trained ELMo word embeddings,
followed by a bidirectional LSTM and an at-
tention layer. We have submitted a 5-model
ensemble of our best performing system to the
NLP4IF shared task on sentence-level propa-
ganda detection (team LIACC), achieving rank
10 among 25 participants, with 59.5 F1-score.
1 Introduction
Propaganda shapes information in order to pur-
posefully influence people’s mindset and advance
a predetermined agenda. The NLP4IF shared task
on propaganda detection challenged participants
to build systems capable of sentence-level (SLC)
or fragment-level (FLC) detection of propagandis-
tic texts (Da San Martino et al., 2019). We have
participated on the SLC track, hence this will be
the focus of this paper.
The rise of fake (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017),
hyperpartisan (Silverman et al., 2016), and propa-
gandistic news on social media and online news
outlets calls for improved automatic detection of
bias in texts. However, any and all attempts at au-
tomated regulation of online content have freedom
of speech implications, and risk unintended cen-
sorship (Akdeniz, 2010). Mindful of these con-
siderations, we experiment with a set of hand-
crafted and interpretable stylometric features, to-
gether with a model based on Gradient Boosted
Trees (Drucker and Cortes, 1996), thus facilitating
inspection of what it is that the model has learned.
In addition, aiming for a better performance to
the detriment of the model’s interpretability, we
experiment with deep neural networks, supplied
with word embeddings learned on large external
corpora, as this combination is the state-of-the-
art for several natural language processing (NLP)
tasks (Peters et al., 2018; Devlin et al., 2018; Ak-
bik et al., 2019). Nonetheless, some degree of in-
terpretability is maintained through the use of at-
tention layers (Bahdanau et al., 2014), enabling in-
spection of which time-steps (words) the model is
considering when making a prediction.
The provided train dataset consists of 350 arti-
cles, with a total of 16,965 sentences — 4,720 of
which are labeled propaganda, and the remaining
12,245 labeled as non-propaganda. This class im-
balance leads supervised learning models to favor
predicting the majority class (non-propaganda),
severely impacting performance on the minority
class (Japkowicz and Stephen, 2002). In order to
tackle this problem, we train all systems on a bal-
anced version of the provided dataset, by means
of random undersampling of the majority class, as
this technique has been shown to have good results
on several NLP tasks (Japkowicz and Stephen,
2002; Prusa et al., 2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes data pre-processing and fea-
ture selection, and details all tested models and
their architectures. Section 3 analyzes our models’
performance, analyzes attention-weight plots, and
discusses results. Finally, Section 4 draws conclu-
sions and sketches future work.
107
2 System Description
We propose an approach based on a selection
of handcrafted features paired with a Gradient
Boosted Trees (GBT) model, as well as an ap-
proach based on learned dense semantic repre-
sentations (word embeddings) paired with differ-
ent deep-learning models. This Section describes
the data pre-processing and feature selection, the
choice of word embeddings, and the tested models
and their hyperparameters.
2.1 Data Pre-processing
We tokenize sentences into words using
Spacy (Honnibal and Montani, 2017). We
standardize quotation marks (left and right, single
and double), as well as single grave and acute
accents, as all these characters may be represented
by different unicode characters while portraying
the same meaning.
2.2 Feature Selection
We use a small set of linguistically-inspired style
and complexity features, already proven to have
good performance on a similar bias-detection task
– hyperpartisan news detection (Cruz et al., 2019).
Some of the features portray the article in which
each sentence is incorporated, while others portray
the sentence itself. Our features are as follow:
• num sentences: total number of sentences in
the article;
• avg sent char len: average character-length
of article’s sentences;
• var sent char len: variance of character-
length of the article’s sentences;
• actual sent char len: character-length of
current sentence;
• avg word len: average of character-length of
this sentence’s words;
• var word len: variance of character-length of
this sentence’s words;
• punct freq: this sentence’s punctuation fre-
quency;
• capital freq: this sentence’s capital-case fre-
quency;
• type-token-ratio over lemmatized words —
a measure of vocabulary diversity and rich-
ness (Johnson, 1944).
• TF-IDF (Robertson, 2004) vector for the 50
most frequent unigrams and bi-grams, whose
document frequency does not exceed 95%.
2.3 Contextualized Word Representations
Deep-learning models proposed in this paper are
supplied with dense word representations, gen-
erated from the pre-trained ELMo model (Pe-
ters et al., 2018). We use the Flair library (Ak-
bik et al., 2019) to generate contextualized
3072-dimensional representations for each input
word (concatenation of outputs from three 1024-
dimensional layers). These embeddings are a
function not only of the word itself but also of its
context, enabling word disambiguation into differ-
ent semantic representations.
We crop sentences to a maximum of 50 words,
as a compromise between the representation’s ex-
pressiveness and its computational cost (affect-
ing only 3.7% of longer samples, see Figure 1).
Shorter sentences are padded out with zeros.
Figure 1: Distribution of sentence length.
2.4 Models & Architectures
As mentioned, we pair the data from handcrafted
features with a Gradient Boosted Trees (GBT)
model (Drucker and Cortes, 1996). Table 1
shows all hyperparameter values set for the GBT
model. These values are the result of extensive
grid searching, optimizing for F1-score (the task’s
official metric), and selecting the best performing
model on 5-fold cross-validated results.
Additionally, we devise two deep-learning mod-
els to pair with word embedding representations.
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estimators 100
learning-rate 0.1
loss exponential
max. tree depth 10
min. samples at leaf 10
min. samples to split 2
Table 1: Hyperparameter values for GBT.
The BiLSTM model consists of a bidirectional
long short-term memory layer (Gers et al., 2000).
The last hidden time-step, concatenated from both
directions, is then passed through a final fully
connected layer followed by a sigmoid activation
function. The ABL (Attention-based Bidirectional
LSTM) model is similar to the BiLSTM model,
with an added attention layer (Bahdanau et al.,
2014) operating over the hidden LSTM represen-
tations. Figure 2 shows this model’s architecture.
We use 40% dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014) on
the initial embeddings, and 20% dropout on all re-
maining hidden-layers. All LSTM layers use 50
as the number of features of the hidden state.
For training, we use the Adam opti-
mizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014) with default
parameters, and Binary Cross-Entropy as the
loss function. The batch size was set to 16,
and training was stopped after 25 epochs, with
early stopping upon 5 consecutive non-improving
epochs on validation loss.
Deep-learning models were implemented using
PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017), and GBT using
scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011).
3 Results and Discussion
Table 2 shows the results of all models over 5-
fold cross-validation on the provided SLC training
data. The top rows correspond to systems trained
on a balanced version of the provided dataset, by
means of random undersampling of the majority
class (Japkowicz and Stephen, 2002), as an at-
tempt to tackle the class imbalance on the origi-
nal dataset (only 27.8% of which corresponds to
propaganda sentences).
On the balanced dataset, the ABL model is the
best-performing on both F1-score (official task
metric) and accuracy, while BiLSTM achieved the
best F1-score on the original data. GBT has a
surprisingly inferior F1-score on the original data
(32.6 points vs 53.0 points on the F1-metric for
BiLSTM), but suffers the largest boost when com-
Model F1 P R A
ABL Balanced 75.0 71.9 78.5 73.9
BiLSTM Balanced 74.7 69.5 80.7 72.6
GBT Balanced 67.7 65.8 69.6 66.7
BiLSTM 53.0 60.7 48.3 76.5
ABL 52.1 62.6 46.0 77.0
GBT 32.6 38.0 28.7 67.1
Table 2: Propaganda detection performance over 5-fold
cross-validation. Models are ordered by decreasing F1-
score (the task’s official metric).
Model F1 P R
Best (team ltuorp) 63.2 60.3 66.5
Ours (ABL-Balanced-Ens) 59.5 50.9 71.6
Table 3: Official results for propaganda detection task
(on withheld test data).
pared with its training on the balanced data (67.7
F1-score). Nonetheless, models based on word
embeddings (BiLSTM & ABL) perform far better
than those based on a handcrafted selection of fea-
tures (GBT). This is expected, as n-grams fail to
encode the text as a sequence, and fail to carry the
meaning and relations between each word, which
are known to be encoded in word embeddings (Pe-
ters et al., 2018).
Regarding the effectiveness of training on a bal-
anced dataset, all systems saw dramatically in-
creased performance on metrics relative to the pos-
itive class (labeled propaganda), accompanied by
small decreases of overall accuracy. This is ex-
pected, as we are effectively depriving the model
of useful samples from the majority class (la-
beled non-propaganda), but remarkably beneficial
as can be seen by the improved F1-scores.
Our submission to the task was a 5-member
ABL ensemble (ABL-Balanced-Ens), from 5
cross-validation iterations, trained on the balanced
data. This system’s predictions were the aver-
age of each model’s independent prediction. This
follows numerous works demonstrating consistent
performance improvements when using ensembles
of deep-learning classifiers (Peters et al., 2018).
Table 3 presents ours results on the official test
data. Our system achieved 59.5 F1-score, ranking
10th among 25 participants, but lagging only 3.7
F1 points behind the best-performing system.
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Figure 2: Visualization of ABL (bidirectional LSTM with attention).
3.1 Analyzing Attention Weights
Although the predictions of deep learning models
are notoriously opaque, the attention layer present
in ABL renders some degree of interpretability
possible. By analyzing the attention energy asso-
ciated with each word, we can intuitively extract
conclusions regarding which parts of a sentence a
model is taking into consideration.
Figure 3 shows a plot of attention energies
over a sample article. The model seems to track
writing style mostly through verb conjugations
(e.g. ‘needs’, ‘given’, ‘unprecedented’), as well
as words with strong connotation which often por-
tray the writer’s opinion (e.g. ‘wretched deals’,
‘machination’, ‘horrify’).
From the sentences shown in Figure 3, the
model incorrectly classifies the 4th and 5th sen-
tences as non-propaganda (marked •), although
with markedly low confidence (8% and 18% re-
spectively). All remaining sentences are cor-
rectly classified. Through inspection of several
attention-plots, intuitively, the model seems to pay
close attention to a single opinion-inducing word
when classifying a sentence as propaganda, while
featuring a broader spread of attention weights
when classifying a sentence as non-propaganda.
The latter happens for both the 4th and 5th sen-
tences.
• He needs medical attention, the kind of treatment you getonly in a hospital.
•
But it has been made clear to him that if he attempts to go
to a hospital he will not be given free passage and he will
be arrested.
+ His treatment amounts to the most unprecedentedpersecution.
•
Julian could leave the embassy if his own government, the
government of his homeland, Australia, applied legitimate
diplomatic pressure on behalf of its citizen.
• We must ask ourselves why this hasn’t happened.
+ But that might be one of the so-called“wretched deals”that are being offered Assange.
• Some very strange things are being said by seniormembers of these two governments.
+
The new foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, Jeremy
Hunt, said sarcastically that the British police would offer
Julian“a warm welcome” when he came out, when he
would face serious charges.
• Was Hunt referring to a deal which has already been donewith the United States on extradition?
+ But this is the milieu of machination around someone whohas the right of natural justice concerning his freedom.
+
Putting aside freedom of speech, the persecution of
this man has been something that should horrify all
free-thinking people.
Figure 3: Plots of attention-weights. Sentences are
marked with + if predicted to be propaganda, and
• otherwise. Symbol is colored red if prediction is
wrong.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
We experimented with several models for
sentence-level propaganda detection, exploring
both handcrafted features and word embeddings.
As expected, deep learning models improve
performance to the detriment of feature inter-
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pretability. The best performing model is based
on a bidirectional LSTM followed by an attention
layer. We have submitted a 5-member ensemble of
this model to the NLP4IF shared task, achieving
59.5 F1-score on the official test data, and ranking
10th among 25 participants.
Additionally, we have experimented with ran-
dom undersampling to tackle the class imbalance
on the provided training data. This lead to dra-
matic performance improvements on all models
for metrics related to the minority class, accom-
panied by a small decrease in accuracy.
For future work, we intend to explore the in-
tegration of handcrafted features with word em-
beddings, to improve both model performance and
transparency. We also intend to experiment with
ensembles of independent classifiers, from inde-
pendent feature-sets, in order to capture different
facets of this complex problem.
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Abstract
The internet and the high use of social me-
dia have enabled the modern-day journalism
to publish, share and spread news that is diffi-
cult to distinguish if it is true or fake. Defining
“fake news” is not well established yet, how-
ever, it can be categorized under several labels:
false, biased, or framed to mislead the readers
that are characterized as propaganda. Digital
content production technologies with logical
fallacies and emotional language can be used
as propaganda techniques to gain more read-
ers or mislead the audience. Recently, several
researchers have proposed deep learning (DL)
models to address this issue. This research pa-
per provides an ensemble deep learning model
using BiLSTM, XGBoost, and BERT to detect
propaganda. The proposed model has been ap-
plied on the dataset provided by the challenge
NLP4IF 2019, Task 1 Sentence Level Classifi-
cation (SLC) and it shows a significant perfor-
mance over the baseline model.
1 Introduction
The spread of news has been transformed from tra-
ditional news distributors to social media feeds.
However, content on social media is not properly
monitored (Granik and Mesyura, 2017). It is diffi-
cult to distinguish trusted, credible news from un-
trustworthy news. This has raised questions about
the quality of journalism and enabled the term
“fake news”. Identifying an article as fake news
relies on the degree of falsity and intentionality of
spreading the news. There are various types of
fake or misleading news, such as publishing in-
accurate news to reach a wide audience, publish-
ing untruths with the intention to harm a person
or organization, or publishing false news without
checking all the facts. News with propaganda are
called Propagandistic news articles, that are inten-
tionally spread to mislead readers and influence
their minds with a certain idea, for political, ideo-
logical, or business motivations (Tandoc Jr et al.,
2018; Brennen, 2017).
Detecting fake news and propaganda is getting
more attention recently (Jain and Kasbe, 2018;
Helmstetter and Paulheim, 2018; Bourgonje et al.,
2017), however, the limited resources and corpora
is considered the biggest challenge for researchers
in this field. In this work, we use the corpus pro-
vided by the shared task on fine-grained propa-
ganda detection (NLP4IF 2019) (Da San Martino
et al., 2019). The corpus consists of news arti-
cles in which the sentences are labeled as propa-
gandistic or not. The goal of the challenge is to
build automatic tools to detect propaganda. Know-
ing that deep learning is outperforming traditional
machine learning techniques, we have proposed
an ensemble deep learning model using BiLSTM,
XGBoost, and BERT to address this challenge.
Our proposed model shows a significant perfor-
mance F1-score (0.6112) over the baseline model
(0.4347). The key novelty of our work is using
word embeddings and a unique set of semantic
features, in a fully connected neural network ar-
chitecture to determine the existence of propagan-
distic news in the article.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the
existing work in detecting fake news and propa-
ganda. Section 3 provides a dataset description
and the extracted features. Section 4 proposes the
system architecture to determine the presence of
propaganda in an article. Section 5 presents the
evaluations and results. Finally, section 6 con-
cludes with future directions for this research.
2 Related Work
Fake news and propaganda are hard challenges
that face society and individuals. Detecting fake
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news and propaganda is increasingly motivat-
ing researchers (Jain and Kasbe, 2018; Helm-
stetter and Paulheim, 2018; Aphiwongsophon
and Chongstitvatana, 2018; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al.,
2019; Orlov and Litvak, 2018). The researchers in
Jain and Kasbe (2018) proposed an approach for
fake news detection using Naive Bayes classifier,
where they applied the model on Facebook posts.
The dataset was produced by GitHub that con-
tains 6335 training samples. The results showed
that using Naive Bayes classifier with n-gram is
better than not using n-gram. Gilda (2017) ex-
plored Support Vector Machines, Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent, Gradient Boosting, Bounded De-
cision Trees, and Random Forests to detect fake
news. Their dataset was acquired from signal me-
dia and a list of sources from OpenSources.co, to
predict whether the articles are truthful or fake.
In Helmstetter and Paulheim (2018), the re-
searchers modeled the fake news problem as
a two-class classification problem and their ap-
proach was a fake news detection system for Twit-
ter using a weakly supervised approach. Naive
Bayes, Decision Trees, Support Vector Machines
(SVM), and Neural Networks had been used as ba-
sic classifiers with two ensemble methods, Ran-
dom Forest and XG Boost, using parameter op-
timization on all of those approaches. In ad-
dition, the researchers in (Aphiwongsophon and
Chongstitvatana, 2018) proposed a fake news de-
tection model using Naive Bayes, Neural Network
and SVM. The dataset collected by their team us-
ing TwitterAPI for a specified period between Oc-
tober 2017 to November 2017. The authors in
(Bourgonje et al., 2017; Chaudhry et al., 2017)
provided a platform to detect the stance of article
titles based on their content on Fake News Chal-
lenge (FNC-1) dataset1.
For identifying propagandistic news articles and
reducing the impact of propaganda to the audi-
ence, (Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019) provided the
rst publicly available propaganda detection system
called proppy, which is a real-world and real-time
monitoring system to unmask propagandistic arti-
cles in online news. The system consists of four
modules, which are article retrieval, event identi-
cation, deduplication and propaganda index com-
putation. Moreover, (Gavrilenko et al., 2019) ap-
plied several neural network architectures such as
Long Short-Term Memory(LSTM), hierarchical
1http://www.fakenewschallenge.org
bidirectional LSTM (H-LSTM) and Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) in order to classify the
text into propaganda and non-propaganda. They
have used different word representation models in-
cluding word2vec, GloVe and TF-IDF (Penning-
ton et al., 2014; Mikolov et al., 2013). The results
showed that CNN with word2vec representation
outperforms other models with accuracy equal to
88.2%. (Orlov and Litvak, 2018) provided an
unsupervised approach for automatic identifica-
tion of propagandists on Twitter using behavioral
and text analysis of users accounts. Their pro-
posed approach was applied on dataset that was re-
trieved from Twitter and collected using the Twit-
ter stream API. Seven suspicious accounts were
detected by the approach and it achieved 100%
precision.
In contrast to these prior works reviewed, our
work is different as we have investigated sev-
eral Neural Network approaches to determine the
most appropriate model for detecting propagandis-
tic sentences in news article. We test the hypothe-
sis that propagandistic news articles would contain
emotional and affective words to a greater extent
than other news articles.
3 Dataset and Extracted Features
The provided dataset for the NLP4IF 2019 Task 1
is described in (Da San Martino et al., 2019). The
corpus consists of 350 articles for training and 61
articles for development for a total of 411 articles
in plain text format. The title is followed by an
empty row and the content of the article starting
from the next row, one sentence per line. There are
16975 sentences in the training data, where 12244
are non-propaganda and 4721 are propaganda.
3.1 Data preprocessing
In our model, text preprocessing has been per-
formed for each sentence of training and devel-
opment set that includes: removing punctuation,
cleaning text from special symbols, removing stop
words, clean contractions, and correct some mis-
spelled words.
3.2 Features
In our approach, we have 449 dimensions for
our extracted features that are obtained as the
following: Each line of text is represented as
a 300-dimensional vector using the pretrained
Glove embedding model (Pennington et al., 2014).
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Figure 1: The architecture of our approach
It is worth mentioning that we have also ex-
perimented word2vec embedding model that is
trained on Google News (Mikolov et al., 2013)
but the results were not promising. Our hypoth-
esis is that emotional and affective words will
characterize fake news more strongly than neutral
words. Accordingly, each line of text is repre-
sented as 149-dimensional vector by concatenat-
ing three vectors obtained from AffectiveTweets
Weka-package (Mohammad and Bravo-Marquez,
2017; Bravo-Marquez et al., 2014), 43 features
were extracted using the lexical resources; two-
dimensional vector using the sentiments strength
feature from the same package, and the final 100-
dimensional vector is obtained by vectorizing the
text into embeddings (c.f. Table 1).
Features dimension
Glove 300
TweetToEmbeddings 100
TweetToInputLeixicon 4
TweetToLexicon 43
TweetToSentiStrength 2
Table 1: Features used in our approach
4 Our Approach
The architecture of our system consists of four
sub-models: BiLSTM sub-model, XGBoost sub-
model, BERT Cased and UnCased model (Figure
1). The description of these sub-models are in
the following subsections, we have combined the
Cased and UnCased Bert model in one subsection.
4.1 BiLSTM
In this sub-model, we have used use the Bidi-
rectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM)
(Schuster and Paliwal, 1997). The architecture of
this sub-model as shown in Figure 2. There are
two inputs that are feeding two different network
architectures.
The first input is the encoded sentence to em-
bedding layers, which is a lookup table that con-
sists of 300-dimensional pretrained Glove vec-
tor to represent each word. This input goes into
two BiLSTM layers each with 256 nodes and 0.2
dropout to avoid overfitting. Then, the output from
BiLSTM layer is concatenated with Global Max
Pooling and Global Average Pooling.
The second input is extracted using Affec-
tiveTweets package as described earlier. The 145-
dimensional vector feeds a fully connected neu-
ral network with four dense hidden layers of 512,
256, 128, 64 neurons, respectively. We found that
the best activation function is ReLU (Goodfellow
et al., 2013). A dropout of 0.2 has been added
to avoid overfitting. After that we feed it into the
previous concatenation layer. A fully connected
neural network with four dense hidden layers of
512, 256, 128, 64 neurons for each layer has been
applied after the concatenation layer. The activa-
tion function for each layer is ReLU, and between
them there is a 0.2 dropout.
The output layer consists of 1-sigmoid neuron
to predict the class of the sentence. For optimiza-
tion, we have used Adam optimizer (Kingma and
Ba, 2014) with 0.0001 learning rate and binary
cross-entropy as a loss function. We have saved
the output prediction weights to predict the testing
datasets. The fit function uses number of epochs=
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Figure 2: The architecture of BiLSTM sub-model
Features StopWord Cased F1 Precision Recall
Glove + AffectiveTweets With Yes 0.564600 0.630000 0.511502
Glove + AffectiveTweets With No 0.550273 0.648897 0.477673
Table 2: BiLSTM result on development data set
100, batch size= 512, validation split= 33% (See
Table 2).
4.2 XGBoost
XGBoost (Chen and Guestrin, 2016) is a decision-
tree ensemble machine learning algorithm that
uses gradient boosting framework. It relies on
an iterative method where new models are trained
to correct previous model errors. Moreover, it is
an optimized implementation of Gradient Boost-
ing Decision Tree (GBDT) that provides a highly-
efficient and parallel tree boosting. XGBoost has
many hyperparameters that need tweaking. So, we
have used Grid search to find the best values for
the parameters. Also, we have chosen binary lo-
gistic as there are only two classes. Table 3 sum-
marizes XGBoost hyperparameters. It is worth
mentioning that we have handled the word embed-
ding by summing words vectors in one sentence
and feed it into XGBoost, see Table 4.
Hyperparameter Value
Number of trees (n estimators) 1200
Learning Rate 0.1
Max Depth 3
Objective binary:logistic
gamma 0.5
subsample 0.8
Table 3: XGBoost Hyperparameter
4.3 BERT
Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT) (Devlin et al., 2018) is con-
sidered a new pretrained representations which
obtains state-of-the-art results on wide variety
of natural language processing tasks. BERT has
many hyperparameters that need tweaking and
after several experiments we adjust the best values
for our model. There are two types of pretrained
models, BERT-Base and BERT Large (we adopted
the base model as it needs less memory). In each
type, there are 5 pretrained models, however,
we have used Uncased, Cased and Multilingual-
Cased. We have noticed that using Uncased and
Cased models with ensembling between them
gives the best results (Table 5).
5 Results and Evaluation
One of the key findings is noticing that BERT
model gives better prediction than the other mod-
els, which indicates that BERT can understand the
text better than the other models.
In our experiments, we tried several combina-
tions between sub-models. Using the predictions
from the BiLSTM and XGBoost models for the
development and test datasets, we noticed that
the best results are performed with giving BiL-
STM sub-model a weight of 0.8 and XGBoost sub-
model a weight of 0.2. Combining both results
with argmax the predictions to produce a partial
result. Regarding the BERT cased and Uncased
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Features StopWord Cased F1 Precision Recall
Glove (Common Crawl) With Yes 0.501667 0.652928 0.407307
Glove (Wiki-300) With No 0.498328 0.652079 0.403248
Glove+AffectiveTweets (Common Crawl) With Yes 0.479932 0.650463 0.380244
Glove+AffectiveTweets (Wiki-300) With No 0.480269 0.632743 0.387009
Table 4: XGBoost results on development dataset
Type seq length batch size lr epochs StopWord F1 Precision Recall
Cased 400 4 1e-5 3 With 0.590288 0.671848 0.526387
Cased 150 8 1e-5 3 With 0.600304 0.684575 0.534506
Cased 150 8 1e-5 3 Without 0.563694 0.684720 0.479026
Uncased 400 4 1e-5 3 With 0.622781 0.686786 0.569689
Uncased 150 4 1e-5 3 With 0.573405 0.663701 0.504736
Uncased 150 4 1e-5 3 Without 0.570533 0.677840 0.492558
Table 5: BERT result on development dataset
F1 Precision Recall
BERT (Cased) + BERT (Uncased) 0.654671 0.669972 0.640054
BERT (Cased) + BERT (Uncased) + BiLSTM 0.665897 0.580483 0.780785
BERT (Cased) + BERT (Uncased) + BiLSTM (.8) + XGBoost (.2) 0.674534 0.623421 0.734777
BERT (Uncased) + BiLSTM (.5) + XGBoost (.5) 0.641975 0.650904 0.633288
BERT (Uncased) + BiLSTM (.8) + XGBoost (.2) 0.646542 0.543860 0.797023
BERT (Uncased) + BiLSTM 0.633787 0.545366 0.756428
Table 6: Ensembling result on development dataset
result, we have combined both of them together by
checking if the 4 models predict that the sentence
is non-propaganda then it will be labeled as non-
propaganda, otherwise it will be labeled as Propa-
ganda. Table 6 illustrates the best F1 score on the
prediction.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated several models
and techniques to detect if a sentence in an article
is propaganda or not. Experimental results showed
that the ensemble of using BiLSTM, XGBoost,
and BERT has achieved the best results. Also,
the process of analyzing and extracting features,
such as AffectiveTweets, has a major role in im-
proving the BiLSTM model. The evaluations are
performed using the dataset provided by NLP4IF
Shared task. The proposed model has been ranked
the seventh place among 26 teams. The F1-score
that is achieved by our model is 0.6112 which out-
performed the baseline model (0.4347) and it is
(0.02) away from the first team. We strongly be-
lieve that the use of affectivetweets and the lexical
features serve well to distinguish between propa-
ganda vs. non-propaganda news.
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Abstract
Various propaganda techniques are used to
manipulate peoples perspectives in order to
foster a predetermined agenda such as by the
use of logical fallacies or appealing to the
emotions of the audience. In this paper, we
develop a Logistic Regression-based tool that
automatically classifies whether a sentence is
propagandistic or not. We utilize features like
TF-IDF, BERT vector, sentence length, read-
ability grade level, emotion feature, LIWC
feature and emphatic content feature to help us
differentiate these two categories. The linguis-
tic and semantic features combination results
in 66.16% of F1 score, which outperforms the
baseline hugely.
1 Introduction
Attributes of social media communication make it
challenging for a user to interpret someones com-
ment and to examine the truthfulness of the infor-
mation. For example, a social media message can
be anonymous, from real people, or automatically
generated, making it difficult to identify its source.
Because of this challenge to interpret and evalu-
ate a social media message, social media users are
found to be persuaded by views that have no fac-
tual basis (Guo et al., 2018). They are influenced
by misinformation and disinformation.
Various definitions are given in the lit-
erature to explain what propaganda is
(for a list of such definitions, please see:
https://publish.illinois.edu/
mirasotirovic/whatispropaganda).
Focusing on the techniques in propaganda, we
adopt Elluls definition that propaganda is “A set
of methods employed by an organized group that
wants to bring about the active or passive par-
ticipation in its actions of a mass of individuals,
psychologically unified through psychological
manipulation and incorporated in an organization”
(Ellul, 1966). People use propaganda techniques
to purposely shape information and foster prede-
termined agenda (Miller, 1939; Weston, 2018).
With the fast and wide spread of online news
articles, it is much desired to have computing
technologies that automatically detect propaganda
in these texts.
This study presents our approach to a shared
task that is aimed at detecting whether an given
sentence from a news article is propagandistic.
The shared tasks are part of 2019 Workshop on
NLP4IF: censorship, disinformation, and propa-
ganda , co-located with the EMNLP-IJCNLP con-
ference. We focused on one of the task, which is
referred to as SLC (Sentence- level Classification).
In our approach, we came up with various features
and classified the sentences using Logistic Regres-
sion.
2 Our Approach
Our model includes a list of linguistic features and
semantic features extracted from BERT. After ex-
periments on the BERT model and other machine
learning models, we got the best performance us-
ing Logistic Regression.
2.1 Data
(Da San Martino et al., 2019a) provided with a
corpus of about 500 news articles and splited the
corpus into training, development and test, each
containing 350, 61, 86 articles and 16,965, 2,235,
3,526 sentences. Each article has been retrieved
with the newspaper3k library and sentence split-
ting has been performed automatically with NLTK
sentence splitter (Da San Martino et al., 2019a).
2.2 Our Features
We identified a list of features and selected
the top 98% using feature selection tool Se-
lectKBest of Sklearn with score funtion of
f classif (https://scikit-learn.org/
stable/modules/generated/sklearn.
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feature_selection.SelectKBest.
html). Our final features including TF-IDF,
length, readability grade level, emotion, LIWC
and emphatic features, and the semantic features
extracted from BERT.
2.2.1 TF-IDF
Term Frequency Inverse Document Frequency
(TF-IDF) (Jones, 2004) gives us the information of
term frequency through the proportion of inverse
document frequency. Words that have small term
frequency in each document but have high possi-
bility to appear in documents with similar topics
will have higher TF-IDF, while words like func-
tion words though frequently appear in every doc-
ument will have low TF-IDF because of lower in-
verse document frequency. We used feature selec-
tion tool of sklearn based on ANOVA to select top
100 features from over 40,000 words.
2.2.2 Sentence Length
We found that the propagandistic sentences
are more likely to be longer than the non-
propagandistic ones, so we came up some features
to capture this information. We have categorical
feature Short or Long Document and used 1 to
denote that it is a long document. A sentence
belongs to a short document if it has less than
eight tokens; otherwise, it belongs to a long doc-
ument. We also have discrete features including
Text Length(the number of characters in a sen-
tence), Word Count and Word Count Per Sen-
tence.
2.2.3 Readability Grade Level
We used The Flesch Grade Level readability for-
mula, which is also commonly referred to as the
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level to calculate the read-
ability grade of each text (Kincaid et al., 1975).
The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level outputs a U.S.
school grade level, which indicates the average
student in that grade level can read the text. For
example, a score of 9.4 indicates that students in
the ninth grade are able to read the document. The
formula is as follow.
FKRA = (0.39∗ASL)+(11.8∗ASW )−15.59
where, FKRA = Flesch-Kincaid Reading Age,
ASL = Average Sentence Length (i.e., the num-
ber of words divided by the number of sentences),
ASW = Average number of Syllable per Word
(i.e., the number of syllables divided by the num-
ber of words). The average grade level is eighth
and twelfth for non-propagandistic and propagan-
distic sentences, respectively.
2.2.4 Emotion Feature
Studies about the relationship between emotion
and propaganda techniques are conducted. For
example, (Kadir et al., 2016) found out that pro-
paganda techniques in YouTube conjure peoples
emotion that could affect unity. We took advan-
tage of these studies by adding emotion features
for SLC task.
• NRC VAD Lexicon (Mohammad, 2018);
NRC Emotion Lexicon (Mohammad and
Turney, 2013); NRC Affect Intensity Lexi-
con (Mohammad and Bravo-Marquez, 2017).
We calculated the total score of the words
listed in these lexicons respectively, and nor-
malized the score between zero and one for
each sentence.
• MPQA (Wilson et al., 2005), Bing Liu (Hu
and Liu, 2004), and AFINN (Nielsen, 2011).
We calculated the percentage of words with
positive and negative emotions respectively
in these lexicons for each sentence.
• Insult Noted that insult words are likely
to be used in Name Calling and Labeling
techniques, we refer to a lexicon that con-
tains insult words from the http://www.
insult.wiki/wiki/Insult_List.
We calculated the count of insult words
appearing in a sentence and normalized it by
the token counts.
• LIWC Emotion Lexicon
Affect the LIWC dictionary includes the
overall affect including positive emotions,
negative emotions, anxiety, anger and sad-
ness; Negative Emotions it also includes
negative emotion words correspond with hu-
man ratings of the writing excerpts (Alpers
et al., 2005); Anger and some anger words
without considering the context like ’hate,
kill, annoyed’. We combined these three
emotion information provided by LIWC
emotion lexicon with the others provided by
the lexicons mentioned above as the final
emotion features.
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2.2.5 LIWC Feature
• Dictionary Words: Percentage of all words
captured by the dictionary, which refers to the
collection of words that define one particu-
lar of the 80 categories (Tausczik and Pen-
nebaker, 2010).
• Article The use of article can tell us some
information about gender and the personal-
ity. (Newman et al., 2008) found that males
had higher use of large words and articles
than women. (Pennebaker and King, 1999)
showed that articles were less frequent in the
writing of people who scored high on ex-
traversion.
• Conjugations Depth of thinking is reflected
in complexity, and people use conjunctions
to join multiple complex thoughts together to
deepen their thoughts (Graesser et al., 2004).
• Quote The use of quote distracts us from
the main body of the text to the content
in the quotes. For example, ironic content
(e.g. “A researcher with the organisation,
Matthew Collins, said it was ‘delighted’ with
the decision.”), slogans (e.g. “Time for US
to do the same.”) and and loaded language
(e.g. “Muslin Invaders”) are put in the dou-
ble quotes.
2.2.6 Emphatic Content in Double Quote
Researchers have identified many standard tech-
niques (Koob, 2015; Zollmann, 2019) used in pro-
paganda, such as slogans, name calling and loaded
language, which often include the emphatic con-
tent in the title format(every word begins with cap-
ital letter) or every letter of the word is capitalized
in the double quote. Therefore, our model includes
a feature that reflects this aspect.
• Slogans. A slogan is a brief and striking
phrase that may include labeling and stereo-
typing (Da San Martino et al., 2019b). Slo-
gans tend to act as emotional appeals (Dan,
2015). Ex.: President Donald Trump Pro-
poses “Simple Immigration Plan”: Illegals
Have To Go!
• Name Calling. Labeling the object of the
propaganda campaign as either something the
target audience fears, hates, finds undesirable
or otherwise loves or praises (Miller, 1939).
Ex.: Democrats Friend Louis Farrakhan In
Iran: “Death to America!” America Is The
“Great Satan” Neither Manafort nor these
“Russians” are in the visitor logs.
• Loaded Language Using words/phrases
with strong emotional implications (positive
or negative) to influence an audience (We-
ston, 2018). Ex.: Dem Candidate Ilhan Omar
Defending Tweet On “The Evil Doings Of Is-
rael” by Frank Camp, Daily Wire, October
28, 2018:
To translate the emphatic content in double quote
into feature, we used a feature called “isEm-
phatic”. If we found the stressed content in double
quote in the format of title or upper letter in a sen-
tence, we would use 1 to denote the sentence has
emphatic content in it.
2.2.7 BERT Features
In order to further extract the semantic information
of text, we apply sentence vectors generated by
the state-of-the-art models, Bidirectional Encoder
Representations from Transformers (BERT) (De-
vlin et al., 2018). Specifically, we use pretrained
BERT model to predict text category, but we do
not directly adopt BERT results as our final results
because of the better performance of Logistic Re-
gression. We use the vector obtained by BERT’s
hidden layer which can represent the semantic fea-
ture. The experimental result shows that BERT
features can improve hugely on F1 score on the
development dataset.
3 Experiment
3.1 Data Cleaning
For the input of BERT model, we removed the
punctuation, and changed all the uppercase letters
to lowercase. Also, we changed all clitics to full
words (e.g. “isn’t” becomes “is not”). For the lin-
guistic features extraction part, we did not apply
the same method as above, because uppercase let-
ter and quotes are important features for this task.
3.2 Model
We used two models, one is the pretrained BERT
model and the other is Logistic Regression. The
architecture of our model is shown in Figure 1.
3.3 Model Setup
We used the pretrained uncased BERT-Base model
and fine-tuned it using the following hyper-
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Figure 1: The architecture of our model
parameters: batch size of 16, sequence length of
70, weight decay of 0.01, and early stopping on
validation F1 with patience of 7. For optimization,
we used Adam with a learning rate of 2e− 5. We
tuned our models on the train dataset and we report
results on the development dataset. For the Lo-
gistic Regression, we used the solver of LBFGS,
penalty of l2, C of 1.0 and we used “balanced”
mode to automatically adjust weights inversely
proportional to class frequencies in the input data.
4 Results
Table 1 shows the ablation study results for the
SLC task. We used the Logistic Regression with
sentence length(the number of characters) fea-
ture to be the baseline. To test the importance
of each individual feature in the classification,
we applied them to Logistic Regression one at
a time, including readability grade level, sen-
tence length, LIWC, TF-IDF, emotion and BERT.
Among these features, readability and sentence
length increased 3.13% and 5.34% of F1 score,
while LIWC, TF-IDF and emotion features in-
creased 7.28%, 12.76% and 12.92% of F1 score
respectively. These results suggest that the length
and the complexity of a sentence is effective to dif-
ferentiate propagandistic sentences from the non-
propagandistic ones, but not as effective as LIWC,
TF-IDF and emotion do. The implication is that
while propaganda techniques are likely to ap-
pear in a complex and longer sentences, there
are also long non-propagandistic sentences con-
taining complex words. In addition, some pro-
paganda techniques like slogan are not necessar-
ily expressed in long sentences. The difference
of language use, reflected by the words, punctu-
ations (LIWC), term frequency inverse document
frequency (TF-IDF) and the emotional expression
(emotion) shapes a more fit boundary between
propagandistic and non-propagandistic sentences.
We further explored the efficiency of semantic
features extracted from BERT. The BERT feature
improves the most among all the features in Lo-
gistic Regression by 18.05% of F1 score. This in-
dicates that the higher granularity representation
of a sentence better capture the presence of propa-
ganda techniques. We conducted experiment us-
ing the pretrained and fine-tuned BERT and ob-
tained huge improvements on the SLC task. As
shown in Table 1, BERT performed better than
LR bert but worse than LR†‡, which indicates that
the transfer learning when considering single se-
mantic variable is not as effective as the combi-
nation with other linguistic features. Furthermore,
we explored the effect of the isEmphatic feature
introduced in Section 2.2.6. The isEmphatic fea-
ture is extremely sparse. We compared the perfor-
mances of two classifiers that had the same fea-
ture set except the presence of isFmphatic, i.e.,
LR† and LR†‡ . The isEmpahtic feature improved
the performance as evidenced by the slightly in-
crease from 65.08% to 66.16%.
Model Precision Recall F1
LR base 38.80 49.42 43.47
LR read 41.15 53.45 46.50
LR length 42.49 57.38 48.82
LR liwc 42.11 63.87 50.75
LR tfidf 45.76 72.94 56.23
LR emotion 49.58 65.36 56.39
LR bert 55.50 69.01 61.52
BERT 67.00 63.19 65.04
LR† 57.10 75.64 65.08
LR†‡ 58.00 77.00 66.16
Table 1: Sentence-level (SLC) results. † represents
the inclusion of features other than isEmphatic into the
model. ‡ represents the inclusion of isEmphatic fea-
tures into the model
5 Related Work
There are a number of researchers applying ma-
chine learning to automatically identify Propa-
gandistic news articles. (Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al.,
2019) presented PROPPY, the first publicly avail-
able real-world, real-time propaganda detection
system for online news and they show that char-
acter n-grams and other style features outperform
existing alternatives to identify propaganda based
on word n-grams. (Ahmed et al., 2017) proposed
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a fake news(propagandistic news articles) detec-
tion model that use n-gram analysis and machine
learning techniques. (Orlov and Litvak, 2018) pre-
sented an unsupervised approach using behavioral
and text analysis of users and messages to iden-
tify groups of users who abuse the Twitter micro-
blogging service to disseminate propaganda and
misinformation.
Most relevant to our study, (Da San Martino
et al., 2019b) proposed a BERT based technique
to identify propaganda problems in the news arti-
cles. Specifically, the researchers trained a Multi-
Granularity BERT model that includes multiple
levels of semantic representations on two tasks.
One task FLC identifies which of 18 propaganda
techniques is/are present in the given fragment of
the text. The other, namely, SLC is about clas-
sifying whether the given sentence is propagan-
distic. Different from their approach, we focused
on the SLC task, and used the fine-tune BERT
vectors combining various linguistic features, and
fitted into a Logistic Regression model. Also,
we only used the vectors extracted from the hid-
den layers of BERT to be part of our features.
With a similar but smaller dataset, the researchers’
model achieved 60.98% of F1 score, while ours is
66.16%. In this competition, our team ranked 9th
out of 29 teams on the development set, with the
F1 score of the top team being 2.7% higher than
ours.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we focused on the sentence-level
propaganda detection task and developed an au-
tomatic system based on some effective features.
We got features including TF-IDF, length, emo-
tion, readability level, LIWC, emphatic and BERT.
Our ablation study shows that the length and com-
plexity of sentence help to improve the perfor-
mance slightly, comparing to the use of language
reflected in specific term, frequency and emotional
expression, which captures more propagandistic
information. The semantic information extracted
from BERT is crucial in detecting propaganda
techniques, which improves the F1 score the most.
The combination of these features and the BERT
feature achieved the best performance with the Lo-
gistic Regression model. The F1 score is 66.16%.
Compared to (Da San Martino et al., 2019b),
our approach focus more on the linguistic features
combined with semantic features extracted from
BERT, and use machine learning model , while
they use the deep learning model with a high gran-
ularity task to improve performance on low gran-
ularity task.In terms of the performance, our F1
score is 66.16% whereas theirs is 60.98%. On the
other hand, we noted that the two studies used dif-
ferent versions of the propaganda datasets, which
may contribute to the observed difference in the
performances.
In the future, we plan to embed the features we
designed in the BERT model or studied more fea-
tures from the propaganda techniques to improve
the performance.
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Abstract
The automatic identification of propaganda
has gained significance in recent years due to
technological and social changes in the way
news is generated and consumed. That this
task can be addressed effectively using BERT,
a powerful new architecture which can be fine-
tuned for text classification tasks, is not sur-
prising. However, propaganda detection, like
other tasks that deal with news documents and
other forms of decontextualized social com-
munication (e.g. sentiment analysis), inher-
ently deals with data whose categories are si-
multaneously imbalanced and dissimilar. We
show that BERT, while capable of handling
imbalanced classes with no additional data
augmentation, does not generalise well when
the training and test data are sufficiently dis-
similar (as is often the case with news sources,
whose topics evolve over time). We show how
to address this problem by providing a statisti-
cal measure of similarity between datasets and
a method of incorporating cost-weighting into
BERT when the training and test sets are dis-
similar. We test these methods on the Propa-
ganda Techniques Corpus (PTC) and achieve
the second highest score on sentence-level pro-
paganda classification.
1 Introduction
The challenges of imbalanced classification—in
which the proportion of elements in each class
for a classification task significantly differ—and of
the ability to generalise on dissimilar data have re-
mained important problems in Natural Language
Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning in gen-
eral. Popular NLP tasks including sentiment anal-
ysis, propaganda detection, and event extraction
from social media are all examples of imbalanced
classification problems. In each case the num-
ber of elements in one of the classes (e.g. nega-
tive sentiment, propagandistic content, or specific
events discussed on social media, respectively) is
significantly lower than the number of elements in
the other classes.
The recently introduced BERT language model
for transfer learning (Devlin et al., 2018) uses a
deep bidirectional transformer architecture to pro-
duce pre-trained context-dependent embeddings.
It has proven to be powerful in solving many NLP
tasks and, as we find, also appears to handle imbal-
anced classification well, thus removing the need
to use standard methods of data augmentation to
mitigate this problem (see Section 2.2.2 for related
work and Section 4.1 for analysis).
BERT is credited with the ability to adapt to
many tasks and data with very little training (De-
vlin et al., 2018). However, we show that BERT
fails to perform well when the training and test
data are significantly dissimilar, as is the case with
several tasks that deal with social and news data.
In these cases, the training data is necessarily a
subset of past data, while the model is likely to
be used on future data which deals with different
topics. This work addresses this problem by incor-
porating cost-sensitivity (Section 4.2) into BERT.
We test these methods by participating in the
Shared Task on Fine-Grained Propaganda Detec-
tion for the 2nd Workshop on NLP for Internet
Freedom, for which we achieve the second rank on
sentence-level classification of propaganda, con-
firming the importance of cost-sensitivity when
the training and test sets are dissimilar.
1.1 Detecting Propaganda
The term ‘propaganda’ derives from propagare
in post-classical Latin, as in “propagation of the
faith” (Auerbach and Castronovo, 2014), and thus
has from the beginning been associated with an
intentional and potentially multicast communica-
tion; only later did it become a pejorative term.
It was pragmatically defined in the World War II
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era as “the expression of an opinion or an action
by individuals or groups deliberately designed to
influence the opinions or the actions of other indi-
viduals or groups with reference to predetermined
ends” (Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1937).
For the philosopher and sociologist Jacques El-
lul, however, in a society with mass communica-
tion, propaganda is inevitable and thus it is nec-
essary to become more aware of it (Ellul, 1973);
but whether or not to classify a given strip of text
as propaganda depends not just on its content but
on its use on the part of both addressers and ad-
dressees (Auerbach and Castronovo, 2014, 6), and
this fact makes the automated detection of propa-
ganda intrinsically challenging.
Despite this difficulty, interest in automatically
detecting misinformation and/or propaganda has
gained significance due to the exponential growth
in online sources of information combined with
the speed with which information is shared today.
The sheer volume of social interactions makes
it impossible to manually check the veracity of
all information being shared. Automation thus
remains a potentially viable method of ensuring
that we continue to enjoy the benefits of a con-
nected world without the spread of misinformation
through either ignorance or malicious intent.
In the task introduced by Da San Martino et al.
(2019), we are provided with articles tagged as
propaganda at the sentence and fragment (or span)
level and are tasked with making predictions on a
development set followed by a final held-out test
set. We note this gives us access to the articles in
the development and test sets but not their labels.
We participated in this task under the team name
ProperGander and were placed 2nd on the sen-
tence level classification task where we make use
of our methods of incorporating cost-sensitivity
into BERT. We also participated in the fragment
level task and were placed 7th. The significant con-
tributions of this work are:
• We show that common (‘easy’) methods of
data augmentation for dealing with class im-
balance do not improve base BERT perfor-
mance.
• We provide a statistical method of establish-
ing the similarity of datasets.
• We incorporate cost-sensitivity into BERT to
enable models to adapt to dissimilar datasets.
• We release all our program code on GitHub
and Google Colaboratory1, so that other re-
searchers can benefit from this work.
2 Related work
2.1 Propaganda detection
Most of the existing works on propaganda detec-
tion focus on identifying propaganda at the news
article level, or even at the news outlet level with
the assumption that each of the articles of the
suspected propagandistic outlet are propaganda
(Rashkin et al., 2017; Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019).
Here we study two tasks that are more
fine-grained, specifically propaganda detection
at the sentence and phrase (fragment) levels
(Da San Martino et al., 2019). This fine-grained
setup aims to train models that identify linguistic
propaganda techniques rather than distinguishing
between the article source styles.
Da San Martino et al. (2019) were the first
to propose this problem setup and release it
as a shared task.2 Along with the released
dataset, Da San Martino et al. (2019) proposed
a multi-granularity neural network, which uses the
deep bidirectional transformer architecture known
as BERT, which features pre-trained context-
dependent embeddings (Devlin et al., 2018). Their
system takes a joint learning approach to the
sentence- and phrase-level tasks, concatenating
the output representation of the less granular
(sentence-level) task with the more fine-grained
task using learned weights.
In this work we also take the BERT model as
the basis of our approach and focus on the class
imbalance as well as the lack of similarity between
training and test data inherent to the task.
2.2 Class imbalance
A common issue for many Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) classification tasks is class imbal-
ance, the situation where one of the class cate-
gories comprises a significantly larger proportion
of the dataset than the other classes. It is especially
prominent in real-world datasets and complicates
classification when the identification of the minor-
ity class is of specific importance.
Models trained on the basis of minimising er-
rors for imbalanced datasets tend to more fre-
1http://www.harishmadabushi.com/
research/propaganda-detection/
2https://propaganda.qcri.org/
nlp4if-shared-task/
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quently predict the majority class; achieving high
accuracy in such cases can be misleading. Be-
cause of this, the macro-averaged F-score, chosen
for this competition, is a more suitable metric as it
weights the performance on each class equally.
As class imbalance is a widespread issue, multi-
ple techniques have been developed that help alle-
viate it (Buda et al., 2018; Haixiang et al., 2017),
by either adjusting the model (e.g. changing the
performance metric) or changing the data (e.g.
oversampling the minority class or undersampling
the majority class).
2.2.1 Cost-sensitive learning
Cost-sensitive classification can be used when the
“cost” of mislabelling one class is higher than that
of mislabelling other classes (Elkan, 2001; Kukar
et al., 1998). For example, the real cost to a bank
of miscategorising a large fraudulent transaction
as authentic is potentially higher than miscate-
gorising (perhaps only temporarily) a valid trans-
action as fraudulent. Cost-sensitive learning tack-
les the issue of class imbalance by changing the
cost function of the model such that misclassi-
fication of training examples from the minority
class carries more weight and is thus more ‘ex-
pensive’. This is achieved by simply multiplying
the loss of each example by a certain factor. This
cost-sensitive learning technique takes misclassi-
fication costs into account during model training,
and does not modify the imbalanced data distribu-
tion directly.
2.2.2 Data augmentation
Common methods that tackle the problem of
class imbalance by modifying the data to cre-
ate balanced datasets are undersampling and over-
sampling. Undersampling randomly removes in-
stances from the majority class and is only suitable
for problems with an abundance of data. Over-
sampling means creating more minority class in-
stances to match the size of the majority class.
Oversampling methods range from simple random
oversampling, i.e. repeating the training proce-
dure on instances from the minority class, cho-
sen at random, to the more complex, which in-
volves constructing synthetic minority-class sam-
ples. Random oversampling is similar to cost-
sensitive learning as repeating the sample several
times makes the cost of its mis-classification grow
proportionally. Kolomiyets et al. (2011), Zhang
et al. (2015), and Wang and Yang (2015) per-
form data augmentation using synonym replace-
ment, i.e. replacing random words in sentences
with their synonyms or nearest-neighbor embed-
dings, and show its effectiveness on multiple tasks
and datasets. Wei et al. (2019) provide a great
overview of ‘easy’ data augmentation (EDA) tech-
niques for NLP, including synonym replacement
as described above, and random deletion, i.e. re-
moving words in the sentence at random with
pre-defined probability. They show the effective-
ness of EDA across five text classification tasks.
However, they mention that EDA may not lead to
substantial improvements when using pre-trained
models. In this work we test this claim by com-
paring performance gains of using cost-sensitive
learning versus two data augmentation methods,
synonym replacement and random deletion, with
a pre-trained BERT model.
More complex augmentation methods include
back-translation (Sennrich et al., 2015), transla-
tional data augmentation (Fadaee et al., 2017), and
noising (Xie et al., 2017), but these are out of the
scope of this study.
3 Dataset
The Propaganda Techniques Corpus (PTC) dataset
for the 2019 Shared Task on Fine-Grained Pro-
paganda consists of a training set of 350 news
articles, consisting of just over 16,965 total sen-
tences, in which specifically propagandistic frag-
ments have been manually spotted and labelled by
experts. This is accompanied by a development
set (or dev set) of 61 articles with 2,235 total sen-
tences, whose labels are maintained by the shared
task organisers; and two months after the release
of this data, the organisers released a test set of 86
articles and 3,526 total sentences. In the training
set, 4,720 (∼ 28%) of the sentences have been as-
sessed as containing propaganda, with 12,245 sen-
tences (∼ 72%) as non-propaganda, demonstrat-
ing a clear class imbalance.
In the binary sentence-level classification (SLC)
task, a model is trained to detect whether each
and every sentence is either ’propaganda’ or ’non-
propaganda’; in the more challenging field-level
classification (FLC) task, a model is trained to
detect one of 18 possible propaganda technique
types in spans of characters within sentences.
These propaganda types are listed in Da San Mar-
tino et al. (2019) and range from those which
might be recognisable at the lexical level (e.g.
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NAME CALLING, REPETITION), and those which
would likely need to incorporate semantic under-
standing (RED HERRING, STRAW MAN).3
For several example sentences from a sample
document annotated with fragment-level classi-
fications (FLC) (Figure 1). The corresponding
sentence-level classification (SLC) labels would
indicate that sentences 3, 4, and 7 are ’propa-
ganda’ while the the other sentences are ‘non-
propaganda’.
3.1 Data Distribution
One of the most interesting aspects of the data pro-
vided for this task is the notable difference be-
tween the training and the development/test sets.
We emphasise that this difference is realistic and
reflective of real world news data, in which major
stories are often accompanied by the introduction
of new terms, names, and even phrases. This is
because the training data is a subset of past data
while the model is to be used on future data which
deals with different newsworthy topics.
We demonstrate this difference statistically by
using a method for finding the similarity of cor-
pora suggested by Kilgarriff (2001). We use
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Wilcoxon, 1945)
which compares the frequency counts of randomly
sampled elements from different datasets to deter-
mine if those datasets have a statistically similar
distribution of elements.
We implement this as follows. For each of the
training, development and test sets, we extract all
words (retaining the repeats) while ignoring a set
of stopwords (identified through the Python Nat-
ural Language Toolkit). We then extract 10,000
samples (with replacements) for various pairs of
these datasets (training, development, and test sets
along with splits of each of these datasets). Fi-
nally, we use comparative word frequencies from
the two sets to calculate the p-value using the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Table 1 provides the
minimum and maximum p-values and their inter-
pretations for ten such runs of each pair reported.
With p-value less than 0.05, we show that the train,
development and test sets are self-similar and also
significantly different from each other. In mea-
suring self-similarity, we split each dataset after
shuffling all sentences. While this comparison is
made at the sentence level (as opposed to the arti-
3https://propaganda.qcri.org/
annotations/ includes a flowchart instructing annotators
to discover and isolate these 18 propaganda categories.
Set 1 Set 2 p-value(min)
p-value
(max)
% Similar
Tests
50%
Train
50%
Train 2.38E-01 9.11E-01
100
50% Dev 50% Dev 5.55E-01 9.96E-01 100
50% Test 50% Test 6.21E-01 8.88E-01 100
25% Dev 75% Dev 1.46E-01 5.72E-01 100
25% Test 75% Test 3.70E-02 7.55E-01 90
25%
Train
75%
Train 9.08E-02 9.66E-01
100
Train Dev 2.05E-09 4.33E-05 0
Train Test 8.37E-23 1.18E-14 0
Dev Test 2.72E-04 2.11E-02 0
Table 1: p-values representing the similarity between
(parts of) the train, test and development sets.
cle level), it is consistent with the granularity used
for propaganda detection, which is also at the sen-
tence level. We also perform measurements of self
similarity after splitting the data at the article level
and find that the conclusions of similarity between
the sets hold with a p-value threshold of 0.001,
where p-values for similarity between the train-
ing and dev/test sets are orders of magnitude lower
compared to self-similarity. Since we use random
sampling we run this test 10 times and present the
both the maximum and minimum p-values. We in-
clude the similarity between 25% of a dataset and
the remaining 75% of that set because that is the
train/test ratio we use in our experiments, further
described in our methodology (Section 4).
This analysis shows that while all splits of each
of the datasets are statistically similar, the train-
ing set (and the split of the training set that we
use for experimentation) are significantly differ-
ent from the development and test sets. While our
analysis does show that the development and the
test sets are dissimilar, we note (based on the p-
values) that they are significantly more similar to
each other than they are to the training set.
4 Methodology
We were provided with two tasks: (1) propaganda
fragment-level identification (FLC) and (2) pro-
pagandistic sentence-level identification (SLC).
While we develop systems for both tasks, our main
focus is toward the latter. Given the differences
between the training, development, and test sets,
we focus on methods for generalising our models.
We note that propaganda identification is, in gen-
eral, an imbalanced binary classification problem
as most sentences are not propagandistic.
Due to the non-deterministic nature of fast GPU
computations, we run each of our models three
times and report the average of these three runs
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Sentence 1:
The Senate Judiciary Committee voted 11-10 along party lines to advance the nomination of Judge
Brett Kavanaugh out of committee to the Senate floor for a vote.
Sentence 2:
Of course, RINO Senator Jeff Flake (R-AZ) wanted to side with Senate Democrats in pushing for a
FBI investigation into unsubstantiated allegations against Kavanaugh.
Sentence 3:
Outgoing Flake, and <LOADED LANGUAGE> good riddance </LOADED LANGUAGE>, said that
he sided with his colleagues in having a ”limited time and scope” investigation by the FBI into the
allegations against Kavanaugh.
Sentence 4:
“<FLAG-WAVING> This country is being ripped apart here, and we’ve got to make sure we do
due diligence</FLAG-WAVING>,” Flake said.
Sentence 5: He added that he would be more ”comfortable” with an FBI investigation.
Sentence 6: Comfort?
Sentence 7:
<WHATABOUTISM>What about Judge Kavanaugh’s comfort in being put through the ringer
without a shred of evidence, Senator Flake</WHATABOUTISM>?
Figure 1: Excerpt of an example (truncated) news document with three separate field-level classification (FLC)
tags, for LOADED LANGUAGE, FLAG-WAVING, AND WHATABOUTISM.
through the rest of this section. When picking the
model to use for our final submission, we pick the
model that performs best on the development set.
When testing our models, we split the labelled
training data into two non-overlapping parts: the
first one, consisting of 75% of the training data is
used to train models, whereas the other is used to
test the effectiveness of the models. All models
are trained and tested on the same split to ensure
comparability. Similarly, to ensure that our mod-
els remain comparable, we continue to train on the
same 75% of the training set even when testing on
the development set.
Once the best model is found using these meth-
ods, we train that model on all of the training data
available before then submitting the results on the
development set to the leaderboard. These results
are detailed in the section describing our results
(Section 5).
4.1 Class Imbalance in Sentence Level
Classification
The sentence level classification task is an imbal-
anced binary classification problem that we ad-
dress using BERT (Devlin et al., 2018). We use
BERTBASE, uncased, which consists of 12 self-
attention layers, and returns a 768-dimension vec-
tor that representation a sentence. So as to make
use of BERT for sentence classification, we in-
clude a fully connected layer on top of the BERT
self-attention layers, which classifies the sentence
embedding provided by BERT into the two classes
of interest (propaganda or non-propaganda).
We attempt to exploit various data augmenta-
tion techniques to address the problem of class im-
balance. Table 2 shows the results of our experi-
ments for different data augmentation techniques
when, after shuffling the training data, we train the
model on 75% of the training data and test it on the
remaining 25% of the training data and the devel-
opment data.
Augmentation
Technique
f1-score on
25% of Train
f1-score on
Dev
None 0.7954 0.5803
Synonym
Insertion 0.7889
0.5833
Dropping
Words 0.7791
0.5445
Over Sampling 0.7843 0.6276
Table 2: F1 scores on an unseen (not used for train-
ing) part of the training set and the development set on
BERT using different augmentation techniques.
We observe that BERT without augmentation
consistently outperforms BERT with augmenta-
tion in the experiments when the model is trained
on 75% of the training data and evaluated on the
rest, i.e trained and evaluated on similar data,
coming from the same distribution. This is con-
sistent with observations by Wei et al. (2019) that
contextual word embeddings do not gain from data
augmentation. The fact that we shuffle the training
data prior to splitting it into training and testing
subsets could imply that the model is learning to
associate topic words, such as ‘Mueller’, as pro-
paganda. However, when we perform model eval-
uation using the development set, which is dissim-
ilar to the training, we observe that synonym in-
sertion and word dropping techniques also do not
bring performance gains, while random oversam-
pling increases performance over base BERT by
4%. Synonym insertion provides results very sim-
ilar to base BERT, while random deletion harms
model performance producing lower scores. We
believe that this could be attributed to the fact that
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synonym insertion and random word dropping in-
volve the introduction of noise to the data, while
oversampling does not. As we are working with
natural language data, this type of noise can in fact
change the meaning of the sentence. Oversam-
pling on the other hand purely increases the impor-
tance of the minority class by repeating training on
the unchanged instances.
So as to better understand the aspects of over-
sampling that contribute to these gains, we per-
form a class-wise performance analysis of BERT
with/without oversampling. The results of these
experiments (Table 3) show that oversampling in-
creases the overall recall while maintaining preci-
sion. This is achieved by significantly improving
the recall of the minority class (propaganda) at the
cost of the recall of the majority class.
OS No OS
precision 0.7967 0.7933
recall 0.7767 0.8000
f1-score 0.7843 0.7954
Non-Propaganda
precision 0.8733
0.8467
Non-Propaganda recall 0.8100 0.8900
Non-Propaganda F1 0.8433 0.8667
Propaganda precision 0.5800 0.6600
Propaganda recall 0.6933 0.5533
Propaganda F1 0.6300 0.5533
Table 3: Class-wise precision and recall with and with-
out oversampling (OS) achieved on unseen part of the
training set.
So far we have been able to establish that a) the
training and test sets are dissimilar, thus requir-
ing us to generalise our model, b) oversampling
provides a method of generalisation, and c) over-
sampling does this while maintaining recall on the
minority (and thus more interesting) class.
Given this we explore alternative methods of
increasing minority class recall without a signif-
icant drop in precision. One such method is
cost-sensitive classification, which differs from
random oversampling in that it provides a
more continuous-valued and consistent method of
weighting samples of imbalanced training data;
for example, random oversampling will inevitably
emphasise some training instances at the expense
of others. We detail our methods of using cost-
sensitive classification in the next section. Further
experiments with oversampling might have pro-
vided insights into the relationships between these
methods, which we leave for future exploration.
4.2 Cost-sensitive Classification
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, cost-sensitive clas-
sification can be performed by weighting the cost
function. We increase the weight of incorrectly la-
belling a propagandistic sentence by altering the
cost function of the training of the final fully con-
nected layer of our model previously described in
Section 4.1. We make these changes through the
use of PyTorch (Paszke et al., 2017) which cal-
culates the cross-entropy loss for a single predic-
tion x, an array where the jth element represents
the models prediction for class j, labelled with the
class class as given by Equation 1.
loss(x, class) = − log
(
exp(x[class])∑
j exp(x[j])
)
= −x[class] + log
∑
j
exp(x[j])
 (1)
The cross-entropy loss given in Equation 1 is
modified to accommodate an array weight, the ith
element of which represents the weight of the ith
class, as described in Equation 2.
loss(x, class) = weight[class]Θ
where, Θ = −x[class] + log
∑
j
exp(x[j])

(2)
Intuitively, we increase the cost of getting the
classification of an “important” class wrong and
corresponding decrees the cost of getting a less
important class wrong. In our case, we increase
the cost of mislabelling the minority class which is
“propaganda” (as opposed to “non-propaganda”).
We expect the effect of this to be similar to that
of oversampling, in that it is likely to enable us
to increase the recall of the minority class thus
resulting in the decrease in recall of the overall
model while maintaining high precision. We re-
iterate that this specific change to a model results
in increasing the model’s ability to better identify
elements belonging to the minority class in dissim-
ilar datasets when using BERT.
We explore the validity of this by perform-
ing several experiments with different weights as-
signed to the minority class. We note that in our
experiments use significantly higher weights than
the weights proportional to class frequencies in the
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Figure 2: The impact of modifying the minority class
weights on the performance on similar (subset of train-
ing set) and dissimilar (development) datasets. The
method of increasing minority class weights is able to
push the model towards generalisation while maintain-
ing precision.
training data, that are common in literature (Ling
and Sheng, 2011). Rather than directly using the
class proportions of the training set, we show that
tuning weights based on performance on the de-
velopment set is more beneficial. Figure 2 shows
the results of these experiments wherein we are
able to maintain the precision on the subset of the
training set used for testing while reducing its re-
call and thus generalising the model. The fact that
the model is generalising on a dissimilar dataset
is confirmed by the increase in the development
set F1 score. We note that the gains are not infi-
nite and that a balance must be struck based on the
amount of generalisation and the corresponding
loss in accuracy. The exact weight to use for the
best transfer of classification accuracy is related
to the dissimilarity of that other dataset and hence
is to be obtained experimentally through hyperpa-
rameter search. Our experiments showed that a
value of 4 is best suited for this task.
We do not include the complete results of our
experiments here due to space constraints but in-
clude them along with charts and program code on
our project website. Based on this exploration we
find that the best weights for this particular dataset
are 1 for non-propaganda and 4 for propaganda
and we use this to train the final model used to
submit results to the leaderboard. We also found
that adding Part of Speech tags and Named En-
tity information to BERT embeddings by concate-
nating these one-hot vectors to the BERT embed-
dings does not improve model performance. We
describe these results in Section 5.
4.3 Fragment-level classification (FLC)
In addition to participating in the Sentence Level
Classification task we also participate in the Frag-
ment Level Classification task. We note that ex-
tracting fragments that are propagandistic is sim-
ilar to the task of Named Entity Recognition, in
that they are both span extraction tasks, and so use
a BERT based model designed for this task - We
build on the work by Emelyanov and Artemova
(2019) which makes use of Continuous Random
Field stacked on top of an LSTM to predict spans.
This architecture is standard amongst state of the
art models that perform span identification.
While the same span of text cannot have multi-
ple named entity labels, it can have different pro-
paganda labels. We get around this problem by
picking one of the labels at random. Addition-
ally, so as to speed up training, we only train our
model on those sentences that contain some propa-
gandistic fragment. In hindsight, we note that both
these decisions were not ideal and discuss what we
might have otherwise done in Section 7.
5 Results
In this section, we show our rankings on the
leaderboard on the test set. Unlike the previous ex-
ploratory sections, in which we trained our model
on part of the training set, we train models de-
scribed in this section on the complete training set.
5.1 Results on the SLC task
Our best performing model, selected on the ba-
sis of a systematic analysis of the relationship
between cost weights and recall, places us sec-
ond amongst the 25 teams that submitted their re-
sults on this task. We present our score on the
test set alongside those of comparable teams in
Table 4. We note that the task description pa-
per (Da San Martino et al., 2019) describes a
method of achieving an F1 score of 60.98% on
a similar task although this reported score is not
directly comparable to the results on this task be-
cause of the differences in testing sets.
5.2 Results on the FLC task
We train the model described in Section 4.3 on
the complete training set before submitting to the
leaderboard. Our best performing model was
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Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 ltuorp 0.632375 0.602885 0.664899
2 Proper-Gander 0.625651 0.564957
0.564957
3 YMJA 0.624934 0.625265 0.624602
. . .
20 Baseline 0.434701 0.388010 0.494168
Table 4: Our results on the SLC task (2nd, in bold)
alongside comparable results from the competition
leaderboard.
placed 7th amongst the 13 teams that submitted
results for this task. We present our score on
the test set alongside those of comparable teams
in Table 5. We note that the task description
paper (Da San Martino et al., 2019) describes a
method of achieving an F1 score of 22.58% on a
similar task although, this reported score is not di-
rectly comparable to the results on this task.
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 newspeak 0.248849 0.286299 0.220063
2 Anti-ganda 0.226745 0.288213
0.186887
. . .
6 aschern 0.109060 0.071528 0.229464
7 Proper-Gander 0.098969 0.065167
0.205634
. . .
11 Baseline 0.000015 0.011628 0.000008
Table 5: Our results on the FLC task (7th, in bold)
alongside those of better performing teams from the
competition leaderboard.
One of the major setbacks to our method for
identifying sentence fragments was the loss of
training data as a result of randomly picking one
label when the same fragment had multiple labels.
This could have been avoided by training differ-
ent models for each label and simply concatenat-
ing the results. Additionally, training on all sen-
tences, including those that did not contain any
fragments labelled as propagandistic would have
likely improved our model performance. We in-
tend to perform these experiments as part of our
ongoing research.
6 Issues of Decontextualization in
Automated Propaganda Detection
It is worth reflecting on the nature of the shared
task dataset (PTC corpus) and its structural cor-
respondence (or lack thereof) to some of the
definitions of propaganda mentioned in the in-
troduction. First, propaganda is a social phe-
nomenon and takes place as an act of communi-
cation (O’Shaughnessy, 2005, 13-14), and so it
is more than a simple information-theoretic mes-
sage of zeros and ones—it also incorporates an
addresser and addressee(s), each in phatic con-
tact (typically via broadcast media), ideally with
a shared denotational code and contextual sur-
round(s) (Jakobson, 1960).
As such, a dataset of decontextualised docu-
ments with labelled sentences, devoid of autho-
rial or publisher metadata, has taken us at some
remove from even a simple everyday definition of
propaganda. Our models for this shared task can-
not easily incorporate information about the ad-
dresser or addressee; are left to assume a shared
denotational code between author and reader (one
perhaps simulated with the use of pre-trained word
embeddings); and they are unaware of when or
where the act(s) of propagandistic communication
took place. This slipperiness is illustrated in our
example document (Fig. 1): note that while Sen-
tences 3 and 7, labelled as propaganda, reflect a
propagandistic attitude on the part of the journal-
ist and/or publisher, Sentence 4—also labelled as
propaganda in the training data—instead reflects a
“flag-waving” propagandistic attitude on the part
of U.S. congressman Jeff Flake, via the conven-
tions of reported speech (Volosˇinov, 1973, 115-
130). While reported speech often is signaled by
specific morphosyntactic patterns (e.g. the use
of double-quotes and “Flake said”) (Spronck and
Nikitina, 2019), we argue that human readers rou-
tinely distinguish propagandistic reportage from
the propagandastic speech acts of its subjects, and
to conflate these categories in a propaganda detec-
tion corpus may contribute to the occurrence of
false positives/negatives.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we have presented a method of in-
corporating cost-sensitivity into BERT to allow for
better generalisation and additionally, we provide
a simple measure of corpus similarity to determine
when this method is likely to be useful. We intend
to extend our analysis of the ability to generalise
models to less similar data by experimenting on
other datasets and models. We hope that the re-
lease of program code and documentation will al-
low the research community to help in this exper-
imentation while exploiting these methods.
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Abstract
In this paper, we describe our system used
in the shared task for fine-grained propaganda
analysis at sentence level. Despite the chal-
lenging nature of the task, our pretrained
BERT model (team YMJA) fine tuned on the
training dataset provided by the shared task
scored 0.62 F1 on the test set and ranked third
among 25 teams who participated in the con-
test. We present a set of illustrative exper-
iments to better understand the performance
of our BERT model on this shared task. Fur-
ther, we explore beyond the given dataset for
false-positive cases that likely to be produced
by our system. We show that despite the high
performance on the given testset, our system
may have the tendency of classifying opinion
pieces as propaganda and cannot distinguish
quotations of propaganda speech from actual
usage of propaganda techniques.
1 Introduction
The NLP4IF shared task for 2019 consists of 451
newspaper articles from 48 news outlets that have
been tagged for characteristics of 18 propaganda
techniques (Da San Martino et al., 2019). The
18 propaganda techniques range from loaded lan-
guage, name calling/labelling, repetition, to log-
ical fallacies such as oversimplification, red her-
ring, etc. Some of the techniques, by definition,
require background knowledge to detect, such as
the identification of slogans, which would first re-
quire one to know of the slogans.
The shared task consists of two subtasks, sen-
tence level classification (SLC) and fragment level
classification (FLC). In this paper, we focus our
discussion on the sentence level classification. The
subtask involves determining for each sentence,
whether the text is ‘propaganda’ or not as a binary
task. The definition of being ‘propaganda’ is that
whether the utterance uses one of the 18 propa-
ganda techniques listed in (Da San Martino et al.,
2019).
In this paper, we describe our fine tuned BERT
model used in the shared task. Our system (team
YMJA) scored 0.62 F1 on the test set and ranked
number third in the final competition for the SLC
task. Further, we perform analyses in order to
better understand the performance of our system.
Specifically, we would like to understand if the
model was able to identify propaganda given ap-
pearances of the defined propaganda techniques,
or if it is exploiting obvious features that may lead
to harmful false-positive examples.
Our results show that trained on the provided
dataset from the shared task, our system may clas-
sify opinion pieces as propaganda and cannot dis-
tinguish quotation of propaganda speech from us-
age of propaganda techniques. We advise that
future applications of propaganda analysis algo-
rithms trained with similar definition of propa-
ganda should be used with caution. We hope the
insights gained from our study can help towards
the design of a more robust system in propaganda
analysis.
2 Related Work
Transformer based models (Vaswani et al., 2017)
such as BERT (Devlin et al., 2018) have swept the
field of natural language process and has led to re-
ported improvements in virtually every task. The
capacity of these models to capture long term de-
pendencies and to represent context in ways useful
for tagging is by now well established with mul-
tiple papers suggesting best practices (Sun et al.,
2019).
Early works have applied machine learning
techniques directly to the problem of propaganda
labelling at article level (Rashkin et al., 2017;
Volkova and Jang, 2018; Barro´n-Cedeno et al.,
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2019), with varying definitions of propaganda.
On the other hand, concerns have been raised re-
garding whether or not transformer based mod-
els themselves (Solaiman et al., 2019) will lead to
propaganda generated by machines to deceive hu-
mans. However, others have argued (Zellers et al.,
2019) that strong fake news generators are an es-
sential part of detecting machine generated propa-
ganda.
3 Fine Tuned BERT models
In principle, this tagging problem in the NLP4IF
shared task is similar to the well studied problem
of sentiment analysis for which there is ample lit-
erature. Our own model draws heavily from a
Kaggle competitor’s shared kernel (Reina, 2019)
built upon the popular PyTorch Transformers li-
braries (Hugging Face, 2019). While that appli-
cation in (Reina, 2019) is targeting toxicity in on-
line comments, a change of labels is sufficient to
make the same model apply to propaganda detec-
tion. The code of our implementation can be found
in the published colab file1.
We retrieved the uncased BERT-large model
from github2 and fine tuned the model on the train-
ing set. We used 10-fold cross validation to create
an ensemble of models. The use of model ensem-
ble techniques (Opitz and Maclin, 1999) to limit
over-training and improve model performance on
held out test data is a well established. This is a
common feature of most Kaggle competitions, de-
spite the fact that the resulting models consume
substantially more resources.
We trained each model for 1 epoch, with batch
size of 32, learning rate of 10−5, decay of 0.01 and
max sentence length of 129. Given the imbalance
of positive and negative labels, we up-weight posi-
tive samples with a factor of 5 in the cross-entropy
loss.
Our ensemble of models scored 0.62 F1 on
the test set and ranked third among 25 teams,
likely because the ensemble decreases the degree
of overfiting.
4 Discussion
Recently, concerns have been raised (Niven and
Kao, 2019) about the way that transformer based
models encode information about the world.
1https://bit.ly/2kYmYwb
2https://github.com/google-research/
bert
There exists a very real possibility that the answers
to questions about what statements are true or pro-
paganda might have been identifications of triv-
ial statistical cues that exist in the training data.
Therefore, in this section, we perform the follow-
ing analysis in order to better understand whether
our system “understands” the true nature of propa-
ganda.
The two largest categories of propaganda tech-
niques being used are loaded language and name
calling/labeling (51% according to (Da San Mar-
tino et al., 2019)). Since these two techniques are
also often used in the scenario of online harass-
ment and trolling, we experiment with tools spe-
cialized in online harassment detection in order
to provide with a baseline. To this end, we use
Perspective API 3. Given an utterance and a de-
fined attribute, the API returns a score between
0 to 1 as an estimate of the probability the ut-
terance contains properties of the attribute. The
attributes are toxicity, severe toxicity, identity at-
tack, insult, profanity, threat, sexually explicit, flir-
tation, inflammatory, obscene, likely to reject (by
New York Times moderators) and unsubstantial.
The details of attributes’ definitions are described
at Perspective API website. We aggregate these
scores as sentence-level features and train a logis-
tic regression on top of them to predict the likeli-
hood of the sentence being propaganda. As shown
in Table 1, the Perspective-API baseline achieves
0.57 F1, with 0.54 precision and 0.60 recall on de-
velopment set, better accuracy than the provided
baseline using sentence length. Given that Per-
spective API was created for an unrelated task, the
performance is surprisingly high and likely results
from a high proportion of certain types of propa-
ganda techniques in the dataset.
In the second analysis we investigate the un-
igrams and bigrams being labeled with highest
likelihood of being propaganda by our trained
BERT model. To this purpose, we fed all unigram
and bigram combinations that appeared in the pro-
vided training set, development set and test set into
our ensemble model to infer their likelihood of be-
ing propaganda. We list the top 20 unigrams and
bigrams with highest probability of being propa-
ganda determined by our system in Table 2. Many
of the shown terms indicate uncivil usage (such as
stupid, coward), or strong emotion (such as terri-
3https://github.com/conversationai/
perspectiveapi/blob/master/api_
reference.md
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Method F1 Precision Recall
Perspective baseline 0.57 0.54 0.60
Sentence length baseline 0.47 0.44 0.51
BERT ensemble 0.66 0.63 0.69
Table 1: Performance of baselines on development set.
unigrams devastating, cruel, vile, irrational, absurd, brutal, vicious, stupid,
coward, awful, ignorant, unbelievable, doomed, idiot, terrifying,
disgusting, horrible, hideous, horrific, pathetic
bigrams shame less, totally insane, a horrible, utterly unacceptable, hys-
terical nonsense, the horrible, this horrific, absolutely disgusting,
monumental stupidity, a pathetic, a disgusting, absolutely worth-
less, truly disgusting, utterly insane, this murderous, incredibly
stupid, monstrous fraud, this lunatic, a disgrace, a hideous
Table 2: Top 20 unigrams and bigrams with highest likelihood of being propaganda.
fying, devastating, horrible). In fact, the inclusion
of such words in sentences would often lead to
the sentence being classified as propaganda. How-
ever, these combinations may as well be used in
opinion pieces published in credible news sources.
Indeed, our system predicts certain titles of opin-
ion pieces as propaganda with high likelihood. For
example, “Devastating news for America’s intelli-
gence”4 published in Washington Post was scored
with 0.85 probability of being propaganda by our
system. Given the definition of this shared task, it
could be the intended behavior that opinion pieces
being considered as propaganda. Nevertheless, it
is important to inform future users of this dataset
and the resulting systems that opinion pieces are
likely going to be classified as propaganda.
Another concern that this analysis raises is the
limited capability of a system like this to distin-
guish quotations from actual usage of propaganda
techniques. News articles often have the need
to quote original speech from political figures or
other events, who might use techniques of propa-
ganda. Our analysis shows that the prediction of
our system is not changed for a sentence when it
is expressed as a quotation and that the mere pres-
ence of trigger words may lead to the classification
of propaganda.
In conclusion, the shared task on fine-grained
propaganda analysis at NLP4IF workshop raises
an important problem and with its dataset provides
a key tool to analyze and evaluate progress. How-
4https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2019/08/02/
devastating-news-americas-intelligence/
ever, as our analysis illustrated, there remains the
challenge that the dataset appears unbalanced in
that it focuses on loaded language and name call-
ing/labelling. This makes it challenging for sys-
tems to capture signals of other more subtle or
complex types of propaganda techniques. For ex-
ample, despite its high performance on the given
test set, our BERT ensemble model trained on
this dataset has high likelihood of failing in a real
world scenario, such as distinguishing quotations
from actual propaganda. We hope this study can
help inform a more refined definition and a more
diverse dataset towards propaganda analysis.
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Abstract
In this paper, we describe our team’s ef-
fort on the fine-grained propaganda detection
on sentence level classification (SLC) task of
NLP4IF 2019 workshop co-located with the
EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019 conference. Our top
performing system results come from applying
ensemble average on three pretrained models
to make their predictions. The first two models
use the uncased and cased versions of Bidirec-
tional Encoder Representations from Trans-
formers (BERT) (Devlin et al., 2018) while
the third model uses Universal Sentence En-
coder (USE) (Cer et al., 2018). Out of 26 par-
ticipating teams, our system is ranked in the
first place with 68.8312 F1-score on the de-
velopment dataset and in the sixth place with
61.3870 F1-score on the testing dataset.
1 Introduction
Propaganda is an information, particularly of a
misleading or biased nature, used to promote cer-
tain causes or views influencing specific audiences
agenda using incorrect claims that might include
emotional delusions.
Thus, propaganda detection problem is a real-
life challenge that can affect how people under-
stand news. Despite the uniqueness of the propa-
ganda detection problem where the sentence can
be affected by the context of the news articles and
biased by external influences like the author writ-
ing style, the problem can still be considered as
a binary sentiment analysis task (Medhat et al.,
2014). Given a sequence of tokens representing
a sentence from an article, tag it with one of two
classes: 0 for non-propaganda or 1 for propa-
ganda.
A new task has been proposed by the Propa-
ganda Analysis Project1 with a new manually an-
1https://propaganda.qcri.org/index.
html
notated dataset at Natural Language Processing
for Internet Freedom 2019 (NLP4IF 2019) work-
shop co-located with EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019 con-
ference. For the full task and dataset descriptions,
readers can refer to (Da San Martino et al., 2019b).
In this paper, we describe our team’s effort to
tackle this problem. Without any preprocessing
steps, we build several models. The first two
use Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT) (Devlin et al., 2018) (un-
cased and cased versions) to extract word em-
beddings, then feed them to a Recurrent Neu-
ral Network (RNN) based on Bidirectional Long
Short-Term Memory (BiLSTM) (Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber, 1997) cells. The third one uses Uni-
versal Sentence Encoder (USE) (Cer et al., 2018)
to extract sentence embeddings, then feeds them to
a shallow Feed-Forward Neural Network (FFNN).
After that, an average ensemble is used to merge
the models predictions. Our system is ranked in
the first place with 68.8312 F1-score on the devel-
opment dataset and in the sixth place with 61.3870
F1-score on the testing dataset out of participating
26 teams. More insights about the teams results
can be found in (Da San Martino et al., 2019a).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we describe our methodology, in-
cluding the pretrained models used and our models
structures, while, in Section 3, we present our ex-
perimental results and discuss some insights from
our models in Section 4. Finally, the paper is con-
cluded in Section 5.
2 Methodology
In this section, we present a detailed description of
the extraction procedure for the word and sentence
embeddings using both BERT and USE pretrained
models. We then discuss the neural network mod-
els built on top of the extracted representations.
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Figure 1: BERT-based models architecture
The implementation is available on a public repos-
itory.2
2.1 BERT-based Models
We use the small version of BERT (Base version)
using each of the uncased and cased models pro-
vided by pytorch− transformers Python pack-
age3 to extract the word embeddings. The uncased
and cased models are separately used to build two
different models using the same RNN architecture.
The usage of the cased version is to benefit from
the cased words which mostly represent the named
entities. As shown in Figure 1, the model can be
divided into four layers/components:
1. Text Tokenization
We use either the uncased or the cased BERT
tokenizer (based on which model we want
to train or inference) to tokenize text before
feeding it to the BERT model. This step is
important to run the BERT model and get the
appropriate contextual words representations
as the pretrained BERT model was trained on
tokenized text (Devlin et al., 2018). The to-
kenizer applies several steps on the text to
2Link removed to maintain anonymity
3https://github.com/huggingface/
pytorch-transformers
tokenize it. For example, it uses the Word-
Piece tokenizer (Wu et al., 2016) to segment
the words into subwords.
2. Embeddings Extraction
After the tokenization step, the tokenized text
runs through the BERT model while saving
the outputs of the hidden layers. The final
embedding vector for each token is the sum-
mation of the last four hidden layers of the
BERT model.
3. RNN Component
The contextual embedding vectors extracted
from the BERT model are fed to two consecu-
tive BiLSTM layers (Hochreiter and Schmid-
huber, 1997) with 128 hidden units, each with
20% dropout rate (Srivastava et al., 2014).
4. Shallow Feed-Forward Neural Network
Component
The thought vector (which is the final state
outputted from the last step by the RNN cell)
taken from the second BiLSTM layer is used
as a representation vector for the input sen-
tence. The vector is used as an input to
two fully-connected layers that have 256 and
128 hidden units, respectively, with ReLU as
their activation function. These layers are fol-
lowed by an output layer with a Sigmoid ac-
tivation function.
The uncased and cased models are trained for 4
and 5 epochs, respectively, on an Nvidia GeForce
GTX 970M GPU in less than 20 minutes to train
each model using Adam optimization algorithm
(Kingma and Ba, 2014) with 0.001 learning rate,
128 batch size, and binary cross-entropy loss func-
tion. As for the inference time on the development
dataset, which contains 2235 sentences, it is 3.5
minutes with an average around 10 sentences per
second.
2.2 USE-based Model
Without any preprocessing steps, we use the
Transformer (Vaswani et al., 2017) version of the
Universal Sentence Encoder (Cer et al., 2018)
model to encode the input sentences into fixed
length vectors of size 512. These vectors are used
as an input to two fully-connected layers with the
same structure as the one used in the BERT shal-
low feed-forward neural network component.
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Figure 2: USE-based model architecture
This model is trained for 5 epochs on an Nvidia
GeForce GTX 970M GPU in less than 5 minutes
using Adam optimization algorithm (Kingma and
Ba, 2014) with 0.001 learning rate, 32 batch size,
and binary cross-entropy loss function. The infer-
encing time for this model is 30 seconds on the
same development dataset with an average of 75
sentences per second.
3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present our experimental results
by comparing our top performing system to sev-
eral other attempts.
Our top performing system consists of three
models. Two of these models are RNN mod-
els trained using contextual word embeddings ex-
tracted from BERT Base model using both un-
cased and cased versions. The uncased version
achieves 66.1827 F1-score on the development
dataset, while the cased version achieves 65.7849
F1-score on the development dataset. The en-
semble average over these two models achieves
67.3279 F1-score on the same dataset. The third
model, which is a shallow FFNN model that
uses sentence embeddings extracted from Univer-
sal Sentences Encoder, achieves 63.7076 F1-score
on the development dataset. Finally, the ensem-
bling of the three models using average ensembing
increases the results to 68.8312 F1-score on the
development dataset, while the results decreased
significantly on the testing dataset with 61.3870
F1-score. We adopted using 0.25 as our threshold
for all experiments because using higher thresh-
olds decreases the results significantly. For ex-
ample, when using threshold 0.5 for the uncased
Table 1: Models results on development and testing
datasets
Model Dataset F1-score
Uncased BERT Dev 66.1827
Cased BERT Dev 65.7849
Uncased BERT +
Cased BERT
Dev 67.3279
USE Dev 63.7076
Uncased BERT +
Cased BERT +
USE
Dev 68.8312
Uncased BERT +
Cased BERT +
USE
Test 61.3870
Table 2: Uncased BERT model experiments results on
development datasets
Model F1-score
More Training 60.6282
3 Fully-Connected Layers 63.3349
3 BiLSTM Layers 65.5619
Duplicating Hidden Units 65.5355
Weighted Attention 65.9804
BERT model, the results decreases to 58.1414 F1-
score on the development dataset. Table 1 shows
the models results on development and testing
datasets.
We reach the previously mentioned uncased
model that achieves 66.1827 F1-score after con-
ducting several experiments to explore the effect
of applying different techniques on the network
structure. The first experiment was to train the
model for 10 epochs instead of 5, which yielded
60.6282 F1-score. Secondly, 3 fully-connected
layers were used in training instead of 2. This re-
duced the result to 63.3349 F1-score. Similarly,
an extra BiLSTM layer was added to the model,
which decreased the result to 65.5619 F1-score.
Then, we tried to duplicate the number of hidden
units in each layers, yielding 65.5355 F1-score.
Finally, we applied a sequence weighted attention
(Felbo et al., 2017) on the outputs of the second
BiLSTM layer. The output attention vector was
used as a sentence representation instead of the
thought vector, but the results did not improve giv-
ing 65.9804 F1-score. Table 2 shows the uncased
BERT model experiments results on developments
dataset.
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4 Discussion
Although the USE model did not perform well
compared to either the uncased or the cased
BERT models (with 63.7076 F1-score compared
to 66.1827 and 65.7849, respectively), adding the
USE model to the ensemble average on top of both
BERT models increases the results on the devel-
opment dataset by around 1.5 F1-score. This indi-
cates that the sentences representations from USE
model could have captured unique information
from the sentences which BERT models missed.
Similarly, BERT cased performs worse than BERT
uncased, but it increases its results by about 1.15
F1-score as it can differentiate the named entities
which highly affects the semantic meanings.
It is worth noting that the results for all the
teams significantly decreased in the testing dataset
compared to their corresponding results on the de-
velopment dataset. This is probably due to the
fact that the testing dataset has a different distribu-
tion from the development dataset, which makes it
harder to predict the outcome from such difference
especially given a relatively small training dataset.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present our work on propaganda
detection on sentence level classification, where
we implemented three different models, two are
based on BERT with uncased and cased versions
and the last one uses USE. All these models build
useful sentence representation which are used to
make predictions. The ensemble average of these
models achieved the first place with 68.8312 F1-
score on the development dataset and in the sixth
place with 61.3870 F1-score on the testing dataset
out of 26 participating teams.
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Abstract
In this paper, we describe our approach and
system description for NLP4IF 2019 Work-
shop: Shared Task on Fine-Grained Propa-
ganda Detection. Given a sentence from a
news article, the task is to detect whether the
sentence contains a propagandistic agenda or
not. The main contribution of our work is to
evaluate the effectiveness of various transfer
learning approaches like ELMo, BERT, and
RoBERTa for propaganda detection. We show
the use of Document Embeddings on the top
of Stacked Embeddings combined with LSTM
for identification of propagandistic context in
the sentence. We further provide analysis of
these models to show the effect of oversam-
pling on the provided dataset. In the final test-
set evaluation, our system ranked 21st with
F1-score of 0.43 in the SLC Task.
1 Introduction and Background
Propaganda is the deliberate spreading of ideas,
facts or allegations with the aim of influencing
the opinions or the actions of an individual or a
group. Propaganda uses rhetorical and psycho-
logical techniques that are intended to go unno-
ticed to achieve maximum effect. Social media
has contributed immensely in spreading these pro-
pagandistic articles reaching million users instan-
taneously. These articles may also lead to fake
news circulation, election bias or misinformation
thereby having adverse societal and political im-
pact (Lewandowsky et al., 2017). Hence, there is
an urgent need to detect these propagandistic arti-
cles and stop them from proliferating.
Propaganda Detection is the technique to auto-
matically detect the use of propaganda in news
articles. This will help to identify news outlets
or articles that are biased and are trying to in-
fluence people’s mindset and spread awareness
limiting the impact of propaganda and help in
fighting disinformation. Generally, propagandistic
news articles use techniques like whataboutism,
loaded-language, name-calling or bandwagon, etc
(Da San Martino et al., 2019b). Detecting these
techniques can help to easily identify propagandis-
tic articles. This work aims to provide an approach
that can accurately classify articles as Propagan-
distic or Non-Propagandistic.
Recently, there has been a lot of interest in
studying bias and disinformation in news articles
and social media (Baly et al., 2018; Gupta and
Kumaraguru, 2018). Terms such as Propaganda
detection, Fact-Checking, Fake News identifica-
tion, etc. have started to gain huge attention in
the domain of NLP (Rashkin et al., 2017; Volkova
et al., 2017). Our work is an enhancement in this
domain with the employment of recent state-of-
the-art deep learning methods and architectures
like ELMo (Peters et al., 2018) and BERT (Devlin
et al., 2018).
Fine-Grained Analysis of propaganda in news
articles (Da San Martino et al., 2019a) focuses on
identifying the instances of use of specific pro-
paganda techniques in the news article through
a multi-granularity network. In this direction,
Proppy - a system to unmask propaganda in online
news (Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019) was developed
which monitors a number of news sources, dedu-
plicates and clusters them into events on the basis
of propagandistic content likelihood using various
NLP techniques. With this motivation, two shared
tasks for Fine-Grained Propaganda Detection were
conducted as a part of “Second Workshop on NLP
for Internet Freedom (NLP4IF): Censorship, Dis-
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information, and Propaganda”, EMNLP-IJCNLP
2019 (Da San Martino et al., 2019a). Our team
participated in the Sentence Level Classification
(SLC) Task of the workshop. The details for the
task is as follows:
Problem Definition SLC Task: Given a la-
belled training dataset D with a set of sentences,
the objective of the task is to learn a binary clas-
sification/prediction function that predicts a la-
bel l, l ∈ {propaganda, non-propaganda} for a
given sentence S, where propaganda: denotes the
sentence containing propagandistic fragment and
non-propaganda: denotes the sentence not con-
taining any propagandistic fragment
Towards this objective we make the following
contributions in this work:
1. We train transformer-based models like
ELMo, BERT and RoBERTa with the pro-
vided dataset and show the effectiveness of
transfer learning on downstream tasks in the
domain of propaganda detection.
2. We show the use of document embeddings on
a combination of multiple models for iden-
tifying whether the sentence contains propa-
gandistic fragments or not.
3. We also show that these models do not per-
form very well on highly imbalanced datasets
and thus require re-sampling techniques such
as class oversampling to give better results on
classification tasks.
4. We also present the comparison of these pre-
trained transformer-based architectures with
classical algorithms such as Naive Bayes, Lo-
gistic Regression and SVM.
Further, we have organised the paper as follows:
In Section-2 we discuss the experimental setup
adopted for this task. Section-3 details about the
results for the experimented models followed by
error analysis of the best model. Finally, Section-
5 highlights the concluding remarks and the future
work of the performed study.
2 Experimental Setup
This section provides an overview of the dataset
used for training and evaluation along with the de-
tails of the various models used in this work.
Label Train
Propaganda 4720
Non-Propaganda 12245
Table 1: Data Distribution
2.1 Dataset
The dataset for the SLC Task used in all of
our experiments is provided by the organisers of
NLP4IF. This data comes in the form of news ar-
ticles given in TXT format. Each article starts
with the title followed by an empty line and news-
article body with the Labels for each article pro-
vided in a separate file.
The dataset is divided into training and devel-
opment set where the labels are distributed as
{propaganda, non-propaganda}. The training set
consists of 16,965 examples of which 4,720 con-
tain one or more propagandistic fragments and the
remaining (12,245) do not. Figure 1 (Blue) ex-
hibits the distribution of the data in the training
set. The unlabelled development and test set were
used for evaluation in our experiments. The stan-
dard evaluation measure for this task was F1-score
even though precision and recall are reported.
As it is clearly evident from Fig.1 (Blue), there
is a high imbalance between distribution of sen-
tences that are propaganda and non-propaganda,
which also happens in case of a real world dataset.
We deal with this high data disproportion by the
technique of class oversampling. For this, we just
randomly select and duplicate the propaganda sen-
tences so that the ratio changes from 3:1 to 3:2
approximately. Fig.1 (Red) shows the distribution
between both the classes after oversampling.
Figure 1: Distribution of Classes in Training Set
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Table 2: Model Architectures used for training and their optimal hyperparameters
Model Hyperparameters
BERT-1 BERT-Base-Uncased
batch-size=32, learning-rate=2e-5,epochs=3
BERT-2 DocumentEmbeddings {Stacked Embeddings BERT + GRU + Dropout (p=0.5)}
batch-size=32, learning-rate=0.01,epochs=2, anneal-factor=0.5, patience=5
ELMo-1 DocumentEmbeddings {Stacked Embeddings ELMo + GRU + Dropout (p=0.5)}
batch-size=64, learning-rate=1e-1,epochs=2, anneal-factor=0.5, patience=5
ELMo-2 DocumentEmbeddings {Stacked Embeddings ELMo + FLAIR Embeddings (forward
+ backward) + GRU + Dropout (p=0.5)}
batch-size=64, learning-rate=0.001,epochs=3, anneal-factor=0.5, patience=5
RoBERTa DocumentEmbeddings {Stacked Embeddings RoBERTa + GRU + Dropout(p=0.5)}
batch-size=64, learning-rate=0.001,epochs=2, anneal-factor=0.5, patience=5
2.2 Training Models
Transfer Learning has recently been one of the
most effective methods in NLP. The key idea is
to use a language model pretrained on a large cor-
pus to transfer the information onto a downstream
task. Fine-tuning these large pre-trained models
produce very good results especially when there
are small datasets available for training. Hence,
for this task, we mainly use transformer-based
models such as RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019), BERT
and ELMo models as they have shown great suc-
cess in handling language based tasks across var-
ious domains. Training was largely done using
Flair framework1 (Akbik et al., 2019) along with
AllenNLP library2 (Gardner et al., 2018). Pre-
trained Stacked Embeddings are used to com-
bine embeddings from multiple models. Docu-
ment representation is then generated by applying
LSTM over the stacked word embeddings in the
document. Now we describe each of the models in
brief:
Embeddings from Language Model (ELMo):
We use the FLAIR implementation of ELMo by
fine-tuning the pretrained stacked weights on Doc-
ument Embeddings (ELMo-1). ELMo goes be-
yond the traditional word embeddings approach
by producing context-sensitive features in a bi-
directional manner. Left-to-right and right-to-left
representations are concatenated to form an im-
mediate word vector which are then fed to sub-
sequent layers. Thus, ELMo can be effective for
1https://github.com/zalandoresearch/
flair
2https://github.com/allenai/allennlp
detecting words with propagandist context in the
sentence even though the word by itself does not
contain any propagandistic sentiment. We find
the optimal parameters and train the model over
original and oversampled dataset. Apart from
this, we also experiment with a combination of
Pretrained ELMo embeddings with FLAIR word-
embeddings (ELMo-2).
Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (BERT) outperformed most of the
existing systems on various NLP tasks by us-
ing a masked language model (MLM) pre-training
method. Moreover, instead of reading the sentence
in a sequential manner (left-to-right or right-to-
left), BERT reads the entire sequence at once in
a unidirectional manner. In addition, BERT goes
deeper by expanding the base model to 12 lay-
ers while ELMo is a shallower model with only 2
LSTM layers. We use the Tensorflow 3 implemen-
tation of the BERT-base-uncased model by fine-
tuning it with best parameters (BERT-1). Doc-
umentRNN implementation of the Stacked pre-
trained BERT along with LSTM is done using
FLAIR (BERT-2).
RoBERTa moves one step ahead of BERT by
pre-training the model over larger data and with
bigger batches. This approach improved previous
state-of-the-art on certain tasks by choosing better
training strategies and design choices. We trained
a RoBERTa classifier by finding the best param-
eters over both original and oversampled dataset
using the FLAIR framework.
3https://github.com/google-research/
bert
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We also experiment with classical algorithms
such as MultinomialNB, Logistic Regression and
Support Vector Classifier for comparison.
3 Results
In this section, we briefly summarize the evalua-
tion and results of the models used for the task.
The metric used for evaluation is standard F1
score. In addition, precision (Pr) and recall (Rc)
are also reported.
Table 3 represents the performance of all the
models trained on the training dataset and evalu-
ated on the development data for the SLC Task.
We see that the RoBERTa model gives the best
performance on the oversampled dataset for the
detection of propaganda in news articles with an
F1 score of 0.60 and a recall of 0.79. The high-
est precision of 0.66 was recorded by SVM and
BERT-1 model. The results obtained from Table
3 show that models such as Naive Bayes, Logistic
Regression and SVM perform decent with respect
to deep learning-based models for the classifica-
tion of propaganda in sentences.
Table 3: Performance of different models on develop-
ment data for SLC Task
Model F1 Pr Rc
Naive Bayes
(count vectorizer) 0.44 0.57 0.36
Logistic Regression
(count vectorizer) 0.41 0.58 0.31
SVM (Linear Kernel)
(tf-idf vectorizer) 0.40 0.66 0.28
BERT-1 0.57 0.66 0.51
BERT-2 0.55 0.45 0.73
ELMo-1 0.51 0.46 0.56
ELMo-2 0.49 0.61 0.40
RoBERTa 0.60 0.49 0.79
Further, the performance of the transformer
models were also evaluated on the original train-
ing dataset to observe the effect of oversampling.
Fig. 2 helps us to compare the F1 scores of these
models. We observe that oversampling the exam-
ples of the minority class i.e. propaganda in this
dataset, provides a significant improvement in the
classification performance.
Figure 2: Effect of oversampling on the training data
for different models
4 Error Analysis
In this section, we briefly highlight the error analy-
sis of our best performing model ”RoBERTa” with
oversampled data. Since the labels for the devel-
opment and the test set were not provided, the
analysis is done on the test set synthetically cre-
ated from the training dataset. 20 percent of the
sentences were randomly chosen as the test set for
prediction. Fig.3 shows the confusion matrix for
the test data. In general, the most incorrect predic-
tions were made for the non-propaganda classes
while the model performed pretty good on detect-
ing the propagandistic sentences.
Figure 3: Confusion Matrix on 8:2 Training to Testing
split
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we report our models and their
respective performance in SLC task of ”Sec-
ond Workshop on NLP for Internet Freedom
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(NLP4IF): Censorship, Disinformation, and Pro-
paganda”, EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019. We showed
how transfer learning of transformer-based pre-
trained models perform well with the provided
dataset. Our final submission on test set was made
from BERT-1 weights and the team ranked 21st
with an F1 score of 0.43 in the SLC Task in the
final evaluation of the test set. Hence, there is a
significant room for improvement.
In the future, we would like to investigate the ef-
fectiveness of these models on the FLC Task of the
workshop where the aim is to detect fine-grained
propaganda techniques from 18 different classes.
In particular, we intend to conduct a comprehen-
sive analysis of the task by cleaning the annotated
data and drawing out patterns specific to the given
problem of propaganda detection. We would also
like to experiment with other machine learning ar-
chitectures like OpenAIGPT2, XLNet, etc for bet-
ter performances specific to the dataset.
6 Code and Reproducibility
We provide the code for FLAIR based models
on the Github Repository located at https:
//github.com/Kartikaggarwal98/
Propaganda_Detection-NLP4IF. The
results can be reproduced using the weights for
the models provided in the github repository. The
Tensorflow implementation of the BERT-1 model
can be reproduced using https://github.
com/google-research/bert. The datasets
for the tasks are not provided according to the
workshop guidelines.
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Abstract
In recent years, the need for communication
increased in online social media. Propaganda
is a mechanism which was used throughout
history to influence public opinion and it is
gaining a new dimension with the rising inter-
est of online social media. This paper presents
our submission to NLP4IF-2019 Shared Task
SLC: Sentence-level Propaganda Detection in
news articles. The challenge of this task is
to build a robust binary classifier able to pro-
vide corresponding propaganda labels, propa-
ganda or non-propaganda. Our model relies
on a unified neural network, which consists of
several deep leaning modules, namely BERT,
BiLSTM and Capsule, to solve the sentence-
level propaganda classification problem. In
addition, we take a pre-training approach on
a somewhat similar task (i.e., emotion clas-
sification) improving results against the cold-
start model. Among the 26 participant teams
in the NLP4IF-2019 Task SLC, our solution
ranked 12th with an F1-score 0.5868 on the
official test data. Our proposed solution indi-
cates promising results since our system sig-
nificantly exceeds the baseline approach of the
task organizers by 0.1521 and is slightly lower
than the winning system by 0.0454.
1 Introduction
The most widely agreed upon definition of pro-
paganda was formulated by the Institute for Pro-
paganda Analysis (1937) and describes the phe-
nomenon as actions exercised by individuals or
groups with the purpose of influencing the opin-
ions of target individuals. This phenomenon was
present in the news industry throughout history.
However, the concern over the presence of propa-
ganda techniques in news articles has grown expo-
nentially since the rise of social media platforms,
especially after the massive impact it had in recent
political events, such as the US 2016 elections or
Brexit (Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al., 2019a).
Automating the detection of propaganda in
news articles is considered very difficult since pro-
paganda uses various techniques (Da San Mar-
tino et al., 2019) that, in order to achieve the
pursued effect, should not be discovered by the
target individuals. The Shared Task of Fine-
grained Propaganda Detection of NLP4IF work-
shop (Da San Martino et al., 2019) consists in
two tasks: FLC (Fragment-level Classification)
and SLC (Sentence-level Classification). We par-
ticipated in the SLC task which implied sentence-
level classification for the presence of propaganda.
Recently, a series of approaches have been stud-
ied in respect to language modeling to obtain a
deeper understanding of language (Devlin et al.,
2018; Peters et al., 2018; Radford et al., 2018).
Thus, the latest solutions of obtaining language
representations keep track of the word context to
model the relationship between words. Here, we
choose to use Bidirectional Encoder Representa-
tions from Transformers (BERT) embeddings as
it showed performance improvements on a se-
ries of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks,
such as the SQuAD v1.1 and SWAG datasets (De-
vlin et al., 2018). Moreover, we aim to study
the newly developed architecture of Capsule Net-
works (Sabour et al., 2017) which were first ap-
plied in the field of computer vision (Xi et al.,
2017). Between the word embeddings generated
by BERT and the Capsule layer, we integrate
a Bidirectional Long Short-Term Memory (BiL-
STM) (Schuster and Paliwal, 1997) layer to cap-
ture the semantic features of the human language
by cumulating prior and future knowledge for ev-
ery input token.
In our paper, we analyze the impact of dif-
ferent architectures based on the main compo-
nents previously mentioned in order to validate
our final unified model, namely BERT-BiLSTM-
Capsule. Moreover, we study the relationship be-
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Figure 1: BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model architecture.
tween emotions and the presence of propaganda
by pretraining the BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model
on an emotion labeled dataset. We therefore use
the learned weights as a starting point for training
on the propaganda dataset.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: in Section 2, we present an analysis of the
literature on the topic of propaganda detection, in
Section 3 we offer an in-depth description of our
system and in the Section 4 we present the exper-
imental setup and the results obtained in the SLC
challenge. Finally, we present the conclusions of
this work.
2 Related work
At first, the task of automated propaganda detec-
tion was approached as a subtask of the broader
problem imposed by fake news detection (Tray-
lor et al., 2019). The automated detection of fake
news has gained a massive interest in the research
community with the rise of machine learning al-
gorithms that enabled the development of power-
ful NLP techniques. One of the consecrated fake
news dataset was created by (Shu et al., 2018) and
the authors also presented an overview of the data
mining based techniques employed for this task
and their results in (Shu et al., 2017).
In recent research, propaganda detection in
news articles was approached as a standalone
problem (Da San Martino et al., 2019). The first
part of the task consists of creating a correctly la-
beled dataset. Some of the earlier works (Rashkin
et al., 2017) attempted labeling news outlets as
trustworthy or not and considering all the articles
published by an outlet as having the same label.
This method was proved inaccurate, as propagan-
distic news outlets also publish objective articles
in order to gain readers’ trust. Barro´n-Ceden˜o
et al. (2019a); Barro´n-Cedeno et al. (2019b) de-
signed Proppy, a real time propaganda detection
system designed to monitor news sources, which
computes a propaganda index using a maximum
entropy classifier based on a variety of features
including n-grams, readability scores and lexicon
features. Baisa et al. (2017) introduced a corpus
of more than 5,000 Czech newspaper articles an-
notated for propaganda use, with a large set of fea-
tures extracted for each one.
Most recently, Da San Martino et al. (2019)
proposed a different annotation level, where not
only the articles are labeled individually in a bi-
nary way (propagandistic or non-propagandistic),
but also each fragment of a sentence containing
one of eighteen identified propaganda techniques
is labeled accordingly. The authors also test sev-
eral state-of-the-art NLP models such as BERT,
obtaining promising results in both binary classi-
fication and identifying individual propagandistic
fragments.
3 Methodology
3.1 BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule Model
In this subsection, a detailed description of the
BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model is presented. A
high-level overview of our model is illustrated in
Figure 1.
BERT Layer. In order to obtain word encod-
ings from the raw sentence, we use BERT (Devlin
et al., 2018). The BERT model is based on the
Transformer architecture (Vaswani et al., 2017)
which follows an encoder-decoder design com-
monly used in neural machine translation.
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BERT model stacks multiple Transformer lay-
ers to obtain a deeper representation of the in-
put and applies a masking procedure on the token
sequence named Masking Language Model. In
contrast to the masking procedure used in Trans-
former architecture, which performs a sequential
masking of the words by replacing the words to
be predicted with a mask token, BERT masks a
percentage of words at random, determining the
bidirectional characteristic of the model. This pro-
cedure enables BERT to attain information sur-
rounding the masked word in both directions and
also enables a human-like approach in determin-
ing a missing word within a context.
BERT model comes in two sizes: BERT-Base
(L=12, H=768, A=12, # of parameters=110M) and
BERT-Large (L=24, H=1024, A=16, # of param-
eters=340M), where L means layer, H means hid-
den, and A means attention heads. In our imple-
mentation, we used the BERT-Large model with
pretrained weights1.
The BERT model could take as input a sen-
tence or a pair of sentences depending on the task
in hand. The input sentence is represented by a
vector of indices, a mapping of the raw sentence
words into integer values accordingly to a dictio-
nary based on the BERT vocabulary.
In our model, we use a single sentence as input
to the BERT model. We extract the last encoder
layer as the output of the BERT layer, which will
be further used as input layer to the BiLSTM layer.
To decrease the chance of overfitting, we add a
spatial dropout layer (Srivastava et al., 2014) af-
ter the BERT layer.
BiLSTM Layer. The BiLSTM layer (Schuster
and Paliwal, 1997) takes as input the output of the
BERT model which returns a sequence V ∈ Rt×d
where t is the number of encoded tokens returned
by the last BERT layer, matching the number of
tokens provided as input to the BERT model, and
d the dimension of the token encoding. The BiL-
STM layer consists of two LSTM layers which
processes the input from both left to right and vice
versa. Each LSTM produces a sequence of hidden
states h which encodes the current token and the
prior knowledge of the processed tokens. The re-
sulting hidden states of each LSTM cell for both
directions
−→
hl and
←−
hl are concatenated together for
each time step i = 1 . . . t with t the number of
input tokens. The resulted sequence of t hidden
1https://github.com/google-research/bert
states hi =
−→
hl |←−hl is then passed to the next layer.
Capsule Layer. The Capsule Networks
(Sabour et al., 2017; Hinton et al., 2018) proposed
a new approach in selecting the most salient fea-
tures extracted by precedent layers, acting as a
replacement for the more common Max Pooling
technique. The Max Pooling step implies drop-
ping the knowledge gathered by activation of sev-
eral neurons depending on the window of Max
Pooling and passing forward only the boldest fea-
tures, which might imply ignoring relevant infor-
mation. Capsule Networks not only overcome this
disadvantage but also propose a more intuitive ap-
proach in determining the presence of concepts by
grouping information from a hierarchical stand-
point, base concepts validating the existence of
more complex ones.
We used a two-layer Capsule Network to deter-
mine the relationship between concepts, a primary
capsule layer to capture the instantiated parame-
ters from previous layers and a convolutional Cap-
sule layer to determine the routing between cap-
sules.
The primary capsule layer applies a convolu-
tional operation over the sequence of hidden states
x ∈ Rt×d from the previous layer where t is the
number of embedded tokens and d the dimension
of the embedding. In our case, depending on the
chosen architecture, the embedding sequence x
comes from the recurrent layer or directly from
the output token embeddings of the BERT layer.
Connection between capsules is determined by a
procedure called routing-by-agreement.
Figure 2: Class label distribution for SLC propaganda
dataset.
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Dense Layer. The results of the Capsule layer
are flattened, and a dense layer is stacked on top
of them. In order to make the model more robust
to overfitting, we add both a batch normalization
layer as well as a dropout layer. The output is
then passed to a final dense layer consisting of 2
neurons, one for each class, propaganda or non-
propaganda. Softmax activation is used over the
output layer to generate a probability distribution
over the two classes.
3.2 BERT-Emotion System
In our proposed model, we freeze the BERT trans-
former layers to preserve the already pretrained
weights and only fine-tune the BiLSTM, Capsule
and Dense layers. This procedure is applied with
success in the field of computer vision, transfer-
ring and freezing the weights of top-performing
models becoming a common practice in order to
conserve the feature extractive layers. This dras-
tically reduces the computational power required
for training step with a slightly lower perfor-
mance than fine-tuning all the BERT layers (Belt-
agy et al., 2019).
This procedure is applied in training of the
BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model on both datasets,
i.e., propaganda and emotion. After training the
BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model on the emotion
dataset, we use the learned weights to initialize the
model to be trained on the propaganda task. We
will further refer to it as BERT-Emotion.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Data
The SLC task provides a dataset containing 350
articles, annotated for the presence of propaganda
with two labels: propaganda and non-propaganda,
for the training step.
We use an additional dataset annotated for emo-
tion and perform a transfer learning step to ini-
tialize the weights of the BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule
model trained on the propaganda task. The emo-
tion dataset is obtained by unifying a series of
datasets annotated for different classes of emo-
tions. A solution2 of unifying multiple emo-
tion datasets was proposed by Bostan and Klinger
(2018). To this dataset, we add the Daily dialogue
dataset (Li et al., 2017) that contains 11,318 tran-
scribed dialogues manually annotated for 7 emo-
tions: neutral, anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sad-
2https://github.com/sarnthil/unify-emotion-datasets
ness and surprise. The third dataset we use to
augment the emotion dataset is the Semeval-2019
Task 3 dataset (Chatterjee et al., 2019) containing
15k records for three emotion classes (i.e., happy,
sad and angry) and 15k records not belonging to
any of the previously mentioned emotion classes.
From the resulted dataset, only the entries anno-
tated for the 4 basic emotions are selected, namely
neutral, joy, anger and sadness.
4.2 Preprocessing
The provided dataset contains empty strings which
are labeled as non-propaganda. We extract all
the non-empty entries from the SLC dataset.
The obtained dataset contains 16,297 sentences.
The distribution between propaganda and non-
propaganda classes in the resulted dataset is illus-
trated in Figure 2.
Because the emotion dataset suffers from severe
class imbalance, we decided to restrict the number
of samples of the neutral class, which has the high-
est presence, to 30k entries. The class distribution
of the obtained emotion dataset is shown in Figure
3.
Figure 3: Class label distribution for emotion unified
dataset.
We further split both the propaganda and emo-
tion datasets in train and validation sets with the
following ratio 0.9/0.1. Because the class distribu-
tion is not balanced, we preserve the initial distri-
bution in both splits to keep the validation results
relevant for the model’s performance.
For the preprocessing step, we use the BERT to-
kenizer to transpose each word into corresponding
index based on the BERT vocabulary. This vo-
cabulary contains entries for 30,522 tokens. The
resulting sentence encoding is delimited by the
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[CLS] token at the start of the sentence and by the
[SEP] token at the end.
4.3 Experimental Settings
During the experiments, we use the Adam opti-
mizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014) with a learning rate
of 0.001 which decreases with a factor of 0.1 after
7 epochs of no improvement until a lower bound
of 10-e5. The BiLSTM hidden size is set to 200
and the second last dense layer has a size of 100.
The Dropout technique is used with a probability
of 0.12 on the features extracted by capsules and a
spatial dropout of 0.1 on the embeddings returned
by the BERT layer. For the Capsule layer, we also
use 10 capsules of dimension 10. The hyperpa-
rameters for our model were chosen empirically.
After performing the stratified splitting of the
propaganda dataset into training and validation
sets, the class distribution remains unchanged in
both splits, the propaganda and non-propaganda
classes maintaining the original ratio 0.72/0.28.
We use a weighted cross-entropy loss in order to
increase the amount of attention paid to samples
from an under-represented class. The weights as-
sociated for every class are computed as follow:
1
wn
=
an
n∑
t=1
at
(1)
where an represents the number of samples of
class n in training set. A similar approach is used
in training the BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model on
the emotion dataset.
4.4 Results
Effect of Various Model Parts. First, we study
the impact of each component of our BERT-
BiLSTM-Capsule model by removing one layer
at a time and retraining the resulted model on the
propaganda dataset. The ablation study on the
components of our model enables to objectively
choose the top performing architecture. Because
the F1 score is the official metric by which the
challenge evaluation is made, we assess the per-
formance of each architecture with respect to it.
The results are shown in Table 1. The BERT-
BiLSTM-Capsule model outperforms the other ar-
chitectures by over 2.1% and achieves highest pre-
cision. Based on these results, we choose to use
the BERT-BiLSTM-Capsule model for the trans-
fer learning step.
Model Rec. Prec. F1 Acc.
BERT-
BiLSTM
0.8557 0.8292 0.5909 0.7723
BERT-
Capsule
0.8506 0.8284 0.5870 0.7687
BERT-
BiLSTM-
Capsule
0.8126 0.8508 0.6164 0.7656
Table 1: Ablation study of our BERT-BiLSTM-
Capsule model on the validation set. For each metric,
the best result is highlighted in bold.
Comparison with our Baselines. We test our
proposed solution against two baseline models to
validate our BERT-Emotion system. The baseline
methods are described below, and we report their
results in Table 2.
Model Rec. Prec. F1 Acc.
XG-
Boost
0.6737 0.4862 0.5648 0.6993
BERT-
Simple
0.7797 0.8543 0.6086 0.7490
BERT-
Emotion
0.8082 0.8618 0.6338 0.7717
Table 2: Comparative results against our base models
on the validation set. The best results are shown in
boldface.
First baseline model is represented by the sim-
ple BERT model in which we unfreeze the last
dense layer and add another dense layer of size
2 with softmax activation to map the obtained fea-
tures to the output propaganda classes. We will
refer to it as BERT-Simple.
As a second baseline model, we used an XG-
Boost classifier (Chen and Guestrin, 2016) based
on the following features:
• First, the lemma of the words was extracted
and the TF-IDF scores (Jones, 2004) were
computed for the n-grams obtained, with n =
1, 2, 3.
• Secondly, parts of speech were tags were ex-
tracted using the NLTK Python package3 and
the TF-IDF scores were computed for the tag
n-grams obtained, with n = 1, 2, 3.
• Thirdly, TF-IDF scores were computed for
character n-grams, with n=1, 2, 3.
3https://www.nltk.org/
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System Rec. Prec. F1
Ituorp (1nd) 0.6648 0.6028 0.6323
BERT-Emotion
(12th place)
0.5747 0.5995 0.5868
SLC baseline 0.4941 0.3880 0.4347
Table 3: Comparative analysis against the official base-
line result as well as the best performer of the SLC task.
Our result is shown in boldface.
Figure 4: Learning curve on the training set.
• Sentiment analysis features were obtained us-
ing the VADER tool (Hutto et al., 2015).
• Other lexical features were added, such as
number of characters, words, syllables and
the Flesch-Kincaid readability score (Kincaid
et al., 1975).
Leaderboard. We submitted for evaluation our
BERT-Emotion system and obtained competitive
results on the SLC task. In Table 3, we present our
results on the test set in comparison to the SLC
task baseline and the highest-ranking team.
Effect of Size of the Training Data. In order to
determine the correlation between the number of
samples provided in training set and the F1 score
obtained on the validation set, we choose to plot
the learning curve. Thus, we study the data insuf-
ficiency issue for our model and examine the pos-
sible need of a larger training dataset in achieving
a better performance. We split the training set in
10 blocks, every block employing a percent of the
original training dataset between 10% and 100%
with a step of 10%. In splitting the original train-
ing set, we maintain the original class distribution
to keep the relevance of the results. Figure 4 plots
the obtained results.
Our model’s performance on the validation set
is dependent on the dataset size until the 5th block
containing 50% of the original dataset, after which
the learning curve reaches a plateau. This implies
not only that the amount of data provided for train-
ing is sufficient but also that our model has a good
understanding of the data, being capable to ab-
stract the knowledge needed for the propaganda
classification task and successfully generalize the
learned information on the new data.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we described our system (BERT-
Emotion) submitted to the Shared Task of Fine-
grained Propaganda Detection of the NLP4IF
2019 workshop. We proposed a transfer learn-
ing approach by pretraining our BERT-BiLSTM-
Capsule model on a distinct task (i.e., emotion
classification), procedure which has proven to suc-
cessfully increase our system’s inference ability
on the target task (i.e., sentence-level propaganda
classification). We based our model on the BERT-
Large version for getting word embeddings in-
stead of classical pretrained embeddings and ex-
plore the promising design of Capsule Networks.
Our final system obtained substantial improve-
ments against competition official baseline and
our baseline systems as well. In the future, we
intend to adopt additional contextualized embed-
dings such as ELMo (Peters et al., 2018) and
FLAIR (Akbik et al., 2018) to test the BERT-
Emotion performance.
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Abstract
This paper presents a method of detecting
fine-grained categories of propaganda in text.
Given a sentence, our method aims to identify
a span of words and predict the type of propa-
ganda used. To detect propaganda, we explore
a method for extracting features of propaganda
from contextualized embeddings without fine-
tuning the large parameters of the base model.
We show that by generating synthetic em-
beddings we can train a linear function with
ReLU activation to extract useful labeled em-
beddings from an embedding space generated
by a general-purpose language model. We also
introduce an inference technique to detect con-
tinuous spans in sequences of propaganda to-
kens in sentences. A result of the ensemble
model is submitted to the first shared task in
fine-grained propaganda detection at NLP4IF
as Team Stalin. In this paper, we provide ad-
ditional analysis regarding our method of de-
tecting spans of propaganda with synthetically
generated representations.
1 Introduction
Automatic propaganda identification is a task
which requires a full set of natural language tech-
nologies, including language understanding, dis-
course analysis, common-sense reasoning, fact-
checking and many more. By focusing on the
genre to political news articles, it is possible to
some extent identify content expressing propa-
ganda based on its stylistic features, readability
level, and keyword features (Barro´n-Cedeno et al.,
2019).
We propose a simple method for extracting and
curating features of propaganda by utilizing con-
textualized token representations obtained from
pre-trained language models. Contextualized to-
ken representations have been used successfully
* Authors sorted alphabetically.
in several natural language understanding tasks,
such as question answering, natural language in-
ference and more (Devlin et al., 2019; Peters et al.,
2018a; Wang et al., 2018). A contextualized token
embeddning represent a token in-context, i.e. the
same word in different contexts will have different
contextualized embeddnings. The embeddnings
in this paper is used for the task of identifying
fine-grained propaganda. The task of fine-grained
propaganda detection is defined as finding which
spans of tokens in a text express some type of pro-
paganda.
The standard procedure for using pre-trained
models is to train a language model on unla-
beled data, then fine-tune its learned feature rep-
resentations as contextual embeddings on specific
tasks. Often, the fine-tuning of pre-trained lan-
guage models require a large annotated dataset to
be able to extract invariant and discriminatory fea-
tures for the task. While fine-grained propaganda
detection potentially can benefit from the these
model designs, the available annotated data for
fine-grained propaganda techniques is relatively
small. This pose a problem, as the distribution of
propaganda classes is imbalanced, in addition to
the dataset being small.
In this paper, we explore a data augmentation
procedure aimed at balancing the dataset by gener-
ating synthetic contextualized embeddings of pro-
paganda techniques based on expert annotations.
This address the problem of fine-tuning the model
for our task, as we both balance the class distribu-
tions and increase the size of the dataset.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
low: Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the
task, Section 3 presents a detailed description of
our system, and in Section 4 an evaluation of our
system is performed and discussed.
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Figure 1: The STALin system architecture
2 Task overview
The task our system is trying to solve is the fol-
lowing: given a text, identify all spans of text (can
be multiple tokens) that contain propaganda. Pro-
paganda is categorized into 18 different classes,
spanning single tokens in some cases and longer
phrases in other. Thus, a successful system must
identify both short and long spans of text that
include propaganda. While some classes ap-
pear simple such as name calling, labeling and
exaggeration/minimization, other classes such as
straw man require both world and context knowl-
edge to solve. The propaganda classes and the
task is further described in Da San Martino et al.
(2019).
3 STALin Procedure
STALin is our proposed procedure to gener-
ate Synthetic propaganda embeddings to Train
A Linear projection for contextual embeddings.1
The neural network model we use is designed to
be minimal and simple. The architecture is dis-
played as a schema in Figure 1. The general idea is
that we use pre-trained contextual embeddings as
feature representation of each token, then sample
synthetic embeddnings from the representations.
Then a neural classifier is trained for token level
fine-grained propaganda prediction in two steps,
first we use a MLP layer followed by a bidirec-
tional LSTM layer.
1Our implementation is available at: https://
github.com/GU-CLASP/nlp4if19-stalin
Since the annotated data is small (350 articles)
and the number of token instances for each of
the 19 classes are not balanced, we propose a
simple method to project contextual embeddings
into a more balanced embedding space with syn-
thetic samples. To create a balanced embedding
space, we use synthetic minority over-sampling
(SMOTE) (Chawla et al., 2002) to generated to-
ken embeddnings for the minority classes in the
dataset. With the balanced training data we train
the classifier described previously to predict la-
bels for tokens representations on the propaganda
identification task. After training using the bal-
anced embedding space, we use the learned repre-
sentation in an additional bidirectional LSTM. The
contextual embeddings represent each token in its
context, in other words, these representations not
just encode the knowledge about each token they
also encodes features about the current context.
Contextual embeddings In this report, we com-
pare the performance of 3 different models of pre-
trained contextual embeddings. We use an imple-
mentation with 1024 dimensions:
• ELMo (Peters et al., 2018a) is a weighted
sum of multiple layers of BLSTM trained on
a large sequence of text corpora as a word
predicting language model.2
• BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) is a bidirectional
transformer encoder trained on large corpora
of documents for two tasks of language mod-
eling (1) token predictions (2) next sentence
prediction.3
• GROVER (Zellers et al., 2019) is a genera-
tive language model a transformer-based en-
coder similar to GPT-2 language model (Rad-
ford et al., 2019), which specifically is trained
to generate news articles conditioned with
metadata about title, authors, source and date
of publication. We use the hidden state of the
model as embeddings for propaganda identi-
fication task.4
The tokenization scheme in ELMo is based on
white-space as token boundaries. We used the
2We use version 2 implementation trained on 1 billion
words at https://tfhub.dev/google/elmo/2
3We use BERT-large cased at https://storage.
googleapis.com/bert_models/2018_10_18/
cased_L-24_H-1024_A-16.zip
4We use the hidden states in GROVER-large trained on
realnews corpus.
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same tokenization for BERT according to the bert-
as-service implementation. However, GROVER is
using subwords vocabularies with byte pair encod-
ing (Sennrich et al., 2016).
SMOTE oversampling As it was discussed ear-
lier, contextual embeddings for each token repre-
sent token-in-context. Having tokens annotated by
their propaganda techniques, we can over-sample
on the contextualized embeddnings of the minor-
ity classes using SMOTE. The SMOTE algorithm,
generates nearest neighbor vectors for all cate-
gories of token-context vectors then it balances
the number of instances on each category by over-
sampling from minority class. The generated syn-
thetic samples are not representative of any spe-
cific token-in-context but they are in proximal in-
terpolations of the known token-in-context embed-
dings.
In our model, for a class k we generate new syn-
thetic samples based on the 20 nearest neighbours
within that class. We use a one vs all strategy dur-
ing the sampling. For each class Ck we generate
N synthetic samples where N = |C|− |Ck|, i.e. we
pairwise generate new synthetic samples for the
class based on the number of samples in the other
propaganda classes. We use off-the-shelf imple-
mentation of the SMOTE algorithm in (Lemaıˆtre
et al., 2017).
MLP Model The MLP model consists of two
dense layers trained with categorical cross-entropy
loss and Adam optimization:
1. Dense layer of size 1536 projecting embed-
dings on to a 1024 space with ReLU activa-
tion and a dropout rate of 0.5
2. Dense layer with softmax activation to pre-
dict one of the 19 possible labels: the 18
classes of propaganda and a non-propaganda
label.
After training the plain model, we use the first
dense layer as a fixed projection function to trans-
form any new contextualized embeddings into the
new embedding space.
BLSTMModel We use the projected of embed-
dings from the first layer of the MLP model as the
input for a one layer of bidirectional LSTM with
1024 units. The BLSTM layer use a dropout rate
of 0.5. We then use a copy of the MLP model
described above to predict which class a token be-
long to. For the BLSTM model we also use cate-
gorical cross-entropy loss and Adam optimization.
3.1 Training
We use contextualized embeddings as inputs to the
model, and do not update the language model pa-
rameters. First, the MLP model is trained with a
batch size of 1024 for 20 epochs. The input to this
model is the synthetically generated token as de-
scribed previously. Secondly, we freeze updates
on the parameters in the first layer of MLP model,
and we use it as inputs to the BLSTM model.
The BLSTM model is trained for 10 epochs with
same batch size. When training the BLSTM for
GROVER, we used a batch of 256 due to the GPU
memory limitations.
3.2 Inference
Despite using softmax activation to fit the model
with one of the 19 classes during training, it is
needed to infer concurrent classes. To select the
most probable classes for each token, we apply
a threshold to the softmax output. We experi-
mented with several different techniques for gen-
erating a threshold but found that using the pro-
portion of non-propaganda tokens to propaganda
tokens in the training data gave the best results.
Thus, all classes whose probabilities for a token is
higher than the proportion of propaganda to non-
propaganda in the training data is selected as a
possible label for the current token.
After assigning possible propaganda labels for
each token, we run two post-processing step on
the predicted labels. First, we fill the gap between
two labeled tokens: for each sub-sequence of three
tokens, if the head and tail tokens have any pro-
paganda labels, the intersection of their labels is
going to be assigned to the middle token. Second,
instead of reporting all token labels, we collapse
continuous propaganda tokens into one label, rep-
resenting one span. The final label for a multi-
token span is determined by the label which has
the highest estimated likelihood of all the labels
assigned the span of tokens.
To summarize, we use one model to both detect
relevant spans of text and to label them with the
classes.
3.3 Ensemble model
For our final predictions on the test set we created
a mapping from models to labels as we noted that
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some models performed better on certain classes
of propaganda than other in our validation data.
Thus, our ensemble model is a mapping between
labels and models.
We selected the model-label mapping based on
the F1-score of the models over our randomly se-
lected sentences in the validation set split5. On
our validation set, BERT did not perform well,
thus it was not used in our final model. In our
final submission, we used GROVER for: Slo-
gans, Doubt, Repetition, Name-calling,Labeling,
Loaded Language, Whataboutism and Obfusca-
tion and ELMo for the remaining classes.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Ablation study
Hypothesis Generating balanced data with
SMOTE and using BLSTM to extract features
of propaganda from language model embeddings
improve the models ability to detect propaganda.
Method We perform an ablation study
on ELMo, BERT and GROVER by includ-
ing/excluding SMOTE and/or the BLSTM model.
The results are obtained from the development set
and are shown in Table 1.
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R - - 0.148 0.141 0.156
+ - 0.076 0.067 0.089
- + 0.153 0.157 0.149
+ + 0.125 0.233 0.085
Table 1: Effect of using SMOTE and BLSTM fine-
tuning on the pre-trained language model using macro-
averaged F1-score.
Results and discussions The results of our ab-
lation study show mixed results for both SMOTE
5We used 1024 (one batch) of randomly selected sen-
tences in the validation set.
and BLSTM. Using SMOTE appear to lower
the recall on all models, while also lowering
the precision in ELMo and GROVER. However,
for BERT the precision is increased when us-
ing SMOTE. This seems to indicate that synthetic
sampling works better for BERT than for ELMo
and GROVER.
One of the key differences between BERT and
ELMo/GROVER is that BERT is trained by us-
ing masking, where words in a sentence are re-
moved and then predicted by the model. SMOTE
may work better for BERT since it generates a syn-
thetic sample by sampling from contextual embed-
dings, i.e. words in context, which can be regarded
as a specific word in a specific context, which is
what the training of BERT capture. Using only the
BLSTM and not SMOTE increase the precision in
ELMo and GROVER while lowering it for BERT.
Most interesting is that even with these fluc-
tuations the best results are obtained by combin-
ing SMOTE and BLSTM. However, this is not the
case for GROVER, where only using BLSTM pro-
vide the best results. This is perhaps not so sur-
prising when we consider what type of data the
models were trained on. Both ELMo and BERT
are trained on varied types of text, while Grover
is specifically trained on news articles and their
metadata. Moreover, GROVER embeddings must
have discriminatory meta-features encoded in the
data such as author, source and date. The ab-
sence of this meta-information in the SMOTE em-
beddings may be the cause of the lowered per-
formance. Including meta-features could poten-
tially enrich the context for the tokens generated.
This implies that if GROVER already has high-
level encoded features to identify some classes of
propaganda, using SMOTE with only local fea-
tures simply introduce noise into the embedding
space and discriminatory features are lost. One ar-
gument in favor of SMOTE in GROVER despite
its poor performance is that GROVER achieves its
highest precision of all models when SMOTE and
BLSTM are combined, and high precision is a use-
ful property for creating ensemble models.
4.2 Fine grained span predictions
Hypothesis The inference method for detecting
continuous propaganda sequence can distinguish
spans of different propaganda categories.
Method We report results per class for the FLC
task on the development data in Table 2. The
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ELMo 0.14 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.30 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00
BERT 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.36 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
GROVER 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test-performance 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.35 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.03
Train - 160 106 123 107 127 125 45 62 24 27 120 78 97 17 25 80 32 115
ELMo - 307 22 - 10 25 29 15 31 13 16 - 6 86 10 21 - 9 35
BERT - 93 22 - 10 23 31 15 21 12 13 - 6 65 10 13 20 25 40
GROVER - 74 22 - 69 26 40 15 20 11 13 - 5 28 10 11 20 18 44
Table 2: (1) F1-score for classes in the FLC task. (2) Mean character length for each class in the training data, and
in the labels predicted by the models on the development set.
F1-score per class is calculated to include partial
matching as described in (Da San Martino et al.,
2019). Of our three models with SMOTE and
BLSTM, ELMo showed the overall best perfor-
mance. However, for individual classes, the best
model varies. We consider span length prediction
as a qualitative analysis for the model, as some of
the classes span whole phrases while some only
span over single tokens.
Discussion Each propaganda span in training
data represents a meaningful continuous sequence
often as linguistic units such as phrases or sen-
tences. Depending on the propaganda method, the
span might be short such as a single adjective as
Loaded Language span or it might be a long sen-
tence as the span of Doubt.
Earlier, we described our post-processing infer-
ence to predict continues spans. Observing the
results from Table 2, not all models are predict-
ing meaningful span length on each class compar-
ing to the average length in training data (i.e. the
mean number of characters for Red Herring is 6
in our models, while in the training data this class
appears to span phrases). We calculate the cor-
relation coefficient (r) between the average pre-
dicted length of propaganda techniques and the
average length in training data. If a model has
not predicted propaganda technique k, it was re-
moved from the correlation calculation. Thus,
this measurement only deals with predicted spans
compared to gold spans and does not penalize the
model if it does not predict spans for some classes.
Model Correlation (r) p
ELMo 0.567 0.027
BERT 0.638 0.007
GROVER 0.766 0.000
Table 3: Pearson correlation (r) and p-value for the pre-
dicted span lengths of the models.
Results The results are shown in Table 3. The
result indicate that GROVER is the best model
for identifying span lengths for all classes, while
ELMo has the worst performance. It is rather sur-
prising as ELMo is the model which performed
best on the development data. This indicates
that while GROVER is good at identifying spans,
ELMo is generally better at labeling them with
their correct class.
5 Summary and future works
In this paper, we presented STALin, a transfer
learning method with linear tuning of contextu-
alized token embeddings in the fine-grained pro-
paganda detection task. We showed that balanc-
ing the data representation with synthetic token
embeddings with SMOTE algorithm improved the
representations of ELMo and BERT token embed-
dings. Our ablation study indicates that represen-
tations obtained by GROVER are fairly good for
detecting propaganda out-of-the-box. GROVER
performs better than BERT and ELMo without
any fine-tuning, and our fine-tuning method on
GROVER improved the precision but resulted in
a lower overall recall (See Table 1). One possi-
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ble reason for the lower performance of the fine-
tuned GROVER is that some meta-data is missing,
which GROVER relies on to update its represen-
tations. This project also raises questions in trans-
fer learning about what features are learned in the
fine-tuning phase, and what techniques for fine-
tuning are appropriate for what tasks and datasets.
This study has the potential to be improved in
several directions:
• Pre-trained models use surface information
as input and learn deeper relations between
words ”from scratch”. A way of introducing
inductive bias into the embeddnings would
be to annotate the words with syntax (Peters
et al., 2018b). As the task of propaganda de-
tection require a deeper understanding of the
text than surface information this is a promis-
ing avenue to explore.
• Compare and combine other methods of
fine-tuning in the procedure. As some of
our results are inconsistent (Table 1) ad-
ditional evaluation using conventional fine-
tuning methods would aid us in understand-
ing what is learned by fine-tuning.
• The fine-grained propaganda classes often
overlap in context and concepts. As such,
collapsing the fine-grained classes into more
coarse-grained classes would yield a smaller
and more balanced feature space from which
samples can be drawn.
• Additional studies and evaluation using
GROVER for high-precision propaganda de-
tection. High precision models can be used
as another source of generating training data
instead of over-sampling balancing.
• Our model design is quite simple and sen-
tences surrounding the current sentence are
not used. This could be improved by expand-
ing the models to include previous sentences
as additional context to the current predic-
tions. Also in the case of GROVER, includ-
ing meta-information such as source and au-
thor would benefit the model.
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Abstract
We present the shared task on Fine-Grained
Propaganda Detection, which was organized
as part of the NLP4IF workshop at EMNLP-
IJCNLP 2019. There were two subtasks. FLC
is a fragment-level task that asks for the iden-
tification of propagandist text fragments in a
news article and also for the prediction of the
specific propaganda technique used in each
such fragment (18-way classification task).
SLC is a sentence-level binary classification
task asking to detect the sentences that con-
tain propaganda. A total of 12 teams submit-
ted systems for the FLC task, 25 teams did
so for the SLC task, and 14 teams eventu-
ally submitted a system description paper. For
both subtasks, most systems managed to beat
the baseline by a sizable margin. The leader-
board and the data from the competition are
available at http://propaganda.qcri.
org/nlp4if-shared-task/.
1 Introduction
Propaganda aims at influencing people’s mindset
with the purpose of advancing a specific agenda.
In the Internet era, thanks to the mechanism
of sharing in social networks, propaganda cam-
paigns have the potential of reaching very large
audiences (Glowacki et al., 2018; Muller, 2018;
Tarda´guila et al., 2018).
Propagandist news articles use specific
techniques to convey their message, such as
whataboutism, red Herring, and name calling,
among many others (cf. Section 3). Whereas
proving intent is not easy, we can analyse the
language of a claim/article and look for the use
of specific propaganda techniques. Going at this
fine-grained level can yield more reliable systems
and it also makes it possible to explain to the user
why an article was judged as propagandist by an
automatic system.
With this in mind, we organised the shared
task on fine-grained propaganda detection at the
NLP4IF@EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019 workshop. The
task is based on a corpus of news articles anno-
tated with an inventory of 18 propagandist tech-
niques at the fragment level. We hope that the
corpus would raise interest outside of the commu-
nity of researchers studying propaganda. For ex-
ample, the techniques related to fallacies and the
ones relying on emotions might provide a novel
setting for researchers interested in Argumentation
and Sentiment Analysis.
2 Related Work
Propaganda has been tackled mostly at the arti-
cle level. Rashkin et al. (2017) created a corpus
of news articles labelled as propaganda, trusted,
hoax, or satire. Barro´n-Ceden˜o et al. (2019) ex-
perimented with a binarized version of that cor-
pus: propaganda vs. the other three categories.
Barro´n-Cedeno et al. (2019) annotated a large bi-
nary corpus of propagandist vs. non-propagandist
articles and proposed a feature-based system for
discriminating between them. In all these cases,
the labels were obtained using distant supervision,
assuming that all articles from a given news out-
let share the label of that outlet, which inevitably
introduces noise (Horne et al., 2018).
A related field is that of computational argu-
mentation which, among others, deals with some
logical fallacies related to propaganda. Habernal
et al. (2018b) presented a corpus of Web forum
discussions with instances of ad hominem fallacy.
Habernal et al. (2017, 2018a) introduced Argo-
tario, a game to educate people to recognize and
create fallacies, a by-product of which is a corpus
with 1.3k arguments annotated with five fallacies
such as ad hominem, red herring and irrelevant
authority, which directly relate to propaganda.
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Unlike (Habernal et al., 2017, 2018a,b), our cor-
pus uses 18 techniques annotated on the same set
of news articles. Moreover, our annotations aim
at identifying the minimal fragments related to a
technique instead of flagging entire arguments.
The most relevant related work is our own,
which is published in parallel to this paper at
EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019 (Da San Martino et al.,
2019) and describes a corpus that is a subset of
the one used for this shared task.
3 Propaganda Techniques
Propaganda uses psychological and rhetorical
techniques to achieve its objective. Such tech-
niques include the use of logical fallacies and ap-
peal to emotions. For the shared task, we use 18
techniques that can be found in news articles and
can be judged intrinsically, without the need to
retrieve supporting information from external re-
sources. We refer the reader to (Da San Martino
et al., 2019) for more details on the propaganda
techniques; below we report the list of techniques:
1. Loaded language. Using words/phrases with
strong emotional implications (positive or nega-
tive) to influence an audience (Weston, 2018, p. 6).
2. Name calling or labeling. Labeling the ob-
ject of the propaganda as something the target au-
dience fears, hates, finds undesirable or otherwise
loves or praises (Miller, 1939).
3. Repetition. Repeating the same message over
and over again, so that the audience will eventually
accept it (Torok, 2015; Miller, 1939).
4. Exaggeration or minimization. Either rep-
resenting something in an excessive manner: mak-
ing things larger, better, worse, or making some-
thing seem less important or smaller than it ac-
tually is (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 303),
e.g., saying that an insult was just a joke.
5. Doubt. Questioning the credibility of some-
one or something.
6. Appeal to fear/prejudice. Seeking to build
support for an idea by instilling anxiety and/or
panic in the population towards an alternative,
possibly based on preconceived judgments.
7. Flag-waving. Playing on strong national feel-
ing (or with respect to a group, e.g., race, gender,
political preference) to justify or promote an ac-
tion or idea (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008).
8. Causal oversimplification. Assuming one
cause when there are multiple causes behind an
issue. We include scapegoating as well: the trans-
fer of the blame to one person or group of people
without investigating the complexities of an issue.
9. Slogans. A brief and striking phrase that may
include labeling and stereotyping. Slogans tend to
act as emotional appeals (Dan, 2015).
10. Appeal to authority. Stating that a claim
is true simply because a valid authority/expert on
the issue supports it, without any other supporting
evidence (Goodwin, 2011). We include the special
case where the reference is not an authority/expert,
although it is referred to as testimonial in the liter-
ature (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012, p. 237).
11. Black-and-white fallacy, dictatorship.
Presenting two alternative options as the only pos-
sibilities, when in fact more possibilities exist
(Torok, 2015). As an extreme case, telling the
audience exactly what actions to take, eliminating
any other possible choice (dictatorship).
12. Thought-terminating cliche´. Words or
phrases that discourage critical thought and mean-
ingful discussion about a given topic. They are
typically short and generic sentences that offer
seemingly simple answers to complex questions
or that distract attention away from other lines of
thought (Hunter, 2015, p. 78).
13. Whataboutism. Discredit an opponent’s
position by charging them with hypocrisy without
directly disproving their argument (Richter, 2017).
14. Reductio ad Hitlerum. Persuading an au-
dience to disapprove an action or idea by suggest-
ing that the idea is popular with groups hated in
contempt by the target audience. It can refer to
any person or concept with a negative connota-
tion (Teninbaum, 2009).
15. Red herring. Introducing irrelevant mate-
rial to the issue being discussed, so that every-
one’s attention is diverted away from the points
made (Weston, 2018, p. 78). Those subjected to a
red herring argument are led away from the issue
that had been the focus of the discussion and urged
to follow an observation or claim that may be as-
sociated with the original claim, but is not highly
relevant to the issue in dispute (Teninbaum, 2009).
163
Figure 1: The beginning of an article with annotations.
16. Bandwagon. Attempting to persuade the
target audience to join in and take the course of
action because “everyone else is taking the same
action” (Hobbs and Mcgee, 2008).
17. Obfuscation, intentional vagueness, con-
fusion. Using deliberately unclear words, to let
the audience have its own interpretation (Supra-
bandari, 2007; Weston, 2018, p. 8). For instance,
when an unclear phrase with multiple possible
meanings is used within the argument and, there-
fore, it does not really support the conclusion.
18. Straw man. When an opponent’s proposi-
tion is substituted with a similar one which is then
refuted in place of the original (Walton, 1996).
4 Tasks
The shared task features two subtasks:
Fragment-Level Classification task (FLC).
Given a news article, detect all spans of the text
in which a propaganda technique is used. In
addition, for each span the propaganda technique
applied must be identified.
Sentence-Level Classification task (SLC). A
sentence is considered propagandist if it contains
at least one propagandist fragment. We then de-
fine a binary classification task in which, given a
sentence, the correct label, either propaganda or
non-propaganda, is to be predicted.
5 Data
The input for both tasks consists of news articles
in free-text format, collected from 36 propagandist
and 12 non-propagandist news outlets1 and then
annotated by professional annotators. More de-
tails about the data collection and the annotation,
as well as statistics about the corpus can be found
in (Da San Martino et al., 2019), where an earlier
version of the corpus is described, which includes
450 news articles. We further annotated 47 addi-
tional articles for the purpose of the shared task
using the same protocol and the same annotators.
The training, the development, and the test par-
titions of the corpus used for the shared task con-
sist of 350, 61, and 86 articles and of 16,965,
2,235, and 3,526 sentences, respectively. Fig-
ure 1 shows an annotated example, which con-
tains several propaganda techniques. For ex-
ample, the fragment babies on line 1 is an in-
stance of both Name Calling and Labeling.
Note that the fragment not looking as though
Trump killed his grandma on line 4 is an instance
of Exaggeration or Minimisation and it
overlaps with the fragment killed his grandma,
which is an instance of Loaded Language.
Table 1 reports the total number of instances per
technique and the percentage with respect to the
total number of annotations, for the training and
for the development sets.
1We obtained the gold labels about whether a given news
outlet was propagandistic from the Media Bias Fact Check
website: http://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
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Technique Train (%) Dev (%)
Appeal to Authority 116 (1.92) 50 (5.92)
Appeal to fear / prejudice 239 (3.96) 103 (12.19)
Bandwagon 13 (0.22) 3 (0.36)
Black and White Fallacy 109 (1.80) 17 (2.01)
Causal Oversimplification 201 (3.33) 22 (2.60)
Doubt 490 (8.11) 39 (4.62)
Exaggeration, Minimisation 479 (7.93) 59 (6.98)
Flag Waving 240 (3.97) 63 (7.46)
Loaded Language 2,115 (35.10) 229 (27.10)
Name Calling, Labeling 1,085 (17.96) 87 (10.30)
Obfuscation, Intentional
Vagueness, Confusion 11 (0.18) 5 (0.59)
Red Herring 33 (0.55) 10 (1.18)
Reductio ad hitlerum 54 (0.89) 9 (1.07)
Repetition 571 (9.45) 101 (11.95)
Slogans 136 (2.25) 26 (3.08)
Straw Men 13 (0.22) 2 (0.24)
Thought-terminating Cliches 79 (1.31) 10 (1.18)
Whataboutism 57 (0.94) 10 (1.18)
Table 1: Statistics about the gold annotations for the
training and the development sets.
6 Setup
The shared task had two phases: In the develop-
ment phase, the participants were provided labeled
training and development datasets; in the testing
phase, testing input was further provided.
Phase 1. The participants tried to achieve the best
performance on the development set. A live
leaderboard kept track of the submissions.
Phase 2. The test set was released and the partici-
pants had few days to make final predictions.
In phase 2, no immediate feedback on the submis-
sions was provided. The winner was determined
based on the performance on the test set.
7 Evaluation
FLC task. FLC is a composition of two sub-
tasks: the identification of the propagandist text
fragments and the identification of the techniques
used (18-way classification task). While F1 mea-
sure is appropriate for a multi-class classification
task, we modified it to account for partial match-
ing between the spans; see (Da San Martino et al.,
2019) for more details. We further computed an F1
value for each propaganda technique (not shown
below for the sake of saving space, but available
on the leaderboard).
SLC task. SLC is a binary classification task
with imbalanced data. Therefore, the official eval-
uation measure for the task is the standard F1 mea-
sure. We further report Precision and Recall.
8 Baselines
The baseline system for the SLC task is a very sim-
ple logistic regression classifier with default pa-
rameters, where we represent the input instances
with a single feature: the length of the sentence.
The performance of this baseline on the SLC task
is shown in Tables 4 and 5.
The baseline for the FLC task generates spans
and selects one of the 18 techniques randomly.
The inefficacy of such a simple random baseline
is illustrated in Tables 6 and 7.
9 Participants and Approaches
A total of 90 teams registered for the shared task,
and 39 of them submitted predictions for a total
of 3,065 submissions. For the FLC task, 21 teams
made a total of 527 submissions, and for the SLC
task, 35 teams made a total of 2,538 submissions.
Below, we give an overview of the approaches
as described in the participants’ papers. Tables 2
and 3 offer a high-level summary.
9.1 Teams Participating in the
Fragment-Level Classification Only
Team newspeak (Yoosuf and Yang, 2019)
achieved the best results on the test set for the FLC
task using 20-way word-level classification based
on BERT (Devlin et al., 2019): a word could be-
long to one of the 18 propaganda techniques, to
none of them, or to an auxiliary (token-derived)
class. The team fed one sentence at a time in
order to reduce the workload. In addition to ex-
perimenting with an out-of-the-box BERT, they
also tried unsupervised fine-tuning both on the 1M
news dataset and on Wikipedia. Their best model
was based on the uncased base model of BERT,
with 12 Transformer layers (Vaswani et al., 2017),
and 110 million parameters. Moreover, oversam-
pling of the least represented classes proved to be
crucial for the final performance. Finally, careful
analysis has shown that the model pays special at-
tention to adjectives and adverbs.
Team Stalin (Ek and Ghanimifard, 2019)
focused on data augmentation to address the
relatively small size of the data for fine-tuning
contextual embedding representations based
on ELMo (Peters et al., 2018), BERT, and
Grover (Zellers et al., 2019). The balancing of
the embedding space was carried out by means of
synthetic minority class over-sampling. Then, the
learned representations were fed into an LSTM.
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Team BERT LSTM Word Emb. Char. Emb. Features Unsup. Tuning
CUNLP   
Stalin  
MIC-CIS   
ltuorp 
ProperGander  
newspeak  
Table 2: Overview of the approaches for the fragment-level classification task.
Team BERT LSTM logreg USE CNN Embeddings Features Context
NSIT  
CUNLP   
JUSTDeep    
Tha3aroon  
LIACC   
MIC-CIS     
CAUnLP  
YMJA 
jinfen   
ProperGander 
Table 3: Overview of the approaches used for the sentence-level classification task.
9.2 Teams Participating in the
Sentence-Level Classification Only
Team CAUnLP (Hou and Chen, 2019) used two
context-aware representations based on BERT. In
the first representation, the target sentence is fol-
lowed by the title of the article. In the sec-
ond representation, the previous sentence is also
added. They performed subsampling in order to
deal with class imbalance, and experimented with
BERTBASE and BERTLARGE
Team LIACC (Ferreira Cruz et al., 2019) used
hand-crafted features and pre-trained ELMo em-
beddings. They also observed a boost in perfor-
mance when balancing the dataset by dropping
some negative examples.
Team JUSTDeep (Al-Omari et al., 2019) used
a combination of models and features, including
word embeddings based on GloVe (Pennington
et al., 2014) concatenated with vectors represent-
ing affection and lexical features. These were
combined in an ensemble of supervised models:
bi-LSTM, XGBoost, and variations of BERT.
Team YMJA (Hua, 2019) also based their ap-
proach on fine-tuned BERT. Inspired by kaggle
competitions on sentiment analysis, they created
an ensemble of models via cross-validation.
Team jinfen (Li et al., 2019) used a logistic re-
gression model fed with a manifold of representa-
tions, including TF.IDF and BERT vectors, as well
as vocabularies and readability measures.
Team Tha3aroon (Fadel and Al-Ayyoub, 2019)
implemented an ensemble of three classifiers: two
based on BERT and one based on a universal sen-
tence encoder (Cer et al., 2018).
Team NSIT (Aggarwal and Sadana, 2019) ex-
plored three of the most popular transfer learning
models: various versions of ELMo, BERT, and
RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019).
Team Mindcoders (Vlad et al., 2019) combined
BERT, Bi-LSTM and Capsule networks (Sabour
et al., 2017) into a single deep neural network and
pre-trained the resulting network on corpora used
for related tasks, e.g., emotion classification.
Finally, team ltuorp (Mapes et al., 2019) used
an attention transformer using BERT trained on
Wikipedia and BookCorpus.
9.3 Teams Participating in Both Tasks
Team MIC-CIS (Gupta et al., 2019) participated
in both tasks. For the sentence-level classifica-
tion, they used a voting ensemble including lo-
gistic regression, convolutional neural networks,
and BERT, in all cases using FastText embeddings
(Bojanowski et al., 2017) and pre-trained BERT
models. Beside these representations, multiple
features of readability, sentiment and emotions
were considered. For the fragment-level task, they
used a multi-task neural sequence tagger, based
on LSTM-CRF (Huang et al., 2015), in conjunc-
tion with linguistic features. Finally, they applied
sentence- and fragment-level models jointly.
166
SLC Task: Test Set (Official Results)
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 ltuorp 0.6323 0.6028 0.6648
2 ProperGander 0.6256 0.5649 0.7009
3 YMJA 0.6249 0.6252 0.6246
4 MIC-CIS 0.6230 0.5735 0.6818
5 CUNLP 0.6183 0.5778 0.6648
6 Tha3aroon 0.6138 0.5309 0.7274
7 JUSTDeep 0.6112 0.5792 0.6468
8 CAUnLP 0.6109 0.5180 0.7444
9 LIPN 0.5962 0.5241 0.6914
10 LIACC 0.5949 0.5090 0.7158
11 aschern 0.5923 0.6050 0.5800
12 MindCoders 0.5868 0.5995 0.5747
13 jinfen 0.5770 0.5059 0.6712
14 guanggong 0.5768 0.5039 0.6744
15 Stano 0.5619 0.6666 0.4856
16 nlpseattle 0.5610 0.6250 0.5090
17 gw2018 0.5440 0.4333 0.7306
18 SDS 0.5171 0.6268 0.4400
19 BananasInPajamas 0.5080 0.5768 0.4538
20 Baseline 0.4347 0.3880 0.4941
21 NSIT 0.4343 0.5000 0.3838
22 Stalin 0.4332 0.6696 0.3202
23 Antiganda 0.3967 0.6459 0.2863
24 Debunkers 0.2307 0.3994 0.1622
25 SBnLP 0.1831 0.2220 0.1558
26 Sberiboba 0.1167 0.5980 0.0646
Table 4: Official test results for the SLC task.
Team CUNLP (Alhindi et al., 2019) considered
two approaches for the sentence-level task. The
first approach was based on fine-tuning BERT. The
second approach complemented the fine-tuned
BERT approach by feeding its decision into a lo-
gistic regressor, together with features from the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC)2 lexi-
con and punctuation-derived features. Similarly to
Gupta et al. (2019), for the fragment-level problem
they used a Bi-LSTM-CRF architecture, combin-
ing both character- and word-level embeddings.
Team ProperGander (Madabushi et al., 2019)
also used BERT, but they paid special attention to
the imbalance of the data, as well as to the differ-
ences between training and testing. They showed
that augmenting the training data by oversampling
yielded improvements when testing on data that
is temporally far from the training (by increasing
recall). In order to deal with the imbalance, they
performed cost-sensitive classification, i.e., the er-
rors on the smaller positive class were more costly.
For the fragment-level classification, inspired by
named entity recognition, they used a model based
on BERT using Continuous Random Field stacked
on top of an LSTM.
2http://liwc.wpengine.com/
SLC Task: Development Set
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 Tha3aroon 0.6883 0.6104 0.7889
2 KS 0.6799 0.5989 0.7861
3 CAUnLP 0.6794 0.5943 0.7929
4 ProperGander 0.6767 0.5774 0.8173
5 JUSTDeep 0.6745 0.6234 0.7347
6 ltuorp 0.6700 0.6351 0.7090
7 CUNLP 0.6649 0.6198 0.7171
8 aschern 0.6646 0.6104 0.7293
9 jinfen 0.6616 0.5800 0.7699
10 YMJA 0.6601 0.6338 0.6887
11 SBnLP 0.6548 0.5674 0.7740
12 guanggong 0.6510 0.5737 0.7523
13 LIPN 0.6484 0.5889 0.7212
14 Stalin 0.6377 0.5957 0.6860
15 Stano 0.6374 0.6561 0.6197
16 BananasInPajamas 0.6276 0.5204 0.7902
17 Kloop 0.6237 0.5846 0.6684
18 nlpseattle 0.6201 0.6332 0.6075
19 gw2018 0.6038 0.5158 0.7280
20 MindCoders 0.5858 0.5264 0.6603
21 NSIT 0.5794 0.6614 0.5155
22 Summer2019 0.5567 0.6724 0.4749
23 Antiganda 0.5490 0.6609 0.4695
24 Cojo 0.5472 0.6692 0.4627
25 Baseline 0.4734 0.4437 0.5074
26 gudetama 0.4734 0.4437 0.5074
27 test 0.4734 0.4437 0.5074
28 Visionators 0.4410 0.5909 0.3518
29 MaLaHITJuniors 0.3075 0.4694 0.2286
Table 5: Results for the SLC task on the development
set at the end of phase 1 (see Section 6).
10 Evaluation Results
The results on the test set for the SLC task are
shown in Table 4, while Table 5 presents the re-
sults on the development set at the end of phase
1 (cf. Section 6).3 The general decrease of the F1
values between the development and the test set
could indicate that systems tend to overfit on the
development set. Indeed, the winning team ltuorp
chose the parameters of their system both on the
development set and on a subset of the training set
in order to improve the robustness of their system.
Tables 6 and 7 report the results on the test and
on the development sets for the FLC task. For
this task, the results tend to be more stable across
the two sets. Indeed, team newspeak managed to
almost keep the same difference in performance
with respect to team Antiganda. Note that team
MIC-CIS managed to reach the third position de-
spite never having submitted a run on the develop-
ment set.
3Upon request from the participants, we reopened the sub-
mission system for the development set for both tasks after
the end of phase 2; therefore, Tables 5 and 7 might not be up
to date with respect to the online leaderboard.
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FLC Task: Test Set (Official Results)
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 newspeak 0.2488 0.2862 0.2200
2 Antiganda 0.2267 0.2882 0.1868
3 MIC-CIS 0.1998 0.2234 0.1808
4 Stalin 0.1453 0.1920 0.1169
5 CUNLP 0.1311 0.3234 0.0822
6 aschern 0.1090 0.0715 0.2294
7 ProperGander 0.0989 0.0651 0.2056
8 Sberiboba 0.0450 0.2974 0.0243
9 BananasInPajamas0.0095 0.0095 0.0095
10 JUSTDeep 0.0011 0.0155 0.0006
11 Baseline 0.0000 0.0116 0.0000
12 MindCoders 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
13 SU 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6: Official test results for the FLC task.
11 Conclusion and Further Work
We have described the NLP4IF@EMNLP-
IJCNLP 2019 shared task on fine-grained
propaganda identification. We received 25 and 12
submissions on the test set for the sentence-level
classification and the fragment-level classification
tasks, respectively. Overall, the sentence-level
task was easier and most submitted systems
managed to outperform the baseline. The
fragment-level task proved to be much more
challenging, with lower absolute scores, but most
teams still managed to outperform the baseline.
We plan to make the schema and the dataset
publicly available to be used beyond NLP4IF. We
hope that the corpus would raise interest outside
of the community of researchers studying propa-
ganda: the techniques related to fallacies and the
ones relying on emotions might provide a novel
setting for researchers interested in Argumentation
and Sentiment Analysis.
As a kind of advertisement, Task 11 at SemEval
20204 is a follow up of this shared task. It features
two complimentary tasks:
Task 1 Given a free-text article, identify the pro-
pagandist text spans.
Task 2 Given a text span already flagged as pro-
pagandist and its context, identify the specific
propaganda technique it contains.
This setting would allow participants to focus
their efforts on binary sequence labeling for Task 1
and on multi-class classification for Task 2.
4http://propaganda.qcri.org/
semeval2020-task11/
FLC Task: Development Set
Rank Team F1 Precision Recall
1 newspeak 0.2422 0.2893 0.2084
2 Antiganda 0.2165 0.2266 0.2072
3 Stalin 0.1687 0.2312 0.1328
4 ProperGander 0.1453 0.1163 0.1934
5 KS 0.1369 0.2912 0.0895
6 CUNLP 0.1222 0.3651 0.0734
7 aschern 0.1010 0.0684 0.1928
8 gudetama 0.0517 0.0313 0.1479
9 AMT 0.0265 0.2046 0.0142
10 esi 0.0222 0.0308 0.0173
11 ltuorp 0.0054 0.0036 0.0107
12 Baseline 0.0015 0.0136 0.0008
13 CAUnLP 0.0015 0.0136 0.0008
14 JUSTDeep 0.0010 0.0403 0.0005
Table 7: Results for FLC tasl on the development set.
The values refer to the end of phase 1 (see section 6)
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